State v. TippettState v. Tippett
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Kelly
Vernon H. Tippett, (hereinafter referred to as defendant) was convicted of driving while his driver’s license was revoked.
Defendant was arrested by a Missouri state trooper while driving on U.S. Highway 61 in Lewis County, Missouri, on January 26, 1985, for exceeding the speed limit. During the process of issuing the speeding ticket, the trooper checked defendant’s driving record. Upon receiving the information that defendant’s driver’s license in Missouri was currently under revocation, the trooper charged defendant with driving while his license was revoked.
Defendant did not receive notice from the Department of Revenue that his driving privileges had been revoked until February 5, 1985.
At trial, defendant moved for a dismissal of the charge of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while his license was revoked. Defendant contends that even though the effective date of the revocation was January 26, 1985, the same day that defendant was arrested, the notice of revocation of defendant’s driving privileges was not received by defendant until 10 days after his arrest, on February 5, 1985. We hold that defendant could not be convicted under ’
While there are no Missouri cases directly on point, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.W.2d 543, 545[3] (1976), held that there must be actual or constructive knowledge of suspension or revocation of driver’s license for there to be a conviction for driving while license is suspended or revoked.
North Carolina’s Statute G.S. 20-28(a) is virtually identical to Missouri’s Statute
The state relies on State v. Johnson, 687 S.W.2d 706 (Mo.App.1985). In Johnson, *911the defendant had knowledge that he had already lost his driving privileges because he was convicted of a previous offense which carried an assessment of 12 points, which is by itself sufficient for revocation.
In the case at bar, the defendant’s driving privileges were revoked for an accumulation of points, not an individual offense which constituted a mandatory revocation.
Here, the state was required to provide notice of revocation to the defendant, before the defendant could be convicted of driving while his driver’s license was revoked.
We reverse defendant’s conviction under