The STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terry Allen TIPTON aka Terry Allen Inlow, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12440.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Dec. 4, 1978.
587 P.2d 305 | 99 Idaho 670
Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Arthur J. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
BAKES, Justice.
Defendant appellant Terry Allen Tipton appeals from a judgment based on his guilty plea finding that he committed three first degree burglaries and sentencing him to three concurrent prison terms not to exceed fifteen years. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested in the early morning of April 23, 1976, after fleeing on foot from Officer Gunderson of the Kellogg, Idaho, police department, who had responded tо a report that a burglary was in progress at the Shoshone Funeral Home. After receiving his Miranda warnings at the police station, Tipton told the police the names of his two accomplices and implicated himself in two other recent burglaries. On April 24, Tipton made a taped confession to burglaries of the funeral home, Ed‘s Welding, and Bekins Storage Building, all in Kellogg.
At the time of Tipton‘s alleged burglaries and his arrest, he was seventeen years old. Petitions relating to Tipton‘s admitted burglaries were filed in the magistrates division of the district court under the Youth Rehabilitation Act,
On June 10, 1976, the magistrate held a hearing on the state‘s wаiver motions. Two social workers who had previously worked with the defendant testified to Tipton‘s history of drug and alcohol problems, his record of shoplifting and burglary offenses, and the rehabilitation efforts and defendant‘s responses to them, all of which began when defendant was age 10. Tipton also testified at this hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the court granted the state‘s motion for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over Tipton, holding without making specific findings, that the criteria in State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho at 916, 500 P.2d at 217, for use in determining whether a minor charged with a crime should be tried as an аdult, had been met.
On June 11, 1976, Tipton was charged with three felony counts of first degree burglary,
On June 28, 1976, the suppression motion was heard. Tipton and the police officers who had questiоned him testified concern
I
Defendant appellant first assigns as error the magistrate‘s granting of the state‘s motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction as permitted by the Youth Rehabilitation Act,
We do not reach a consideratiоn of the merits of appellant‘s assignments on this issue. This Court held in State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), that review of a magistrate‘s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction must be sought in the district court by way of appeal before charges as an adult have proceeded to trial. See
Although Harwood was decided in December of 1977 and Tipton‘s criminal proceedings occurred in the spring of 1976, there is no reason to limit the application of the Harwood rule in this case. The question of whether to follow the usual rule that retroactive effect be given judicial rulings or whether a particular case should be limited to prospective effect only, using the criteria we outlined in State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 491, 531 P.2d 579, 581 (1975), arises when the rule announced in the more recent case overrules a precedent upon which parties may have justifiably relied. See State v. Whitman, supra; Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). Harwood was not an overruling decision. It merely confirmed that
II
Defendant appellant argues that the district court erred in not suppressing the confessions he made to the police with respect to the burglaries at Ed‘s Welding and Bekins Storage. It is defendant‘s сontentions that the confessions and any evidence acquired by the police as a result of them should be suppressed because police statements led defendant to believe no charges for any acts other than the funeral home burglary would be brought if dеfendant cooperated with police. The heart of defendant‘s argument is that his confessions were not voluntarily made.
The judgment in this case was based not upon the contents of Tipton‘s confessions to the police or upon evidence derived from thosе confessions. Defendant‘s plea of guilty to the three counts of burglary is the basis of the judgment and subsequent sentence. “A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere
“A valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. [Citations omitted] . . . A valid guilty plea is a judicial admission of all facts charged by the indictment or information. [Citations omittеd] A valid plea of guilty is conclusive as to guilt. [Citations omitted] It is a waiver of trial, [citations omitted] and obviates the necessity of the prosecution coming forward with evidence.” Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59-60 (1969).
See Still v. State, 97 Idaho 375, 544 P.2d 1145 (1976); State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975); and Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 451 P.2d 1014 (1969).
Defendant does not allege that his pleas of guilty were not given voluntarily and understandingly, and our insрection of the trial court record does not indicate that such a contention is supportable. The defendant was at all times relevant to his pleading represented by conscientious counsel. The trial court properly and carefully advised the defеndant of the contents of the charges against him, the effect of a plea of guilty as a waiver of his right to put the state to proof of the charges against him, to a jury trial, to cross examination of the state‘s witnesses, and to his right to call witnesses on his own behalf. See State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976). The trial court advised the defendant that a guilty plea would be an admission of the truth of the charges against him. The court also advised the defendant that any promises of leniency made by the police were not binding upon the court and that by pleading to three counts of burglary Tipton was exposing himself to a potential 45-year sentence.
III
Defendant appellant claims that the district court committed еrror in not delaying sentence until it could be determined whether the state of Oregon would accept jurisdiction over him in one of its juvenile rehabilitation programs. Defendant contends that the failure of the district court to adequately investigate alternatives to his incаrceration was an abuse of its discretion and a denial of due process.
Pronouncement of sentence in Idaho lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision in the matter will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discrеtion. State v. Chapa, 98 Idaho 54, 558 P.2d 83 (1976); State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347, 563 P.2d 405 (1977); State v. Mooneyham, 96 Idaho 145, 525 P.2d 340 (1974). Only where there is an abuse of discretion in sentencing will this Court review and reduce the sentence imposed. State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539 P.2d 553 (1975).
Defendant was sentenced by the district court to a term not to exceed fifteen years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Corrections on each оf the three counts, the sentences to run concurrently. Although fifteen years is the maximum sentence that may be imposed for any one conviction of first degree burglary,
The lack of success of a long sequence of earlier efforts at rehabilitation and the trial court‘s observation, supported by Tiptоn‘s own account of the events, that the burglaries for which he was charged were deliberately planned for the purpose of obtaining money to buy drugs and alcohol and were carried out in a deliberate manner over several days, amply provide basis for thе sentence imposed. In the face of a long record of failures in youth correctional programs in Idaho, we cannot say that omitting to shop around in the social service programs of neighboring states in an effort to find one with a formula necessary to rеhabilitate Terry Tipton was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Affirmed.
SHEPARD, C. J., and McFADDEN and DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
What I said in State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), is equally applicable here, and nothing is to be gained by repetition. Tipton‘s offenses against the State and his waiver of hearing all preceded the release of opinions in In re Doe, 98 Idaho 40, 557 P.2d 634 (1976), and People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal.3d 698, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976 (1976).
In re Doe now declares the law in Idaho as to waiver hearings, but it was not the authoritative construction of
Although I agree that In re Doe has become the law, the Court having addressed the matter of interpreting
In Harwood, I questioned the benefit to society and to Harwood himself in being incarcerated in the state penitentiary for 5 years on his first “adult” offense. Here I raise the same question to a sentence 10 years longer than that meted out to Harwood. I have no quarrel with the fact that Tipton‘s juvenile record showed that as a juvenile he had not been amenable to corrective and rehabilitative measures; but I do question the use of a juvenile record as a predicate upon which to assess punishment for a defendant‘s first adult conviction. Nor can I avoid noting the disparity of sentences meted out tо Harwood and to Tipton, both youthful burglars—5 years for Harwood and 15 years for Tipton. Presumably Tipton was a more offensive and offending juvenile. Be that as it may, it would seem that while some time in the penitentiary might benefit Tipton, for his first adult offense he will remain behind bars, at considerable public expense, long after he may have matured and benefitted from the lesson that crime does not pay. The sentence should be reduced to 5 years.