79 Wash. 472 | Wash. | 1914
The appellant was charged with the crime of seduction, committed on the 22d day of July, 1912, and appeals from a conviction. The prosecuting witness testified that the first act of sexual intercourse took place on the 15th day of June, the second act three or four days later, the third some days still later, and the fourth on the day alleged in the information. At the close of the state’s case, the state, on motion of appellant, was required to elect upon which one of the acts it relied for a conviction, and elected to stand on the act of July 22, as alleged in the information.
The error urged most strongly by appellant is that, the state having selected the act of July 22, it was error for the court to permit evidence of the previous acts as testified to by the prosecutrix, and that the same should have been withdrawn from the jury. Offenses involving carnal intercourse of the sexes furnish a well-recognized exception to the general rule excluding evidence of other like crimes. Tor a reason peculiar to those crimes, the rule has been most liberally extended, until it may be safely asserted that, where the charge is made of the commission of any of the crimes known as sexual offenses, evidence of prior acts of the same character is admissible, even though such prior act is itself a crime. State v. Wood, 33 Wash. 290, 74 Pac. 380; State v. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599, 74 Pac. 810; State v. Osborne, 39 Wash. 548, 81 Pac. 1096; State v. Sargent, 62 Wash. 692, 114 Pac. 868, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 173; Elliott, Evidence, § 3149; Underhill, Crim. Evidence, § 386; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193, note on page 331, where the subject is exhaustively treated.
The appellant complains of certain rulings of the court in permitting the prosecutrix to explain to the jury the meaning of certain expressions used by the appellant in letters written by him to her. The given name of the prosecutrix was Leona, and in certain of his letters to her appellant used these expressions: “So sorry to hear of poor Jane. Take good care of her;” “Poor Jane, I feel so sorry for her;” “What if Jane don’t get sick,” and other like expressions. The prosecutrix testified over objection that “Jane” was a nickname given to her by appellant, and that, in writing of
Appellant next excepts to six of the instructions given to the jury. We shall not set out these instructions, but content ourselves with saying that we have read them in the light of the appellant’s exceptions and find no error. Other exceptions made by appellant have been reviewed, and without setting them out in detail, for the sake of brevity, we. are of the opinion that they are not well taken.
Finding no prejudicial error in the case, the judgment is affirmed.
Crow, C. J., Mount, Fullerton, and Parker, JJ., concur.