94 Wash. App. 286 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1999
— The Snohomish County juvenile court denied T.K’s motion to expunge his juvenile record of a 1993 sex offense conviction, reasoning that a 1997 amendment to RCW 13.50.050(11) removed its authority to vacate and seal juvenile sex offense and Class A felony records. T.K. appeals, alleging that (1) the juvenile court should have applied former RCW 13.50.050(11); (2) application of the 1997 amendment violates the ex post facto clauses of the Washington and United States Constitutions; and (3) the 1997 amendments did not remove the juvenile court’s discretion to order vacation and sealing of juvenile records if warranted in a particular case. Because T.K.’s right to
FACTS
In March 1993, T.K. pleaded guilty in the Juvenile Division of the Snohomish County Superior Court to first degree child molestation. In lieu of the standard 13-week confinement disposition, the prosecutor recommended and the court adopted a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) which required T.K. to undergo treatment and counseling and imposed other probation conditions. The juvenile court entered its disposition order on April 7, 1993. At that time, RCW 13.50.050(11) permitted juvenile offenders to petition the court to vacate disposition orders and permanently seal juvenile court files two years after the juvenile was discharged from state agency supervision. If the juvenile had committed no other offenses, the statute required the juvenile court to grant the motion to vacate and seal.
T.K. successfully completed the requirements of the dis
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the duty of [T.K.] to register under RCW 9A.44.130 shall be, and the same is, vacated/ended under authority of 9A.44.140(4). . . .
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Washington state patrol shall remove [T.K.] from the central registry of sex offenders. . . .
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that any governmental entity which currently has [T.K.] registered as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130 shall remove him from such registration.
T.K. could not have requested vacation or sealing of his conviction records under RCW 13.50.050 at that time because two years had not yet passed from April 13, 1995, the date he was discharged from supervision. But the language in the order may have led T.K. to believe, as he argues, that no further action was necessary to ensure that Washington State Patrol records did not reflect his juvenile conviction.
Effective July 1, 1997, RCW 13.50.050(11) was amended to remove the juvenile court’s mandatory duty
DISCUSSION
When T.K. pleaded guilty to a juvenile sex offense in 1993, former RCW 13.50.050(11) required juvenile courts to grant motions to expunge juvenile records of conviction under the conditions we discussed above. This version of the statute was still in effect on April 13, 1997, the date two years from T.K’s release from state supervision when he was eligible for expungement. But T.K. did not file the necessary motion until October 20, 1997—three months after the Legislature had amended RCW 13.50.050(11) to remove the mandatory expungement directive. T.K. contends that the trial court should have applied former RCW 13.50.050(11) to his motion to expunge because his right to expunge accrued on April 13, 1997, when he satisfied all required conditions for vacation and sealing under that statute. We agree.
The State argues that because T.K. filed his petition to expunge after RCW 13.50.050(11) was amended, his rights under the statute never “vested.” The State cites West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue
More helpful is T.K.’s analogy to our courts’ approach to statute of limitations claims. When the Legislature enacts a new, shortened statute of limitations, Washington courts preserve claims which accrued before the new law was enacted and run the statute of limitations from the new statute’s effective date.
The State argues for the first time on appeal that T.K’s failure to serve the Washington State Patrol with no
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kennedy, C.J., and Ellington, J., concur.
Review granted at 137 Wn.2d 1027 (1999).
See State v. Webster, 69 Wn. App. 376, 378-79, 848 P.2d 1300 (1993) (Interpreting RCW 13.50.050(11) as establishing a mandatory duty to order vacation and sealing if two years had passed since discharge from agency supervision and there were no later convictions.).
RCW 13.50.050(13).
The parties disagree about whether the Legislature intended to prohibit expunging juvenile Class A and sex offenses, or whether the amendment merely removed the court’s mandatory duty to order expungement when the offender satisfied all the stated conditions. Because we hold that the amendment to RCW 13.50.050(11) does not apply to T.K., this dispute is more appropriately reserved for future consideration.
The State objects to T.K.’s filing a pro se supplemental brief because it contains no citations to authority or the record and consists primarily of “hoped-for future events.” We agree with the State that, though T.K’s accomplishments and goals are laudable, his brief is not relevant to the substance of his appeal.
106 Wn.2d 47, 50-51, 720 P.2d 782 (1986).
Schneider Homes, Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wn. App. 774, 777, 942 P.2d 1096 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1021 (1998).
Id. at 777-78.
See Merrigan v. Epstein, 112 Wn.2d 709, 773 P.2d 78 (1989).
Because T.K.’s right to expunge accrued before the effective date of the amendment to ROW 13.50.050(11), we need not reach the question whether applying the 1997 amendments to T.K.’s case would violate the ex post facto clauses of the Washington and United States Constitutions. But, the Washington State Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Ward indicates that it would not. In Ward, the court held that applying the sex offender registration statute to convictions which predated the registration act did not violate ex post facto prohibitions because registration did not constitute punishment. State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 495, 510-11, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). The court has also held that commitment of sexually violent predators under RCW 71.09 does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is civil in nature. In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 18, 857 P.2d 989 (1993). If application of these statutes are not considered “punishment” triggering constitutional protection, T.K.’s claims of “lifelong stigma” resulting from a failure to vacate his juvenile record would likely be considered nonpunitive as well.
73 Wn. App. 334, 340, 869 P.2d 417 (1994).
Port of Grays Harbor, 73 Wn. App. at 340.