State v. Thorne

S.E.2d 817 STATE West

Hillary THORNE. C.

No. 16465. Appeals

Supreme Court Virginia. April 1985.

Submitted July

Decided Opinion Aug.

Dissenting

former of University, President Marshall just resigned. had who He referred to Dr. Hayes hog,” as “the head and stated that piggies get “rest the of the little would it.” Bailey, Affairs, Dr. Nell of Dean Student Stolze, George Huntington, appel- A. for bigot, testified that was she called “a a lant. pig.” secretary, racist Her Phyllis Cald- well, testified the defendant “referred Gen., Asst. Lopez, Atty. Andrew Charles- Hayes, barbecued, Dr. who has been and ton, appellee. for they’re the drippings, going fry the BROTHERTON, piggies little who have been left behind.” Justice: Although these and other ex- witnesses Thorne, Hillary the appellant, is a civil calls, plained they text four rights and activist former Marshall Univer- receiving testified numerous calls of a sity appeals He judgment student. similar Mr. nature from Thorne. County, Circuit Court Cabell guilty phone found him of making calls Mr. Thorne indicted aby was Cabell harass, with the in violation of County grand in jury September, 61-8-16(a)(4) (1984). Code unlawfully making repeated phone § calls to persons University at Marshall problems between Mr. Thorne and one-day jury intent to harass. At a trial on University Marshall are not of recent ori- 1, 1983, December the State called five gin. Thorne, In Mr. an activist witnesses who testified to the facts. above Africa, against apartheid in South sued Mr. Thorne in testified his own defense. University Marshall allowing for not him conclusion, At the jury trial’s found Mr. library access to its because his activi- guilty. appeals Thorne He now to this gave ties. An out-of-court settlement Mr. Court, (1) citing principal three errors: damages library. Thorne and access to 61-8-16(a)(4) (1984), dealing W.Va.Code § suit, After the law Mr. Thorne enrolled in harassing phone with is overbroad Marshall student. per- as a His academic unconstitutional; (2) the court poor. formance was He received “C” in jury’s should have directed verdict at one course and flunked remainder evidence; the conclusion of the State discipline classes. His record was (3) that judge the trial should have recused equally poor, reports with several of dis- himself. rupting report classes and a of a scuffle viewing with another student over the of a I. program. light per-

television In of his formance, Thorne, suspended Marshall Mr. Freedom of is one our and when he in tried enroll classes the liberties, most socie cherished a free semester, next he was denied admission. ty strongly it must be defended. Never semester, He again following tried theless, orderly society must be there again Eventually, without success. speech. some limits to free achieve To suspension impetus series order, legislature may properly limit phone gave calls to Marshall that rise to falsely shouting certain such as activities this ease. theater,1 announcing fire a crowded sailing phone military transports

Each call started out date of or the civil and, manner. troops,2 some each number and location of unpleasant. relevance, turned greater One of Mr. Thorne’s others over a telephone.3 subjects Hayes, favorite was Dr. Robert 47, 52, See Schenck v. United cases in n. 6 cited infra. 247, 249, (1919). 63 L.Ed. 470 697, 716, Minnesota,

2. See Near v. U.S. 75 L.Ed. does not the statute Because challenge the does Mr. Thorne speech, we find prohibit communicative regulate this area. power legislature’s not overbroad. proscription is that its 61- Instead, suggests that W.Va.Code § other agreement with prohibits conclusion (1984) 8-16(a)(4) is overbroad issue.5 addressed this that have governmen courts beyond the conduct harassment.4 It preventing tal interest to greater is of concern This case great impor true that because is a University is State Marshall us because power to speech, the State’s free tance of peti right to first amendment agency. The not, exercised be so regulate “must extends, of for redress government tion end, unduly to in attaining permissible agencies. course, petitioning government freedom.” Cantwell fringe protected rights, is right, as all first amendment 296, 304, Connecticut, 60 S.Ct. 310 U.S. v. A protected by the courts. very jealously (1940). 1213, 1218 We 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. right petition have the citizen must infringement not, however, find undue do forcefully petition it government and to in this case. danger of any be repeatedly without crime. Because ing guilty of a pro is not found Prohibiting harassment right, be it would importance harassment is not hibiting speech, because altar of the easy martyr, on the very not Harassment protected speech. amendment, em government those first communication, although may it take the phone, only ployees who have to answer prohibits speech. The statute form of govern to a say phone calls intent made with the telephone calls In so agency prohibited. cannot intent ment be Phone calls made harass. however, doing the doing, we would be prohibited. to communicate A Virginia a disservice. case, of West Harassment, pro thus is not State in this legitimate government busi great deal of accomplished merely because tected “ people If phone. ness is done over has never been using telephone. ‘[I]t repeated make calls for were allowed to abridgment of freedom of deemed harassing government em purpose of of con sole press to make a course speech or phone for up tie ployees, this would merely the conduct illegal because duct government initiated, evidenced, wish to reach their or carried those who part inwas tie It would also legitimate business. language, spoken, either by means of out ” doing from Louisiana, up government staff written, valuable printed.’ v. Cox 480, does not 563, 476, jobs. The first amendment 559, 13 their 85 S.Ct. 379 U.S. interrupting a 487, protect someone quoting Gibo L.Ed.2d 491-92 See, e.g., Adderley Co., government function. 336 U.S. Empire Storage & Ice ney v. 242, 39, 47-48, 834, Florida, 87 684, 691, 385 U.S. S.Ct. 490, 502, L.Ed. v. 69 93 970, 789, 968, Smith, 61-8-16(a)(4) (1984) Misc.2d 392 N.Y.S.2d 89 Code § 4. 393, 920, denied, any person 54 provides: be unlawful cert. 98 “It shall Zeit, (1977); Or.App. means or abuse another with intent to harass v. 22 State telephone repeated 480, 1130, (1975); Crelly, to: ... [M]ake v. P.2d 1131 State 539 ensues, calls, during with which conversation 455, (S.D.1981). Similar stat N.W.2d 457 313 any person the called num- to harass states be struck down in some utes have been ber_” wording unacceptability of the cause of the 394, People, v. 189 Colo. statute. See Bolles upheld statutes states have 5. Several other 80, 398-99, (1975) (“annoy or P.2d 83 541 proscribed phone calls made with the Klick, overbroad); People Ill.2d 66 alarm” City Donley Moun "intent to harass.” See 329, 858, 860-61, 269, 275, 362 N.E.2d 5 Ill.Dec. 603, Brook, (Ala.Crim.App. So.2d 613 tain 429 overbroad); ("intent (1977) annoy" 331-32 722, 725, 1982); Ariz.App. Hagen, State 862, Moore, Wash.App. City Everett Elder, 750, (1976); 382 So.2d P.2d 687, 617, (“alarms (1984) seriously P.2d 618-20 State, (Fla.1980); Constantino v. 691-93 Dronso, overbroad); annoys” State v. 90 Wis.2d 710, 713, 595, 598, 243 Ga. 114-16, (1979) ("in 713-14 279 N.W.2d L.Ed.2d overbroad). wording annoy” Meunier, tent (1979); So.2d State v. statutes, however, distinguish (La.1978); Md.App. each of these Caldwell v. 537-38 61-8-16(a)(4) People § able from W.Va.Code 337 A.2d (1966) (state 155-56 recuse accepting himself. Instead of may prohibit jail offer, on county judge’s demonstrations appellant withdrew his premises). and, judge motion that the recuse himself therefore, any syl. pt. waived error. See Again, it must be stressed that the Thomas, 157 W.Va. requires statute intent to harass. If a citi S.E.2d 445 legitimate communication, zen intends part There no error on the of the may call and call repeatedly without fear of reversal, trial court which mandates a prosecution. Under this statute he judgment of the hereby trial court is af- totally even call one time purpose for the firmed. Nevertheless, of harassment. there is a legitimate inquiry where ends and Affirmed. begins. harassment There comes a one repeatedly public

where cannot call a MILLER, Justice, Chief dissenting: servant and fry threaten to him in oil. My difficulty plurality opinion1 is that it has internal inconsistencies which

II. I am particularly unable resolve when applied to the facts of this case. On the appellant The also contends that the initially one hand it trial announces that the court should have directed a verdict in “legislature may properly his limit certain favor at the end of the State’s case. [speech] activities such disagree. as ... We Phyllis witnesses Cald telephone,” (Plurality others over a op. and at Hensley well Steve each testified to 453), and then concludes in the receiving call. text with one Tina Harness testified “Again, this statement: it must be receiving stressed two calls. Dr. Nell Bailey requires that the statute intent to received harass. numerous calls. The State’s wit If a citizen intends nesses testified to communica- threatened and tion, may he call and repeatedly call insulted. Even Mr. with- Thorne admitted that out prosecution. fear of may he Under this statute have made references to barbecu totally even call one time ing hogs frying the pigs the little in the fat purpose (Plurality of harassment.” op. at Viewing left behind. the evidence in the 455). light most the favorable to we hold

that there was sufficient evidence to allow particular subsection that is the sub- go jury. case to to a ject of this case “It states: shall be unlaw-

ful any person with intent to harass or III. abuse repeated another ... to ... [m]ake during which conversation appellant’s assignment final ensues, with any person intent to harass at judge error is that the trial should have W.Va.Code, the called number.” 61-8- recused himself from the case. We dis 16(a)(4). agree. presiding While it is true that the judge, Ferguson, part-time Alfred E. was a If plurality saying that where a employee University at Marshall at initially intending legitimate citizen calls trial, time of brought prosecution when this was communication there can be no his Judge Ferguson subsection, attention offered to under this I join then would Battle, "plurality" 1. I use the term because with the Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. 151 W.Va. disqualification Neely, Hammond, Maynard Justice the Court is 154 S.E.2d 854 VIII, evenly divided. Under Article Section 4 of 139 W.Va. 79 S.E.2d 295 Black’s W.Va.Code, Virginia (5th 1979) Dictionary West Constitution and Law ed. defines a 58-5-20, language, plurality opinion opinion which contain identical such as follows: “An of an binding authority except appellate a decision is not justices join in the court in which more than particular any concurring opinion (though case majori- decided: “No decision rendered not a binding court) ty plurality the court shall opinion be considered as of the is a as distin- court, authority upon any except particu- guished majority opinion in the from a in which a decided, majority jus- larger justices lar case panel join unless a of the number of the on the tices of the court concur in such decision.” See than not.” directly de- his it is difficult to unlawful conduct that followed with them. speech. position takes termine what regard to facts of certainly with unanimously con Supreme Court case, wrong present my it is view. merely cluded that advocates is not use of but which force violence plurali- question, this the There is no inciting is protected directed violence at concedes, phone ty call started “[e]ach First Amendment.2 Accord under (Plurality op. manner.” at out in a civil Law Pushinsky Bd. 819). begin did each call in a civil Not Examiners, W.Va. making le- the defendant was manner but cited and Hardware Claiborne gitimate inquiries his status as a about 928, 102 summarized in note 458 U.S. at student, eligibility to take certain his 73 L.Ed.2d at an earlier courses, on the Marshall accident significance: case which is not without campus bicycle his University when “In Watts United destroyed. 1399, 22 [89 It was when the defendant realized (1969)], petitioner was convicted any unable to obtain favorable he was willfully making a to take the life threat response abu- conversation became During public rally President. all of sive. The several State’s witnesses Monument, Washington petitioner at the employees administrative at whom were group: stated in a small discussion of

Marshall could recall substance ‘ “They always get us holler at to eight calls made over a three and one-half already education. And I have re- now period. month my 1-A and ceived draft classification as got report my physical I have this plurality emphasizes some of the defendant, Monday coming. going. I am not If by such language utilized as they me carry ever make a rifle the first referring ex-president to the as “the head my sights man is get I want hog” stating that the rest of little ’ 706, L.B.J.” U.S. at 89 S.Ct. at way piggies get by [394 it of barbe- would 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d at Court language 666]. cued or fried. This cannot be summarily agreed reversed. Court sufficiently shocking deemed to be without statement, petitioner that protection. First Amendment In National context, very taken in was ‘a kind of the Advancement Col- Association for stating polit- crude offensive method Co., People ored v. Claiborne Hardware ical opposition the President.’ [394 886, 927-28, 458 102 U.S. S.Ct. 708, 1402, U.S. at 89 S.Ct. at 22 L.Ed.2d 1215, denied, 1245, reh’g 73 459 L.Ed.2d at 667].” 898, 199, 103 74 U.S. S.Ct. (1982), Supreme by the United Court Any attempt plurality suggest States threatening language addressed issue of whether that the defendant’s is constitu- by tionally language unprotected clearly used the leader of a black mer- is without boycott hold it. was sufficient to him liable Co., 927-28, Ohio, Brandenburg In Claiborne Hardware 458 U.S. at Amendment. In v. 395 3433, 1245, 1827, point 102 at at U.S. S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 444 S.Ct. 23 430 [89 L.Ed.2d (1969) ], stated follows: we the conviction of a Ku reversed threatening Klux Klan leader ‘reven- 'fighting clear "It is that words’—those that geance' ‘suppression’ if the of the white race provoke protect- immediate violence—are not continued; principle we ‘the that the relied on Chaplinsky ed the First Amendment. guarantees speech of free constitutional 568, Hampshire, U.S. New 315 572 S.Ct. [62 press permit free a State or 769, 1031, do not to forbid 766, (1942) 86 L.Ed. 1035 Sim- ]. proscribe advocacy the use of or of force panic ilarly, words create an immediate that except advocacy law such is violation where protection. not entitled to constitutional inciting producing imminent directed to [39 Schenck United 247, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)]. likely pro- lawless action is incite 63 L.Ed. 470 This Court has clear, 447, however, advocacy duce U.S. at S.Ct. at [395 made such action.’ mere 1829, (Emphasis origi- at L.Ed.2d 434].’’ the use of force or violence does not remove speech nal; omitted). protection from the the First footnote plurality Wilson, 518, 1103, I am not sure that the 405 U.S. making suggestion that the defen- L.Ed.2d 408 language constitutionally unpro- dant’s plurality cites a number cases Its statement tected. “[b]ecause jurisdictions from other for the prohibit statute does not communicative they upheld harassing telephone call speech, proscription we find that its is not cases, however, statutes. Some of these 454) (Plurality op. overbroad” would in- examined, carefully when involve statutes long dicate that so as communicative limiting language, that had some or the involved, speech protected. the caller is imposed keep courts limitations to the stat pre- If the were faithful to this ute constitutional. Other cited cases dealt cept, then the defendant should not have with subsections that are not involved clearly engaged

been convicted as he was present Donley case.3 In City speech.” “communicative Brook, (Ala.Crim. Mountain 429 So.2d 603 It cannot be doubted that because of the App.1982), on grounds, reversed other Ex importance (1983), of free that statutes Donley, Parte 429 So.2d 618 regulating remand, (1983), order to be constitutional People So.2d narrowly must they Smith, be drawn so that serve 89 Misc.2d 392 N.Y.S.2d state interest involved. 54 L.Ed.2d Grayned City Rockford, (1977), 98 S.Ct. 393 the statutes had an express exception whereby prohibition Group, against Citizens Action Inc. apply calls did not Daley, 174 W.Va. S.E.2d 713 calls for legitimate pur which there was a In Rutledge, pose. Garcelon v. W.Va. 318 S.E.2d we In Hagen, Ariz.App. said: “To potential ‘chilling minimize the (1976), P.2d 750 Crelly, regulations governing effect’ of the exer- (S.D.1981), upheld N.W.2d 455 the courts rights guaranteed cise of under constitu- forbidding statutes the use of obscene lan- speech provisions, tional regula- free those guage telephone. on the While another narrowly clearly tions must be both portion issue, of our statute deals with this drawn.” it present is not involved case be- Furthermore, pun- where a state statute cause there is no claim that obscenities words, only spoken ishes Elder, it can withstand The were used. court v. State (Fla.1980), an attack on if constitutionality only its it is 382 So.2d 687 was con- authoritatively by part construed the state court cerned with that of the Florida Code to be susceptible application prohibited making anonymous not to con- that harass- stitutionally protected speech. Gooding ing appropriately emphasized v. calls. It that "(5) Many against state of differ- statutes involve a number Threaten to commit a crime obscene, dealing ent subsections ing, threaten- any with person property. or anonymous telephone calls such as "(b) any person It shall be unlawful for W.Va.Code, 61-8-16, provides: covered in knowingly permit any telephone under his "(a) any person It shall be unlawful any purpose prohibited control be used for by with intent to harass or abuse another by this section. telephone means of to: "(c) Any offense committed under this sec- comment, "(1) request, sugges- any Make tion be deemed to have occurred at the obscene; proposal tion or which is or made, place telephone at which the call was "(2) call, telephone Make a whether or not place telephone or the at which the called was ensues, disclosing conversation without received. identity any person and with intent to harass "(d) Any person any provision who violates number; at the called or guilty of this section shall be or, and, of a misdemean- "(3) telephone Make or cause the of anoth- thereof, upon conviction shall be repeatedly continuously ring, er with or dollars, fined not more than five hundred any person intent to harass at the called num- imprisoned county jail in the not than more ber; or months, imprisoned.” six or both fined and calls, "(4) repeated telephone during Make ensues, which conversation with intent to ha- number; any person rass at the called a so- (1982). These not cases of the caller anonymity where, repugnant as I find phistry that of fear or discomfort instilled a sense It here, legitimate ensues. communication militating “a was factor

receiver but ensues, to me where conversation seems speech against any legitimate free commu- come protection must First Amendment at 691. nicative function.” So.2d making any of what play analysis into vague Challenges based the void event, harassing any call. In telephone ness were considered Constan doctrine charge in this case is integral to the State, v. 243 Ga. 255 S.E.2d tino “repeated must have made the defendant telephone during which conversation Meunier, (1979), S.Ct. 293 State Thus, W.Va.Code, 61-8-16(a)(4). ensues.” (La.1978),and So.2d 535 Caldwell con- gravaman just physical (1975), Md.App. 337 A.2d 476 conversa- making the call because a duct did not con upheld courts the statutes but tion must ensue.5 might the statutes be over- sider whether leading federal case States United Zeit, 22 cites broad. State Cir.1978), (3d Lampley, F.2d 783 Or.App. 480, 539 P.2d 1130 but this 223(1)(D),6and which involved 47 U.S.C. § by Oregon result reversed Su was by individual to repeated telephone calls Blair, Or. preme Court in State persons. court on the private seized case, (1979). In latter 601 P.2d 766 this language importing harass” “solely to as statutory “likely phrase found that the “precludes pro- specific intent which annoyance” unconstitutionally cause scription of mere communication.” vague.4 went on consider the F.2d It There are several cases where courts argument the section was void harassing call and, finding specific have found stat vagueness unconstitutionally requirement utes not overbroad be existed of the virtue “solely language, upheld cause the courts characterize statutes harass” quoting passage from regulating conduct and not section Screws 101-02, See, United e.g., itself. v. Anon L.Ed. 1502-03 1270, 5.Ct. Conn.Supp. A.2d ymous, 34 (1945): denied, appeal 174 Conn. 382 A.2d petition 1332 writ denial indeed, of of Court, recognized “The has that Director, corpus aff'd, Gormley habeas requirement specific of a intent to do Probation, Dept. Connecticut State 632 prohibited may act avoid those conse- (2d Cir.),

F.2d 449 938 U.S. quences accused other- to the 1023, 591, (1980); 66 485 L.Ed.2d vague wise render a or indefinite statute invalid_ 517, State, Md.App. 39 Von Lusch v. 387 [Wjhere the im- punishment Taravella, (1978); People A.2d 133 306 posed only knowingly for an act done (1984); 515, Mich.App. 350 780 doing N.W.2d purpose that which the 38, prohibits, 295 S.E.2d Camp, N.C.App. State 59 statute cannot be accused dismissed, 271, warning lack or appeal N.C. 299 said suffer from 5. Where no conversation People two other courts falls consequence, conduct becomes the dominant feature. (3). N.E.2d It was this communicating under See note N.W.2d 710 Klick, either (1977); type First Amendment 66 Ill.2d supra. W.Va.Code, 61-8-16(a)(2) invalidating State element language (1979). Under ensues, Dronso, 5 Ill.Dec. is minimal and these their statutes. concerns the conduct resulted 90 Wis.2d sections, As or in provides: less manifest. See State v. (Fla. which conversation any phone— or “Whoever— (1) In (D) 1980). foreign make material person the District of Columbia or in communication repeated at the called number.” portion ^[*] ensues, solely telephone of U.S.C. ^[*] Elder, by ^[*] means § So.2d 687 to harass 223(1)(D) interstate of tele- during knowledge that the act which he does is held that: strictly “Penal statutes must be against a violation of construed in law.” the State and favor of Syllabus defendant.” Point State v. language I believe that the with “intent Ball, 164 W.Va. S.E.2d 844 W.Va.Code, in to harass” as contained 61- Vandall, See also State v. 168 W.Va. 8-16(a)(4), keep this would section from (1982); Barnett, S.E.2d 177 when it kept unconstitutional W.Va. specific mind that initial this is an Cole, 160 W.Va. 238 S.E.2d that must Where be shown. the initial legitimate, purpose of the call then a violation is by Clearly, not shown summarized principles, under these the de- Elder, the court in State v. 382 So.2d at fendant’s criminal conviction cannot stand. 691: We'have earlier there is noted no dispute persons that the who addition, received the

“In be it must shown that when telephone calls that the testified calls be- telephone call was made it was the gan manner, annoy, abuse, impor- a civil even more caller’s intent but threaten tantly sought legitimate that the improper or harass. defendant intent must be motivating information. There is no evidence that factor the caller’s tele- phoning purpose initial person another and the call the calls was other must than legitimate. legitimate Consequently, serve a communicative or threshold proof (Emphasis specific informative function.” of a intent to harass was omitted). original; footnote absent. place any

To other during construction on this The calls were all made normal section prosecution would be to invite business hours and to four were different any type persistent telephone employees University. calls at Marshall Collec- persons objectives who tively, they could recall the substance Certainly, mind. eight phone I cannot conceive that calls made over a three and legislature right intended chill the period. They of our one-half month did not dis- complain neighbor agree citizens to ato about his that the purpose initial the calls barking dog inquire or his loud stereo and make was to as to the defendant’s status repeated student, courses, calls if he is rebuffed. as a eligibility Nor and the should he repeatedly calling damage be fearful of bicycle to his which occurred on campus. landlord about failure to correct It was after the defen- repairman conditions or to dant response merchant realized that no favorable inadequate repairs who has made forthcoming or has would be became un- sold A lethargic pleasant. defective merchandise.

bureaucracy hardly will business ever suggest Several cases that these circum respond to one call.7 Even if the stances are as a matter of insufficient law intended, legislature so it could not do so to In People warrant a conviction. v. Coo principles. under First Amendment Ill.App.3d 516, per, 336 N.E.2d 247 (1975),

Certainly, a construction of the the court a narrow reversed conviction for statute required on First harassment because evidence grounds prove requi Amendment also because it is did not had the but defendant penal in a consistently annoy. statute. site intent to There the We defendant Although ty- higher voices concern over level of communicative freedom ing "up phone caller: who wish to reach for those government their business” and ability government, "The consonant with Constitution, up government "also tie staff solely valuable from off discourse shut 820), is, doing jobs,” (Plurality op. hearing protect their to words, others from in other analysis dependent upon showing misconceives the The traditional that sub- issue. protect privacy is that such stantial statutes are enacted to interests invaded in privacy essentially interests of receiver. Where calls untolerable manner.” Cohen v. 1780, 1786, working government California, during are made hours to 91 S.Ct. believe, is, employees, reh'g there I a diminished ex- pectation privacy consequence as a Finally, Darsey, home several calls to his brother’s United made States (E.D.Pa.1972), F.Supp. 311 the defendant wanting speak his His sis brother. mother-in-law who was divorced called his telephone and re ter-in-law answered the inquire on a number of occasions to about allow the to talk to his fused to defendant of his former wife whereabouts then made some brother. defendant During particularly the his son. welfare of remarks to-'the sister-in-law. abusive calls, he phone the course of some of the the State failed to court concluded that court con- became abusive. annoy defendant the intent to show the had calls cluded as a matter of law that his calls. at the time made the were not made with the intent to harass Likewise, Md. Caldwell the mother-in-law. A.2d the court App. reasons, foregoing respectfully For the I the state reversed conviction because I am state that dissent and authorized to to show with evidence the failed sufficient joins in this dissent. Justice McGRAW me intended the woman he defendant to harass calling give even he refused to though was name, called her was at work while she day, asking occasions her

on two the same

for a date. court noted that even

though the woman received the calls who by them, annoyed that alone is insuffi-

cient evidence to the defendant in- show that effect

tended when he called.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Thorne

Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date Published: Aug 7, 1985

Citation: 333 S.E.2d 817

Docket Number: 16465

Court Abbreviation: W. Va.