State v. TownsendState v. Townsend
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Lawrence Townsend, appeals the December 18, 2007 trial court judgment adjudicating him a sexual predator. Townsend raises five assignments of error for our review. Upon review of the first and second assignments, wе reverse and remand with instructions to vacate.
{¶ 2} The record before us indicates that Townsend was convicted of rape in a multicount indictment on August 17, 1972. He was sentenced on May 22, 1973, “for an indeterminate period.” The parties stipulаte in their briefs that Townsend was paroled on August 31, 1984. It is unclear from the record before us, but it appears that subsequent to this incarceration, he was returned to prison at least once for a nonsexual offense (not a parоle violation). The record is silent as to the date of his return to prison for the nonsexual offense and is likewise silent as to his date of release. At the time of his H.B. 180 hearing on December 17, 2007, however, Townsend was no longer incarcerated on any charge.
{¶ 3} The only evidence before the trial court on his convictions and sentences indicated that his sentence for the sexual offense was completed in 1984 and that thereafter he was never again cоnvicted of a sexual offense. In his first and second assignments of error, Townsend contends, respectively, that
{¶ 4} In
State v. Champion,
{¶ 5} “As in
Bellman
and
Taylor,
2
we must follow the statutory language carefully.
{¶ 6} Under the authority of Champion, thе trial court was without jurisdiction to require Townsend to register as a sexual predator.
{¶ 7} Subsequent to
Champion,
this court followed that same logic in
State v. Jones,
Cuyahoga App. No. 86251,
{¶ 8}
Champion
was decided in August 2005,
Coston
in November 2005, and
Jones
in March 2006. The dissent states that Townsend “relies upon statutes and case law which were no longer effective at the time the State requested the sexual predator hearing in December 2006 оr at the time he was released from prison in January 2007” and cites
Champion
as one of the cases. The dissent believes that the short-lived April 2005 amendment to
{¶ 9} The dissent further relies on
{¶ 10} Accordingly, consistent with Champion from the Ohio Supreme Court in 2005, Coston from the Southern District of Ohio in 2005, and Jones from this court in 2006, wе hold that in order to be required to register as a sex offender in Ohio, an offender must have served a term of imprisonment for a sexually oriented offense on or after July 1, 1997. Townsend, having completed his sentence for a sexually oriented offense in 1984, is not subject to any registration requirements.
{¶ 11} The first and second assignments of error are sustained, the case is reversed, and the sexual-predator adjudication is vacated. The remaining assignments of error are moot and will not be considered.
Judgment accordingly.
Notes
. Champion was sentenced to an indefinite term оf two to five years as a result of a guilty plea to gross sexual imposition (a sexually oriented offense). The sentence was to be served concurrently with two other sentences. He was released in 1989, only to be returned to prisоn twice for nonsexually oriented offenses. "There appears to be no evidence that he [Champion] was released from prison on a sexually oriented offense after July 1, 1997.”
Champion
at 122,
.
State v. Bellman
(1999),
.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 12} The majority incorrectly relies upon case law construing a version of
{¶ 13} Appellate decisions must be based on the statutes applicable in the common pleas court when it rendered its decision. The version of
{¶ 14} A necessary precondition to the applicability of
{¶ 15} Division (A)(2) also does not apply to appellant. It applies only to juvenile offender registrants, and apрellant is not a juvenile offender. Division (A)(3) applies to offenders convicted or adjudicated in another state, a federal court, military court, Indian tribal court, or a court in another nation. This division also does not apply tо appellant.
*58
{¶ 16} The first precondition of
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} If appellant was properly found to be a sexual predator under
{¶ 19} Under
{¶ 20} While the record does not contain any official record indicating when appellant was released from imprisonment, both the state (in its brief) and appellant (in his disclosures during the sеxual-predator evaluation) indicate that he was paroled in January 2007. The court’s hearing and determination occurred within one year thereafter, in December 2007. Therefore, the hearing was timely.
*59 {¶ 21} I would find there was ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that appellant is a sexual predator. The court’s exhibits included appellant’s institutional records from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, as well as the court psychiatric clinic’s evaluation, of his risk of reoffending. This evidence showed that appellant was 61 years old and had spent 40 of the previous 42 years in prison on the charges discussed above. His institutional rеcord reflected an extensive history of sexual acting-out, including five placements in segregation between 2000 and 2005 for indecent exposure and masturbation in front of female corrections officers. The court psychiatriс clinic determined that persons with appellant’s score of 8 on the static-99 test have a recidivism rate of 39 percent over five years, 45 percent over ten years, and 52 percent over 15 years. Furthermore, apрellant satisfied the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder and exhibitionism. The record provided ample evidence to support the court’s determination that the state had proved by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was likely to engage in the future in a sexually oriented offense.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, I would affirm the common pleas court’s decision.
. The majority correctly but irrelevantly notes that