212 N.W. 591 | Minn. | 1927
1. On September 6, 1925, the defendant Thornson was convicted in the district court of Rice county of the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor on his plea of guilty and was fined $150. He had purchased two half pint bottles of alcohol and some near beer at Albert Lea and proceeded north. At Northfield in Rice county he was arrested and his automobile seized. He was on his way with another man to the Twin Cities to attend the state fair. He carried the liquor in his pockets. He did not intend to sell it. It was intended for the use of himself and his companion.
It is not essential to the offense of unlawful transportation that there be a purpose to sell. State v. Andrew Brothers,
"In that sense transportation comprehends any real carrying about or from one place to another. It is not essential that the carrying be for hire, or by one for another; nor that it be incidental to a transfer of the possession or title. If one carries in his own conveyance, for his own purposes, it is transportation no less than when a public carrier at the instance of a consignor carries and delivers to a consignee for a stipulated charge."
There was clearly transportation in violation of the statute. State v. Dattalo,
The statute provides that if the property is "used for or in connection with the transportation of intoxicating liquor in violation of the constitution or law of this State or of the United States," it shall be condemned and sold upon execution. G.S. 1923, § 3230. See State v. One 1921 Cadillac Touring Car,
"Under the plain and explicit terms of the act itself, the fact that the liquors or beverages thus conveyed were for the personal use of the owner or operator of the vehicle would not alter the rule, but the provision is that the mere use of a vehicle wherein and whereby any of the enumerated liquors are conveyed with the knowledge of the owner renders the vehicle subject to seizure and sale, regardless of what may have been the reason in thus using the vehicle, or what may have been the purpose as to the use or disposition of the liquors. To hold otherwise would entirely emasculate these provisions of the act, and in practice would defeat every purpose for which they were enacted."
Our statute should have the same construction. The defendant, as he confessed by his plea, was unlawfully transporting liquor, and his auto was used for or in connection with the transportation. That this was the first or isolated use of the auto for unlawful transportation is not of consequence. State v. Stephens,
2. The provision in the statute for forfeiture is not unconstitutional as denying due process. Van Oster v. Kansas,
3. Nor is it unconstitutional as prescribing cruel or unusual punishment. Walker v. State,
Judgment affirmed.