State v. TopoloskyState v. Topolosky
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Luper Schuster, Tyack, Horton
D E C I S I O N
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Jacob J. Topolosky appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Municipal Court for a violation of
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} A state highway patrol trooper observed Topolosky speeding and driving without a safety belt. When pulled over, the trooper smelled marijuana as Topolosky
{¶ 3} On arrest, Topolosky was taken to the Reynoldsburg police station, where he provided a urine sample. The Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory tested this sample and detected both marijuana metabolites and alcohol. A tested marijuana metabolite level in excess of 200 nanograms per milliliter gave rise to the lead charge of OVI per se. Topolosky also faced other charges under separate case numbers which are not part of this appeal.
{¶ 4} Topolosky moved to suppress the urine sample analysis based on errors in the collection and analytical processes. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at which it heard testimony from the arresting trooper, the Reynoldsburg police officer who collected the urine sample, the crime laboratory analyst who performed the analysis, and the director of the state highway patrol crime laboratory. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the state had met its evidentiary burden of showing substantial compliance with testing procedures and regulations.
{¶ 5} Topolosky then moved to dismiss the OVI charge on the basis that Ohio‘s marijuana OVI per se statute is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process and equal protection guarantees. The court denied the motion. Topolosky then entered a plea of no contest to a single violation of
{¶ 6} All penalties have been stayed as Topolosky pursues the present appeal.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} Topolosky assigns the following errors for our review:
[1.] The trial court erred by finding that testimony that a lab technician followed a lab manual procedure, without any evidence of the lab manual‘s contents, proved for the state that the procedure was followed.
[2.] The trial court erred by permitting the completion of a form to establish that sodium fluoride was actually present in a urine sample, despite the invisibility of the capsule in photographs of the sample vial. [3.] The trial court erred by permitting a lab technician to testify as to test results and as an expert when the state failed to prove that the technician had passed Ohio Department of Health proficiency tests as required by Ohio Administrative Code.
[4.] The trial court erred in finding that the per se marijuana OVI statute (
R.C. 4511.19 ) is not unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Topolosky and generally.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review for a Motion to Suppress
{¶ 8} On appeal, we review the trial court‘s disposition of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Groce, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1094, 2007-Ohio-2874, ¶ 6. As the trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position to resolve factual conflicts and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). When we examine whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard, however, our review is plenary and without deference to the conclusions reached by the trial court. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶ 9} When a defendant disputes the validity of a blood and alcohol test through a motion to suppress by asserting that the state laboratory undertook a flawed or unreliable analysis, the defendant carries the initial burden of articulating the legal and factual bases for the motion with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor on notice of the issues. State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994), syllabus. The burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate substantial compliance with testing regulations. Burnside at ¶ 24, 27. The burden then shifts back to the defendant to overcome the presumption of admissibility and demonstrate prejudice from the asserted non-compliance with procedures in regulations. Id. at ¶ 24. Absolute and undeviating compliance with Department of Health regulations is not required for the test results to be admissible, unless the deviation demonstrably gives rise to prejudice. Id.
B. First Assignment of Error — Introduction of Crime Lab Manual
{¶ 10} Topolosky‘s first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when it did not require introduction of a copy of the crime lab procedures manual as proof that lab personnel followed the requisite analytical procedure for Topolosky‘s urine sample.
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} Forensic scientist Elizabeth Wolford testified that she followed the laboratory manual for the state highway patrol crime lab when analyzing Topolosky‘s urine sample. Topolosky now claims that this testimony was insufficient, and that the state was required to introduce the applicable manual to substantiate the procedures. We find no case law, nor statutory or regulatory support for this assertion. Topolosky also argues on appeal that the technician‘s assertion that she followed the laboratory manual is a conclusory statement of law. To the contrary, we find that it is a simple statement of fact made by a witness which the trial court was free to accept or reject.
{¶ 13} Topolosky cannot merely speculate that Wolford did not comply with the manual, nor impose a presumption that the absence of the manual conclusively establishes, by negative inference, that the procedures were not followed. As a question of law, we conclude that the state was not required to introduce a copy of the procedure manual in conjunction with the actual technician‘s testimony regarding the analytical process. As a question of fact, we find that the testimony supports the trial court‘s conclusion that the state proved substantial compliance with testing procedures. Topolosky‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
C. Second Assignment of Error — Sodium Fluoride
{¶ 14} Topolosky‘s second assignment of error asserts that the trial court should have found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that a chemical additive, sodium fluoride, had been properly placed in the collection vial prior to collection of
{¶ 15} Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Kristi Comstock, the arresting officer, testified that she had prepared and supplied her highway patrol urine sample collection kit, but had not personally observed collection of the sample because this duty was referred to a male officer, Officer Adam Daron of the Reynoldsburg Division of Police. Trooper Comstock testified that she had added the sodium fluoride capsule to the sample container before furnishing it to Officer Daron and checked the corresponding box on the sample submission form.
{¶ 16} Officer Daron testified that he did not specifically recall the presence of a sodium fluoride tablet in the collection vial prior to obtaining the urine sample from Topolosky. Officer Daron testified that he collected the sample and sealed the vial according to required procedures.
{¶ 17} Lab analyst Wolford testified that, while the sodium fluoride capsule is ordinarily visible in the urine sample and does not dissolve completely, she saw no trace of the capsule when given the opportunity to examine photographs of Topolosky‘s urine sample. Wolford did not test for sodium fluoride in the sample.
{¶ 18} While former versions of
{¶ 19} Topolosky argues that the use of sodium fluoride as a preservative in a urine sample is not required by law, and the addition of this chemical represents an adulteration of the urine sample. Topolosky, however, presented no evidence regarding the impact of sodium fluoride on the accuracy of analysis of a urine sample for drugs or alcohol. The presence or absence of this additive, therefore, absent evidence of its adulterating effect, does not conclusively preclude use of the resulting analysis. See State v. Neale, 5th Dist. No. 2011 CA 00090, 2012-Ohio-2530, ¶ 37; State v. Miracle, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-07-169, 2002-Ohio-4480, ¶ 18. Topolosky‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
D. Third Assignment of Error — Wolford‘s Testimony
{¶ 20} Topolosky‘s third assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Wolford to testify regarding her analysis of his urine sample. Topolosky argues that the state failed to establish that Wolford had undergone requisite proficiency tests specified by the Ohio Administrative Code for lab technicians in a testing facility. The director of the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory, Joseph Jones, testified that he had no personal knowledge of Wolford having passed a proficiency examination.
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} Wolford testified that she was subject to a yearly proficiency examination administered by the College of American Pathology. The laboratory as a whole participated in four such proficiency examinations per year. During Wolford‘s employment, the laboratory had never failed a proficiency examination. She was certified by the laboratory director as competent to test biological samples for drugs, “using immunoassay, gas chromatography, and mass spectroscopy.” (Tr. 30.) This testimony sufficiently demonstrated compliance with
E. Fourth Assignment of Error — OVI Per Se Statute
{¶ 23} Topolosky‘s fourth assignment of error asserts that Ohio‘s marijuana OVI per se statute is both unconstitutionally vague and violates constitutional guarantees of
{¶ 24} In determining the constitutionality of a legislative act, we first determine whether the party is challenging the act on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts. Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, ¶ 14. An “as applied” challenge asserts that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger‘s particular conduct. Columbus v. Meyer, 152 Ohio App.3d 46, 2003-Ohio-1270, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.). In contrast, a facial challenge asserts that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the hypothetical conduct of any person, without reference to the defendant‘s specific conduct and circumstances. Id. In a facial challenge, Topolosky must establish “that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Although this assignment of error is captioned as an as-applied challenge, Topolosky does not allege particular facts or any special context in the application of the law to him. As a result, we limit our review to a challenge to the statute‘s constitutionality on it face.
{¶ 25} The first challenge here is the alleged vagueness of
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} The per se OVI provision of
{¶ 28} Nor is the statute overly vague merely because the quantity, method, or timing of marijuana consumption needed to achieve metabolite levels violating the statute will vary from person to person. Topolosky did not present expert testimony at the hearing regarding the relationship between metabolite levels, impairment, time lapse in the presence of metabolites after use, and the degree of variation between individuals in these factors. We have also specifically rejected such arguments in the parallel cases regarding per se alcohol prohibitions: “[w]hile it true that most people will be unaware of the exact point in their alcohol consumption when the test results will reach the statutory standard, that alone does not render [the per se alcohol statute] unconstitutional for vagueness. [The statute] warns anyone contemplating driving an automobile while drinking alcoholic beverages that there is a certain point at which he will have consumed sufficient alcoholic beverages to make illegal his operation of a motor vehicle.” State v. Woerner, 16 Ohio App.3d 59, 60 (10th Dist.1984). See also Tanner at 3. In keeping with this precedent, we hold that
{¶ 30} Topolosky next asserts that Ohio‘s per se marijuana statute violates due process and equal protection guarantees under the United States and Ohio constitutions. In practice, his arguments on appeal focus solely on equal protection. In an equal protection claim, government actions that affect suspect classifications or fundamental interests are subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, ¶ 14. In the absence of a suspect classification or fundamental interest, the state action is subject to a rational basis test. Id. Under the rational basis test, we will uphold the statute if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist., 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 362 (1995).
{¶ 31} There is no assertion here that either consumers of marijuana or drivers of motor vehicles constitute a suspect class, or that operating a motor vehicle or consuming marijuana are fundamental rights. We therefore apply the rational-basis test to evaluate the constitutionality of
{¶ 32} Pursuant to the rational-basis test, the statute survives constitutional scrutiny if it is reasonably related to implementation of a legitimate government interest.
{¶ 33} Conceding that the statute intends to address a permissible government interest (the prohibition of impaired driving) Topolosky argues that there is no proven link between the specific type of marijuana metabolite found in his urine and an actual impairment of driving ability that would create a danger to other drivers and society in general. He argues that the statute impermissibly discriminates against drivers who have consumed marijuana, present with metabolites in their urine, but are not actually impaired.
{¶ 34} The legislature has selected, as the discriminating factor in a determination of presumed impairment under the marijuana OVI per se statute, a level of metabolite defining the point at which the best evidence before the legislature indicated that an individual cannot operate a motor vehicle without posing a substantially increased risk of harm. State v. Ossege, 12th Dist. No. CA2013-11-086, 2014-Ohio-3186, ¶ 33, fn. 4. Again, Topolosky has presented no expert testimony to rebut the legislature‘s articulated and supported conclusion that marijuana use results in impaired driving and metabolites reflect an impairing level of marijuana use by the person testing at or above the statutory threshold. While Topolosky discusses foreign-state cases disagreeing with this proposition to varying degrees, the conclusions of other courts on disputed factual issues do not bear the same persuasive weight as legal discussions and rationales.
{¶ 35} Finally, Topolosky points to decisions from two other states that interpreted similar, if not strictly comparable, statutes. In People v. Feezel, 486 Mich. 184 (2010), the
{¶ 36} Feezel is obviously distinguishable from the case before us in two important ways. First, the Michigan law did not mention and explicitly ban metabolites, as
{¶ 37} State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343 (2014), in contrast, examined a statute that did explicitly mention metabolites, but barred them at any level. “Count two alleged a violation of
{¶ 38} The reasoning expressed by the Montgomery court is not applicable in Ohio, which has chosen, unlike Arizona, to set per se liability at a minimum metabolite
{¶ 39} Because we find that
IV. Disposition
{¶ 40} Based on the foregoing reasons, Topolosky‘s four assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK and HORTON, JJ., concur.