101 Wash. App. 945 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2000
Fingerprint evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction if the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the fingerprint could have been impressed only at the time of the crime.
The second question is whether the same evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Todd of possession with intent to deliver. To convict for possession with intent to deliver, the State must present evidence of sales or intent to sell narcotics and of possession.
FACTS
Officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Spokane. No one was home. But a stolen Chevrolet Blazer was parked under a carport.
The Blazer housed a methamphetamine “box lab.” A “box lab” holds materials and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Police also found matchbook covers. Certain types of methamphetamine manufacturing require the phosphorous found in matches.
Mr. Todd’s fingerprints were on the flask, jars, and funnel. The methamphetamine manufacture had not been completed. Officers also found a triple beam scale during their search.
The State charged Mr. Todd with manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, RCW 69.50.401(a). The jury convicted Mr. Todd of both charges.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Todd’s Brief
The State asks us to strike Mr. Todd’s statement of the case.
RAP 10.3(a)(4) requires that every brief contain “[a] fair statement of the facts and procedure relevant to the issues presented for review, without argument.” Sanctions may be appropriate for a violation of RAP 10.3.
Mr. Todd’s statement of the case is argumentative. But
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Todd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
Standard of Review. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we must be able to conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is as probative and reliable as direct evidence.
Fingerprint Evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Todd’s fingerprints were • on four different items in the methamphetamine “box lab.” Mr. Todd contends the evi
“Fingerprint evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction where the trier of fact could reasonably infer from the circumstances that it could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed.”
The parties rely on State v. Bridge and State v. Lucca. Both “fingerprint only” cases provide limited help. We distinguish moveable objects generally accessible to the public, like those items in this case, from fixed objects generally not accessible to the public, like those in Lucca.
Manufacture of Methamphetamine. The State had to prove that Mr. Todd manufactured methamphetamine.
The State argues that an innocent explanation is “much more remote” with fingerprints on two items, “extremely unlikely” with fingerprints on three items, and “nearly impossible” with fingerprints on four different items.
We agree. It was reasonable for the trier of fact to infer that, more likely than not, Mr. Todd manufactured methamphetamine based on his fingerprints.
Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Deliver. The State also had to prove that Mr. Todd possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.
Possession. Mr. Todd contends that reversal of his conviction for possession with intent to deliver is required by State v. Spruell
But here:
• Police discovered a methamphetamine “box lab”;27
• The “box lab” indicated that this was an ongoing, large-scale operation for methamphetamine manufacture and distribution;28
• Four items contained methamphetamine residue or compounds used in the production of methamphetamine;29
• Mr. Todd’s fingerprints were on all four items.30
A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Mr. Todd possessed methamphetamine.
Intent to Deliver. Possession with intent to deliver requires that the defendant have something — that is, that he possess drugs to deliver. Intent to deliver must logically follow as a matter of probability from the evidence presented in addition to possession.
Even accepting the State’s argument that the “box lab” supported a large-scale operation, there still must have
We affirm Mr. Todd’s conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine and reverse his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
Kurtz, C.J., and Kato, J., concur.
State v. Bridge, 91 Wn. App. 98, 100-01, 955 P.2d 418 (1998).
State v. Hagler, 74 Wn. App. 232, 235-37, 872 P.2d 85 (1994).
RAP 10.3(a)(4).
RAP 10.7; Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wn. App. 688, 692, 959 P.2d 687 (1998), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1017 (1999).
Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wn. App. 576, 577 n.1, 591 P.2d 461 (1979).
State v. Potts, 93 Wn. App. 82, 86, 969 P.2d 494 (1998); Bridge, 91 Wn. App. at 100.
State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415, 824 P.2d 533 (1992).
Id. at 415-16.
Potts, 93 Wn. App. at 86; Bridge, 91 Wn. App. at 100.
State v. Sewell, 49 Wn.2d 244, 246, 299 P.2d 570 (1956).
State v. Hanna, 123 Wn.2d 704, 710, 871 P.2d 135 (1994) (citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165, 167, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979)).
Bridge, 91 Wn. App. at 100-01.
State v. Lucca, 56 Wn. App. 597, 599, 784 P.2d 572 (1990).
Bridge, 91 Wn. App. at 100-01 (citing Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1990) and Lucca, 56 Wn. App. at 599-600).
Bridge, 91 Wn. App. at 100.
Id. at 101.
State v. Lucca, 56 Wn. App. 597, 599-602, 784 P.2d 572 (1990) (affirming burglary conviction based on the defendant’s fingerprint on a piece of broken glass because there was no evidence that defendant had been to the residence before the burglary); see also Sewell, 49 Wn.2d at 246 (reversing burglary conviction because defendant was authorized to enter the burglarized premises and fingerprint on glass from broken window did not prove unlawful entry).
State v. Bridge, 91 Wn. App. 98, 99, 955 P.2d 418 (1998) (reversing burglary conviction because the State failed to show that defendant’s fingerprint on a store tag on a tool at the burglarized premises was impressed during the burglary, and not before the burglary).
RCW 69.50.401(a).
RCW 69.50.101(p); In re License of Farina, 94 Wn. App. 441, 458, 972 P.2d 531 (1999).
Resp’t’s Br. at 7.
Hanna, 123 Wn.2d at 710; Lucca, 56 Wn. App. at 599.
RCW 69.50.401(a).
State v. Spruell, 57 Wn. App. 383, 385-87, 788 P.2d 21 (1990).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388-89.
Report of Proceedings at 58, 91, 96-115, 180.
Id. at 56, 102, 120, 155, 175-81.
Id. at 100-08, 142-44, 149-56, 171-75.
Id. at 58-59, 198-99.
Potts, 93 Wn. App. at 86.
State v. Davis, 79 Wn. App. 591, 594, 904 P.2d 306 (1995).
State v. Lopez, 79 Wn. App. 755, 768, 904 P.2d 1179 (1995) (citing cases); Hagler, 74 Wn. App. at 236; State v. Simpson, 22 Wn. App. 572, 590 P.2d 1276 (1979) (considering quantity of drugs and nature of packaging to support inference of possession with intent to deliver); State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418-19, 542 P.2d 122 (1975) (emphasizing the “compound” of the facts enabled the jury to infer intent to deliver).