State v. T.K.State v. T.K.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Madsen (en banc)
The question presented by these three consolidated cases is whether the 1997 amendments to
State v. T.K
T.K. pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation in March 1993. The prosecutor recommended, and the court imposed, treatment under a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA). At that time,
T.K. completed the requirements of his SSODA in April 1995. In 1996, he petitioned the juvenile court to vacate his duty to register his residential address under the sex offender registration statute,
In 1997, the Legislature amended
The Court of Appeals, Division I, held that the 1997 amendments could not divest T.K. of the right to have his records sealed because he satisfied all of the requirements for expungement under the pre-1997 version of the statute. The court therefore reversed and remanded with directions that T.K.‘s records be expunged.
State v. D.V.
While trick-or-treating on Halloween night in 1992, D.V. forcibly took bags оf candy from other teenagers. D.V. pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree robbery. The court entered its disposition order in November 1993.1 On July 14, 1998, D.V. filed a motion to seal the juvenile court records under his juvenile court cause number pursuant to
The State Patrol notified D.V.‘s attorney that it declined to comply with the order as it had not been notified of the motion and was not a party to the proceedings. D.V. then re-noted his motion and sеnt notice of the hearing to the State Patrol. At the second hearing the judge again ordered the State Patrol to seal D.V.‘s records because he had become eligible for expungement prior to the 1997 amendments. The State Patrol appealed directly to this Court.
State v. C.C.
C.C. pleaded guilty to the charge of rape of a child in the first degree in 1991. In September 1998, C.C. filed a motion to seal his juvenile records. The trial court granted the motion and entered an order sealing the juvenile records. The State Patrol appealed directly to this Court.
These three cases have been consolidated for review by this Court.
Analysis
The court shall grant the motion to seal records made pursuant to subsection (10) of this section if it finds that:
(a) Two years have elapsed from the later of: (i) Final discharge of the person from the supervision of any agency charged with supervising juvenile offenders; or (ii) from the entry of a court order relating to the commission of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(b) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense; and
(c) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person.
In 1997, the Legislature amended
The court shall grant the motion to seal records made pursuant to subsection (10) of this section if it finds that:
(a) For class B offenses other than sex offenses, since the last date of release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime thаt subsequently results in conviction. For class C offenses other than sex offenses, since the last date of release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, if any, or entry of disposition, the person has spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any offense or crime that subsequently results in conviction;
(b) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(c) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person;
(d) The person has not been convicted of a class A or sex offense; and
(e) Full restitution has been paid.
Initially, the State contends the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering sealing of the defendants’ records because “[t]he statute relied on by the Juvenile Court did not exist when it made its ruling.” Br. of Appellant Washington State Patrol, State v. D.V., at 7; see also Br. of Appellant Washington State Patrol, State v. C.C., at 6. Citing State v. Gilkinson, 57 Wash.App. 861, 865, 790 P.2d 1247 (1990), the State argues that the trial court has no inherent power to resuscitate the terms of a previous statute (former
The State next argues that the 1997 amendments apply to all records for which a request to seal is made after July 1, 1997. Since the defendants did not move for vacation and sealing of records until after the effective date of the amendments, the State contends that the requirements of the amended statute must be met. The defendants reply that the 1997 amendmеnts do not apply if the moving party met the statutory requirements for sealing the documents under the prior statute before it was amended. For this discussion, both the State and the defendants agree the 1997 amendments operate prospectively. However, the defendants believe that adopting the State‘s position will nevertheless result in a retroactive application of the amendment.
To decide whether the 1997 amendments apply in these cases, we must look first to the language of the statute. If a
A statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the Legislature indicates that it is to operate retroactively. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264-66, 114 S.Ct. 1522, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); State v. McClendon, 131 Wash.2d 853, 861, 935 P.2d 1334, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1027, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997); In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wash.2d 104, 110, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997); Adcox v. Children‘s Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Wash.2d 15, 30, 864 P.2d 921 (1993); In re Dissolution of Cascade Fixture Co., 8 Wash.2d 263, 272, 111 P.2d 991 (1941). Courts disfavor retroactivity. In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wash.2d at 110, 928 P.2d 1094. A statute operates prospectively when the precipitating еvent for its application occurs after the effective date of the statute. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass‘n, 83 Wash.2d 523, 535, 520 P.2d 162 (1974). “A statute does not operate `retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute‘s enactment ... or upsets expectations based in prior law.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269, 114 S.Ct. 1522 (quoting Republic Nat‘l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100, 113 S.Ct. 554, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992)). To determine the precipitating event giving rise to application of a statute, a court may look to the subject matter regulated by the statute. In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wash.2d at 112, 928 P.2d 1094.
The State argues that application of the 1997 amendments to these defendants would not result in retroactive application of the amendment because the event which triggers the statute is the motion to seal which occurred after the effective date of the amendment. The State offers two rationales for its position. First, it argues that the plain language of the 1997 amendment provides that the precipitating event for its application is the motion to seal. For support the State cites this Court‘s recent decision in State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997). The issue there was whether application of a statute concerning attorney fees and costs of litigation following appeal involved retroactive application of a statute when applied to a defendant who had filed his appеal prior to adoption of the statute but before completion of his appeal. The Court held that since the precipitating event for application of the statute was the termination of the appeal and affirmance of the defendant‘s conviction, the statute did not operate retroactively in the defendant‘s case. Id. at 249-50, 930 P.2d 1213. Blank does not aid the State‘s position. The language in the statute at issue in Blank made it clear that the completion of the appeal was the triggering event for application of the fees and costs. As mentioned above,
Next, the State contends that the reasoning of In re Estate of Burns compels the conclusion that the motion to seal is the precipitating event. Under the approach announced in In re Estate of Burns, the court looks to the subject matter regulated by the statute to determine the precipitating event. The State contends that the subject matter regulated by
As the defendants point out,
Our decision in State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 740 P.2d 848 (1987), is also helpful in resolving this issue. In Hodgson, this Court considered the application of an amendment which extended a criminal statute of limitations. Rather than becoming bogged down in labels such as “prospective” and “retrospective“, “procedural” or “substantive“, the Court recognized that statutes of limitations are matters of legislative graсe. Id. at 667, 740 P.2d 848. Relying on Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590, 48 S.Ct. 528, 72 L.Ed. 1003 (1928) and People ex rel. Reibman v. Warden, 242 A.D. 282, 285, 275 N.Y.S. 59 (1934), the Court observed that “`[u]ntil the statute has run it is a mere regulation of the remedy ... subject to legislative control. Afterwards it is a defense, not of grace, but of right, not contingent, but absolute and vested, ... not to be taken away by legislative enactment.‘” Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d at 668, 740 P.2d 848 (quoting Warden, 242 A.D. at 285, 275 N.Y.S. 59). Although
Considering the subject matter addressed by the provisions in question and the mandatory language of the statute we conclude that completion of the statutory conditions, not the filing of a motion to seal, is the event that triggers application of the statute. Consequently, assuming the 1997 amendments apply prospectively as both parties contend, the amendments do not apply to the motions made in these consolidated cases.
The State alternatively urges that if this application of the amendments to juveniles who met the criteria prior to the amendment is retroactive, then the Court should find that the statute is remedial and that retroactive application will further its remedial purpose. Defendants counter that none of the exceptions to prospectivity apply to the 1997 amendments.
The presumption of prospectivity can be overcome if (1) the Legislature explicitly provides for retroactivity, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 278, 114 S.Ct. 1522; (2) the amendment is “curative,” In re F.D. Food Processing, Inc., 119 Wash.2d at 461-62, 832 P.2d 1303; or (3) the statute is “remedial,” McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 861, 935 P.2d 1334.
A remedial statute is one which relates to practice, procedures, and remedies. McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 861, 935 P.2d 1334. A remedial statute will ordinarily be applied retroactively unless to do so affects a substantive or vested right. Id. Here the State asserts the statute and its amendments are remedial because they are designed to protect the public by maintaining records of serious offenders and by extending the time spent in the community by juveniles convicted of lesser offenses to demonstrate rehabilitation. The State also contends the amendments are procedural, merely regulating record keeping.
Even if the 1997 amendments at issue here are remedial, a statute will not be applied retroactively if it affects a substantive or vested right. McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 861, 935 P.2d 1334; In re F.D. Food Processing, Inc., 119 Wash.2d at 462-63, 832 P.2d 1303. The Court of Appeals in State v. T.K, and the trial court in State v. D.V. and State v. C.C., held that the defendants’ statutory right to have records sealed had accrued prior to the amendment and no later-enacted statute could divest them of the right. The Court of Appeals analogized
The State finds fault with the court‘s discussion of accrued rights and its reliance on Merrigan. It argues that Merrigan involved interpretation of the tort reform act,
We find the Court of Appeals’ analogy to statutes of limitations apt. In Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 740 P.2d 848, the Court concluded that a statute of limitations is a matter of legislative grace and may be changed or repealed in any case where the right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the running of the statutory period. Id. at 667, 740 P.2d 848. Until the statute runs it merely regulates a remedy. After it has run, however, it becomes a defense which is “absolute and vested.” Id. at 668, 740 P.2d 848. As with a statute of limitations, the right to sealing of records under former
Finally, the State urges that a party has no vested right in the continuation of existing statutory law, citing Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Government v. Washington State Boundary Review Bd. for King County, 127 Wash.2d 759, 768-69, 903 P.2d 953 (1995). State‘s Pet. for Review, State v. T.K., at 7. Relying on this notion of “vested rights“, the State contends that no rights vest unless a timely application is filed during the effective period of the ordinance under which a juvenile is seeking relief. Id. The Court of Appeals properly rejected the State‘s invitation to import land use principles into cases like these.
Conclusion
The precipitating event for application of
SMITH, JOHNSON, ALEXANDER, and SANDERS, JJ., concur.
IRELAND, J. (dissenting).
As the majority properly concludes, the 1997 amendment to
The majority is mistaken, however, regarding the event that triggers the application of
In determining a statute‘s triggering event, courts look first to the statute‘s plain language. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 139 Wash.2d 53, 55-60, 983 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (1999); In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wash.2d at 112, 928 P.2d 1094. When a statute is silent as to a precipitating event, courts will then look at other considerations such as the statute‘s prior history, and whether a new provision operates retrospectively under a given set of facts. Humphrey, at 59-62, 983 P.2d at 1121-22, (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1522, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)).
Contrary to the majority opinion, the plain language of
The court shall grant the motion to seal records made pursuant to subsection (10)[1] of this section if it finds that:
(a) Two years have elapsed from the later of: (i) Final discharge of the рerson from the supervision of any agency charged with supervising juvenile offenders; or (ii) from the entry of a court order relating to the commission of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;
(b) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense; and
(c) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person.
Former
The special protection granted to juveniles by
Even if a juvenile offender has no “proceedings” pending against him at a particular point in time after the date the offender becomes eligible to file a motion to seal, the offender‘s motion will be denied if “proceedings” are pending when the motion is actually
The majority also incorrectly concludes that the petitioners had “accrued” and “absolute” rights to have their juvenile records expunged. Majority op. at 70. While the majority correctly observes that there are “many cases ... in which a preamendment version of a statute will continue to govern in cases arising prior to the amendment, particularly where vested rights or contractual obligations are affected,” the petitioners’ rights to relief under former
To “accrue” means to become “vested.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 20 (6th ed.1990). “Vested rights” are “so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to be defeated....” Black‘s at 1564. A “vested right” “does not depend on any event that is uncertain“; it is a right that is “no longer open to controversy.” Black‘s at 1564.
While vested rights “cannot be interfered with by retrospective laws,” Black‘s at 1564, “`[a] mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law’ is insufficient to vest a legal right.” State v. Shultz, 138 Wash.2d 638, 646, 980 P.2d 1265 (1999) (quoting State v. Hennings, 129 Wash.2d 512, 528, 919 P.2d 580 (1996)); In re Marriage of MacDonald, 104 Wash.2d 745, 750, 709 P.2d 1196 (1985) (an expectation in the continuance of existing law is not equivalent to a vested property right); Johnson v. Continental West, Inc., 99 Wash.2d 555, 563, 663 P.2d 482 (1983) (a person has no vested right in the continuation of existing statutory law).
In the criminal context, contingent and vested rights are mutually exclusive. See, e.g., State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 668, 740 P.2d 848 (1987) (referring to a criminal statute of limitations that has run, “`it is a defense, not of grace, but of right, not contingent, but absolute and vested‘” (quoting People ex rel. Reibman v. Warden of County Jail, 242 A.D. 282, 285, 275 N.Y.S. 59, 63 (1934))).
In the civil context also, with the exception of certain contract and property rights, a right that is contingent is not a vested right and vice versa. See Adams v. Ernst, 1 Wash.2d 254, 265, 95 P.2d 799 (1939) (“`[r]ights are vested, in contradistinction to being expectant or contingent‘“; rights are contingent “`when they are only to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen ... until some other event may prevent their vesting‘” (quoting Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 673, 16 S.Ct. 705, 40 L.Ed. 838 (1896))); Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 261, 227 P. 6 (1924) (a remainder shall not be considered contingent in any case where, consistent with the intеntion of the testator, it may be considered vested); Helgeson v. City of Marysville, 75 Wash.App. 174, 182, 881 P.2d 1042 (1994) (employee‘s right to payment under retirement system does not vest until employee meets contractual conditions for payment).3
As the majority recognizes, the Hodgson analysis is helpful here. However, the majority draws the wrong conclusion because it fails to recognize a critical difference between a statute of limitation and former
A similar situation exists here. A person does not have an absolute right to have their juvenile records sealed under
Other cases cited by the majority are factually distinguishable because, unlike here, the particular rights involved were “no longer open to controversy” and were not dependent upon an “uncertain” future event. For example, in F.D. Processing, a bank obtained a perfected security interest in the inventory and accounts receivable of a dairy products processor. 119 Wash.2d at 454, 832 P.2d 1303. Subsequent to the creation of the bank‘s security interest, the Legislature amended
F.D. Processing concluded that milk producers were not entitled to the retroactive apрlication of the amendments to
Thus, this Court should have reversed the Court of Appeals in State v. T.K. and reversed the trial courts in State v. D.V. and State v. C.C.
GUY, C.J., and TALMADGE, J., concur.
Notes
In any case in which an information has been filed pursuant to RCW 13.40.100 or a complaint has been filed with the prosecutor and referred for diversion pursuant to RCW 13.40.070, the person the subject of the information or complaint may file a motion with the court to have the court vacate its order and findings, if any, and, subject to subsection (24) of this section, order the sealing of the official juvenile court file, the social file, and records of the court and of any other agency in the case.
Former RCW 13.50.050(10) (emphasis added).