State v. TownsState v. Towns
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1, the trial court records and briefs of counsel.
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant, Albardis Towns, appeals the decision of the trial cоurt. Having reviewed the arguments of the parties and the pertinent law, we hereby affirm the lower court.
I
{¶ 3} According to the case and the facts, appellant was named in the following three-count indictment: one count of drug trafficking, in violation of
{¶ 4} Appellant was taken into custody on March 9, 2005, and bond was set at $500,000 cаsh/surety/property. Motion for bond reduction was filed on March 11, 2005. On March 14, 2005, appellant‘s motion for reduction of bond was grаnted and ordered as recommended by the bond commissioner and over the objection of the state at $150,000 cash/surety/property with a condition of participation in the home detention program. Appellant was placed on еlectronically monitored house arrest throughout the duration of all court hearings until she surrendered for transporting to the parent institution.
{¶ 5} On October 4, 2005, appellant was granted credit for time served prior to sentencing and while awaiting transport to the appropriate state institution. On November 10, 2005, appellant filed a pro se motion for jail-time credit. On Novembеr 16, 2005, the court granted appellant‘s motion for jail-time credit for sixteen days only. On March 6, 2006, appellant filed a pro se motion for correction of jail-time credit, which the court denied on March 21, 2006.
{¶ 6} Appellant was sentenced to the Ohiо Reformatory for Women for two years and a stated term of one year mandatory on the firearm specificatiоn, to run prior to and consecutively to one year on the base charge, for an aggregate term of two years. Shе was granted jail credit for sixteen days.
{¶ 7} Appellant has appealed for jail credit for her time spent under electronically monitored house arrest throughout the duration of all court hearings until she surrendered for transporting to the parеnt institution. This appeal follows.
II
{¶ 8} First assignment of error: “The trial court erred to [the] prejudice of defendant-appellаnt by denying jail credit pursuant to statue [sic].”
{¶ 9} Second assignment of error: “The trial court isolated defendant-appellant‘s constitutional right under the Ohio Constitution
{¶ 10} Third assignment of error: “The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellаnt in its abuse of discretion by arbitrary and capricious interpretation of statue [sic]
III
{¶ 11} Because of the substantial interrelаtion between appellant‘s first and third assignments of error, we shall address them together.
{¶ 12} A person not under detention/confinement while awaiting trial does not obtain credit for time served. Pretrial electronic monitoring does not count as custody timе for speedy trial purposes under
{¶ 13} We have determined that a defendant‘s pretrial “period of electronic home monitoring clearly does not equate to confinement in [jail]” State v. Shearer (Dec. 17, 1999), Wood App. No. WD-98-078, citing Bailey v. Chance (Sept. 18, 1998), Mahoning App. No. 98 CA 169. Other appellate courts concur. State v. Kyser (Aug. 10, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 98 CA 144; State v. Peters (May 13, 1999), Licking App. Nos. 98-CA-00118, 98-CA-00119. Additionally, it is commonly held that pretrial electronic mоnitoring is a condition of bond. State v. Kyser (Aug. 10, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 98 CA 144; Akron v. Stutz (Nov. 1, 2000), Summit App. No. 19925; State v. Peters (May 13, 1999), Licking App. Nos. 98-CA-00118, 98-CA-00119; State v. Setting (Mar. 20, 1996), Wayne App. No. 95CA0057; State v. Faulkner (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 602, 604.
{¶ 14} Appellant‘s electronic monitoring was not a sentencing condition; it was a pretrial cоndition of bond. As a condition of bond, it does not constitute detention. Without detention, appellant cannot receivе jail credit. Such conclusions logically follow from treatment of pretrial electronic monitoring for the purposеs of credit for time served and speedy trial. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, appellant‘s first and third assignments are overruled.
{¶ 16} Appellant argues in her second assignment of error that the lower court viоlated her constitutional right under
{¶ 17} Under
{¶ 18} Pursuant to
{¶ 19} In support of her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the lower court erred regаrding her pretrial bond. Appellant contends the court‘s decision was arbitrary and violative of her constitutional and statutоry rights.
{¶ 20} However, after conviction, any error concerning the issue of pretrial bail is moot. See State v. Head (Nov. 21, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 59367; State v. Salina (Mar. 31, 1981), Columbiana App. No. 80-C-24; State v. Bonarrigo (May 22, 1980), Cuyahoga App. No. 41300. The proper prоcedure for seeking relief for excessive pretrial bail is through habeas corpus proceedings. State ex rel. Baker v. Troutman (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 270; Jenkins v. Billy (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 84; State v. Bevacqua (1946), 147 Ohio St. 20, 67 N.E.2d 786. We find no reason to deviate from this rule under the facts of this case. Thus, appellant may not raise this issue on direct appeal of her conviction.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court tо carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and PATRICIA ANN BLAC