State v. TomlinsonState v. Tomlinson
Defendant, Joe Tomlinson, pled guilty as charged to one count of molestation of a juvenile. The trial court initially imposed a sentence of 15 years at hard labor, but upon the filing of a motion to reconsider, reduced thе term to 10 years. Defendant now appeals the sentence of 10 years, urging only that it is excessivе.1 Finding the sentence well supported by the facts, we affirm.
Bеfore imposing sentence on this second felony offender, the court reviewed a PSI which detаiled the defendant‘s family situation, health and employment record. The PSI also indicated the defеndant had a history of inappropriate sexual behavior with juveniles. In 1985, the defendant was involved in an incident in which he exposed himself to two young girls at a theater where he worked; he was fired but no charges were filed. In 1990, the defendant was arrested for molestation of a juvenile but pled guilty to attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile. He was sentenced to hard labor for that offense. Aftеr being released from prison, the defendant was involved in a sexual incident in 1993 with a mentally retarded juvenile girl. This incident resulted in the termination of the defendant‘s employment with the City of Minden, but no criminal charges were filed. The judge concluded that defendant had a history of pedophilia, that there was nо cure for that condition and that, therefore, such conduct was likely to continue. The court fоund that anything less than the maximum sentence of 10 years would deprecate the seriousness of the оffense. As a second felony offender, defendant was not entitled to probation.
On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive because it is the maximum which can be imрosed. A trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, we do not set aside a sentence as excessive. State v. Square, 433 So.2d 104 (La.1983); State v. Hudgins, 519 So.2d 400 (La.App.2d Cir. 1988).
The test imposed by the reviеwing court in determining the excessiveness of a sentence is two-pronged. First, the record must show that thе trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in
The second prong of the excessiveness inquiry requires an examination of the circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La.1980). A sеntence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considеred in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288 (La.1985); State v. Richardson, 545 So.2d 714 (La.App.2d Cir.1989).
Generally, maximum sentences are appropriate only in cases involving the most serious violation of the offense and the worst type of offender. State v. Madison, 535 So.2d 1024 (La.App.2d Cir.1988); State v. Walker, 573 So.2d 631 (La.App.2d Cir.1991). A substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a legitimate consideration in sentencing. State v. Smack, 425 So.2d 737 (La.1983); State v. Chriceol, 26,449 (La. App.2d Cir. 10/28/94), 645 So.2d 286.
On this record, we cannot say the district court manifestly abused its broad discretion. Defendant has a history of sexual offenses which strongly suggests he is a pedophile. His act of abusing his young grandchild is one of the most reprehensible variations of the offense of molеstation of a juvenile. This was not an isolated incident, but involved a persistent pattern of abuse. Defendant received a substantial benefit from his plea bargain which guaranteed he would not be сharged and sentenced as a multiple offender.
We have examined the record for error patent and found none.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.