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State v. Thurston
969 A.2d 906
Me.
2009
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*1 ¶ 20, termination; that admit- ment action.” Id. grounds for Watt case, thus, Hughes that hit Watt asserts assaulting Hughes; ted to acting investigation, properly frightened because she was and was after its UniFirst self-defense, and that claim Hughes. UniFirst’s fired both Watt contrary merely pretextual. Al- the pri- a To demonstrate argues that the record though UniFirst under improper ma facie case of retaliation act in demonstrates that Watt did not self- MHRA, plaintiff a “must show that she defense, Hughes Watt struck reason statutorily activity; engaged protected disputed a issue of material fact. “Even deci employer employment her made party’s ap- one version of the facts her; adversely affected and that sion pears persuasive more credible and pro a causal link there was between court, summary judgment inappropri- activity employ tected and the adverse if genuine dispute ate factual exists that ¶61, 20, Doyle, ment action.” is material to the outcome.” Arrow Fas- (quotation 824 A.2d at 55-56 marks omit Co., Wrabacon, Inc., Inc. v. tener ted). Further, if the “adverse employment ¶34, 17, 123, 126; see also Chad- proximity’ action happens ‘close wick, 561 F.3d at 48 n. 2009 U.S.App. conduct, protected the burden shifts to the (“[A]t summary Lexis 6426 at *22 n. 11 employer produce probative ‘to some evi explana- we do not decide which nondiscriminatory dence to demonstrate a convincing, tion is most but reason for the ac employment adverse plaintiff] [the whether has suffi- ” tion.’ 824 A.2d at 56. A view cient regarding explana- evidence the facts most favorable to tion.”). Accordingly, Watt’s retaliation supports Watt inference she last claim proceed should trial. complained during of sexual harassment entry is: investigation incident, firing. a few weeks before the vacated; Summary judgment case re- proceedings manded for further on both For purposes ap of this counts. peal, not contest UniFirst does that Watt raising prima met her initial burden of Instead,

facie claim. argues retaliation physical Hughes Watt’s assault of legitimate,

constitutes a non-diseriminato-

ry reason for her termination. Because hitting

Watt admitted to Hughes with bar, metal UniFirst contends that her con 2009 ME 41 duct awas clear violation of UniFirst’s STATE Maine General Workplace Code Conduct and Policies, immediately Violence anwas dischargeable offense. Darrell J. THURSTON. Because UniFirst has Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. legitimate articulated a ac reason Submitted on Briefs: Nov. tion, “the burden remains with [Watt] April Decided: was, persuade the fact-finder that there fact, a pro causal connection between the activity employ-

tected and the adverse *2 Toothaker,

Jeffrey Esq., C. Toothaker & Ellsworth, Chong, for Darrell Thurston. Povich, Attorney, Michael E. District Kellett, Mary Atty., N. Asst. Dist. Prose- VII, Ellsworth, cutorial District for the State of Maine. SAUFLEY, C.J.,

Panel: CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, JJ. CLIFFORD, LEVY, Majority: MEAD, SILVER, GORMAN, JJ. SAUFLEY, C.J., Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.

GORMAN, J. Darrell J. appeals from Superior entered Court (Hancock Marden, J.) County, upon jury (Class finding guilty verdict him of assault 1252(4-A) C), 207(1)(A), §§ 17-A M.R.S. (Class (2008); D), and criminal mischief 806(1)(A) (2008); 17-A M.R.S. and not of crime or (Class 758(1)(A) D), injury agree Because we with Thurston push gener- driveway, proceeded at trial where that the evidence punch her in the back of ground a self-defense instruction ated the head. Harmon testified give, court declined and because *3 harmless, grabbed it phone, threw Thurston’s and he is not we vacate as- error Harmon’s children wit- and left. Two of sault conviction. in the kitchen part nessed of the events I. BACKGROUND driveway and and corroborated testimony. and Suzanne Darrell Thurston story. Thurston told a different [¶4] romantically for Harmon were involved grab He that Harmon went to testified child years about five and have one to- off phone knife after he took her cellular gether. evening On the it on floor top the counter and smashed 27, 2007, liv- Harmon and Thurston were and after he threw the meatballs ing together in Sullivan with their child put He testified that she the knife trash. Thur- and Harmon’s two older children. moment, for a but then reached for work, down and al- ston arrived home after that, again. Thurston testified in an effort though Harmon told Thurston that he Harmon, a hold of her stop “grabbed to he was not welcome because he had been said, you know, enough’s enough.” drinking, she unlocked the door and al- Thurston admitted that he left the house him to enter when he arrived. lowed point, at that but then climbed back in into the kitchen where Thurston went through get phone window to his making Harmon was meatballs. The driveway Harmon into the when followed couple argue, started to and Thurston she would not hand it over. Thurston pot threw the of meatballs in the trash. ground testified that Harmon fell to the point, At Thurston’s driveway, point at which he retrieved versions of the events conflict. According his and left. to Thur- Harmon testified that Thurston ston, he once when touched threw her onto the kitchen floor and grabbed he in the kitchen to shoulders punched kicked and her head. She testi- stop getting her from the knife. her, assaulting fied that after Thurston evidence, After the close of telephone smashed her cellular requested ston on self-de- grabbed a knife from the kitchen. Har- fense, arguing jury might that the view the mon responded testified that she also assault to have occurred when he grabbing a but that she and Thur- Harmon’s shoulders as she reached for the put ston both the knives down when her knife. The court denied re- Thurston’s daughter ordered them to do so. Harmon quest. jury, After the court instructed the testified that Thurston left at point request Thurston renewed his for an addi- door, locked the but Thurston tional instruction. The court denied returned forgot realized it, stating, phone. his Harmon testified that when it, give she refused to let on I [Rjelying Thurston inside the evidence as viewed any testimony him phone appear his because she needed it to call there did not to be damaged provide Thurston kicked and a basis which I feel a entering rely finding front door and screen before could it was Harmon, through According to take the window. defendant protect through she and the children left the front action he did order himself, others. property, protect door and Thurston chased them into the issue of Thurston evidence is sufficient raise the found mischief, but not to 17-A M.R.S. and criminal 108(1) (2008),2 of crime or give the court must self- guilty of See injury. The court sentenced defense instruction. State Department in the months 512. We eighteen and a fíne on the assault have held that a court’s failure to do so Corrections $800 mischief on the criminal and six months “deprives the defendant of a fair trial and concurrently. Thur- served be Id. (quotation amounts to obvious error.” timely appeal. omitted). filed a ston marks

II. DISCUSSION In involving cases evidence [¶ 10] describing potentially several moments of Thurston contends that suffi conduct, trial courts must look to the evidence at cient was complaint He or indictment to determine if it the issue of self-defense. generate complaint specifies particular that because the does which event induced contends charges. led to the assault at specify not what actions the See id. 793 A.2d accept his charge,1 jury the was free to have held that if the complaint We or testimony that he touched Harmon identify particular indictment does not the stop grabbing her from leading charge, once in an effort event the court can knife, and, therefore, a in a self-defense jury not refuse to instruct on self- struction was warranted. if generates defense one of the events a instruction. Id. self-defense argues The State that a self-de- generated simply instruction not fense was In we vacated the defen- description because Thurston offered a of dant’s assault conviction because the trial physical separate conduct and distinct judge rejected request the defendant’s by from that offered the State. The State though self-defense instruction even that in order to be entitled to a contends specific indictment did not indicate the instruction, Thurston needed self-defense charge, event that induced the and the evidence of self-defense with present jury heard two different from stories to the conduct described respect alleged defendant and his victim. See id. State’s witnesses. ¶¶ 3-4, 793 A.2d at 511. Bard testified pushed alleged analyzing ease to de victim’s face biting whether a self-defense instruction because she was his knuckle to the termine ¶ generated, point bleeding. views the evi that it was Id. 4. The Court alleged dence in a most favorable to the victim testified that she in her Glassman, entered, Bard living defendant. State v. room when started to ¶ 12, 863, repeatedly, 772 A.2d 866. When the hit and kick her threatened to charging using part complaint person 1. The A a reasonable states, degree nondeadly force another part: ston with assault in relevant “On person person Sullivan, order to defend the or a or about person person from what the 3rd reason- Maine, County, Hancock DARRELL J. ably believes to be the imminent use of THURSTON, intentionally, knowingly, did unlawful, nondeadly such other recklessly bodily injury cause or offensive may person, person degree and the ause physical conduct to Suzanne F. Harmon.” person reasonably force that the be- such purpose. lieves to be for such states, 108(1) part: in relevant 2. Section 108(1) (2008). § ¶ 104(1) (2008). her, eventually raped governing kill her. Id. 3. The statute states, trespass the crime of criminal guilty Bard of criminal found assault, part: person guilty “A of crim- threatening, and violation of a con- relevant if, release, trespass knowing inal that that guilty but not of two dition of so, that privileged is not licensed or to do and criminal gross counts of sexual assault any dwelling place,” person: [e]nters threatening dangerous weapon. Id. ¶ any place in defiance of a “[r]emains In vacating personally lawful order to leave that was conviction, reasoned that we person by communicated to that the own- jury’s acquit decision to Bard of numerous person.” er or another authorized 17-A it did counts was an indication not (D) (2008). 402(1)(A), M.R.S. Whether alleged believe all of the victim’s testimo- generated, Thus, at ny. we therefore, hinges on whether Thurston assess, could not concluded that the court right had a to be at the home. deciding give a self-de- whether instruction, alleged fense which instance of Both Thurston and Harmon tes- conduct led the to find Bard *5 they in tified had been involved an “on assault. again” relationship off for approxi- mately years, and that they five had been presents This case a similar situ-

[¶ 12] living together daughter them with jury ation. The convicted Thurston of as- other Harmon’s two children for more acquitted sault and criminal mischief but than a month at the time of these events. him the on of that, They agreed although also injury. crime or support These verdicts had told Thurston not to return home that conclusion the court could not evening because he had been drinking, she certainty know which event or allowed him to enter home when he in events—the ones the kitchen and drive- arrived. way as described Harmon or the one involving the knife as described In order to determine that provided the basis for the jury’s ston— right Harmon had the to use a knife to charge. verdict on the assault Be- Thurston, that, therefore, eject Thur- possible cause it that the convicted grabbing ston’s actions in Harmon when Thurston of grabbing assault for Harmon’s she went for the knife could not have been shoulders after she reached for the right a lawful exercise of his to defend given should been have “the himself, the trial court would have had to authority” means and the to decide wheth- determine that Thurston was neither li er to accept reject justification his privileged censed nor to be at the home. self-defense. See id. determining When whether a self-defense generated, dissent asserts that Thur- instruction has been both we

ston was not entitled to a in- and the trial court must consider the rec struction because he committing ord most favorable Thur- Glassman, trespass criminal when he entered and re- ston. 2001 772 against mained in the home light, Harmon’s A.2d at 866. In that this record wishes. The dissent reasons that Thur- supports more than a determination that justified ston’s unlawful acts Harmon’s Thurston with Harmon at lived the time of non-deadly was, therefore, use of force—the grabbing of these events and both li the knife—to prevent privileged or terminate the censed and to enter the home trespass pursuant to 17-A telling M.R.S. remain there. Harmon’s

9H telling eject from her attempt “come home” or even invader him not to gen- not home. No self-defense instruction is once he was there does get him to out person protecting erated when a herself change his status. and cannot and, on present- and her home the record asserts The dissent also here, legal right ed Thurston had no to be smashing of Har- taking Thurston’s home. both crim- cellular constituted mon’s Although Thurston had been that, therefore, mischief and theft and inal staying period with Harmon for some be- threatened use of force was law- events, record, these fore even when ful to 17-A M.R.S. 105 favor, support viewed will not states, “A Section any “right” determination that he had nondeadly using degree a reasonable home him be Harmon’s once she told reasonably is or prevent what permitted not welcome. Harmon had taking to be an unlawful appears spend Thurston to on night past occa- mischief, or criminal person’s property, sions, but that does not diminish her au- person’s property to retake the immediate- thority enter, him to order not to to order M.R.S. ly following taking.” its 17-A arrived, him to leave and to use added). Here, neither (emphasis attempt eject force to him from her presented any evidence that Harmon party home if he against enters home to retrieve her cellular attempting wishes. she reached for the knife. phone when testimony Harmon testified that she Thurston’s own estab- *6 (1) one, grabbed home; had that: Harmon knife because Thurston lishes her (2) alleged grabbed and Harmon Thurston called her in advance to Thurston tell (8) home; that he coming knife because he had thrown the meatballs her to her Additionally, told garbage. into the because Thurston not to come to her (4) home; disregarding threatened of force occurred objec- use (5) tions, home; destroyed took came to after Thurston Thurston her him— phone, acting prevent despite Harmon was not to entered her statement to you according testimony either criminal mischief or a theft. to his told not —“I you I to come here.... don’t like when entry The is: (6) drunk”; you’re Thurston remained vacated; Judgment on charge the assault home, and Harmon asked him to judgment of conviction on criminal mis- (7) leave; Thurston and Harmon then be- chief affirmed. (8) gan arguing; during argument prepar- Thurston threw food Harmon was ALEXANDER, J., with whom ing garbage into the and took and smashed C.J., SAUFLEY, joins, dissenting. (9) phone; her cell Harmon asked Thur- respectfully I 17] dissent. [¶ and, ston to leave when he did not—and is to according pulled Thurston —“she A self-defense 18] [¶ (10) knife”; Thurston then justify resistance to an available shoulders, the touch that is “unlawful” use of force. 17-A M.R.S. self-defense, act of purported to re- 108(1) (2008). law, § Under Maine a vic- anticipated her threat strain tim may of a home invasion and assault knife. lawfully use force to resist the home inva- Code, protect sion and herself from further as- 21] Criminal [¶ 104(1) saults, (2008), may lawfully unequivocally and she use force to states that a 912 (1) here, prevent if to: posses another such as the victim

person, home, taking person’s proper- using non- the unlawful sion of her (2) ty, phone; as the theft of the cell she believes neces such deadly force when mischief, criminal such as the de- sary prevent or terminate a criminal prevent (3) phone; A defendant who has refused cell retake trespass. struction of the may eject be immediately to leave a residence follow- person’s property demand Thus, residence and is not ed force from the Harmon’s use of ing taking. its jus entitled to a self-defense instruction justified response taking force was tify resisting that lawful use of phone of her cell theft destruction —a Benson, 115, Me. force. See State v. 155 mischief. (1959); 266, 268 see also the if take the evidence Even we the 1975 en supporting drafter’s comment Thurston, testi- favorably most his own of section 17-A M.R.S.A. actment that Harmon’s use of mony establishes p. 104 at her against him after he invaded point, On this the case before us [¶ home and robbed her of her cell Bard, distinguishable from State use, use, Her or threatened lawful. the evi- 793 A.2d 509. force did not create entitlement to a dence established that the defendant was regarding self-defense instruction unlawful and entered invited to the victim’s home use of force. ¶¶ 2-4, permission. the home with her I affirm the 26] would contrast, By conviction. (1) telephone admitted that: in the call home, Har- before he came to Harmon’s (2) home; told him not to come her

mon told him to leave arrived she

immediately upon at appearance (3)

home; prior displaying repeatedly

Harmon had told Thurston to *7 her home.

leave On the facts testified to Thur- John L. et al. JORGENSEN ston, Harmon’s lawful use force de- fend herself and her home from his home DEPARTMENT OF generate invasion did not a self-defense TRANSPORTATION. instruction in favor of her attacker because gen- there was no unlawful use of force to Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. erate to section Argued: Jan. 108(1). April Decided: Furthermore, Harmon’s defense premises justification

of her is not the Har- rendering lawful whatever force evidence, including

mon used. The testimony, prior

ston’s establishes that Harmon,

use destroyed

took her cell it. The Code, (2008),

Criminal person may

states that a use-force

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Thurston
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: Apr 23, 2009
Citation: 969 A.2d 906
Docket Number: Docket: Han-08-205
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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