19 Iowa 299 | Iowa | 1865
On the trial, the State offered to read in evidence to the jury, an instrument of writing, precisely like the copy set out in the indictment, except that it was signed T. B. Skiff instead of F. B. Skiff. The defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence ; and such ruling is assigned as error.
The technical exactness of the common law, as enforced in criminal prosecutions, whereby many guilty persons escaped the just penalties due their crimes, and which justly became the reproach of that system of jurisprudence, has' been wisely superseded in this State by the Revision of 1860. See Revision, §§ 4650, 4656, 4657, 4659, 4660, 4667 and 4925.
It is now sufficient, if the offense is charged in ordinary language, in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Rev., §§ 4650, 4659. So, if the proof offered to support the charge is such as would not mislead a person of common understanding, it should be held competent, since no greater strictness ought to be required in proving an offense than •as required in charging it.
By the application of the statutory standard of capacity, to the language used in the indictment to charge the offense, ■it will be seen that there is no possible chance of misleading the defendant by the use of the signature T. B. Skiff, instead of F. B. Skiff, to the alleged forged instrument, or in admitting in evidence the paper signed T. B. Skiff, to prove the charge alleged as F. B. Skiff. By reference .to the language used in the indictment immediately pre
Now, since the forging of the signature of T. B. Skiff, would not show an intent to defraud F. B., nor purport to be the act of F. B., or to create a demand against F. B., it becomes, in the light of a “ common understanding,” tolerably reasonable, that the letter T. is a mere clerical, error and was intended for F. We think that both the spirit and language of the Revision justifies the ruling of the District Court; and it is especially provided by the Revision, § 4925, that “the Supreme Court must, on appeal, examine the- record, and without regard to technical errors or defects, which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties, render such judgment on the record as the law demands.” Without, therefore, regarding the technical defect complained of, we affirm the action' of the District Court in this particular.
After the defendant had sued Skiff upon the alleged forged instrument and recovered judgment, Skiff had him arrested on the charge of forgery, and upon preliminary examination had, the defendant was discharged. At the time of his discharge, and after the examination was over, the defendant took from his pocket an old looking paper, of which the following is a copy: “Ravenna, Aug. 6, 1856. Received of E. E. Thompson a promisory note against S. A. Thompson baring date February 32th, 1850, of which i am to have one hundred dollars when eolected or fifty in 4 years from date if not eolected. F. B. Skiff.” That as he took it out, defendant asked Skiff if he had got through with him, and handed this paper to him. Skiff testified that this paper was genuine, and was given at the time of the making of the contract of purchase of the horse.
That instrument concludes: “ Or I am to pay fifty dollars at the end of three years from date. F. B. Skiff.”
This would be a promise, on the part of Skiff (if the instrument were genuine), to pay the fifty dollars to the person to whom it was delivered, or who should be in possession of the same. If defendant forged the instrument, he would be in possession of it, and he could use it (assuming it to be genuine) as the foundation of a legal liability against Skiff to the extent of fifty dollars.' By this process of reasoning, I conclude that if such an instrument as the one set out in the indictment were forged with intent to defraud, the offense of forgery would be complete.
If to this reasoning we add the practical fact, that this identical alleged forged instrument was used by the defendant as the foundation of a legal liability against F. B. Skiff, and that he actually recovered judgment thereon, which remains unreversed and in full force, the question seems to be placed beyond controversy. There was no error in the ruling of the District Court upon this point. ‘
It is only as to the first branch of this instruction that the defendant’s counsel objects. But it is apparent that if the'jury were not allowed to take those and like facts into consideration, in determining the place where the forgery was committed, and were limited to the last fact of instruction, as to the place it bears date, it would be
The facts stated, together with the appearance of the forged paper as to its apparent age or newness, and many other facts, were proper to be considered by the jury in ' determining the question of the place of the forgery. The court did not err in giving the instruction.
VI. The evidence is somewhat conflicting, and is really quite meagre on one or two of the essential ingredients of the crime. But the case seems to have been very fairly put to the jury, and while we might, as an original question, have come to another conclusion, there is not such a state of proof as will justify us in interfering with their verdict.
Since it appears, however, that there was no real controversy as to the fact that Skiff owed the defendant the amount claimed by him, and recovered before the justice (less one year’s interest), and that defendant, who is now quite aged, has always up to this charge sustained an excellent character among his neighbors, and the absence, in this case, of that gross moral turpitude usually characterizing forgery, we have concluded to reduce the period of imprisonment from one year to one day; otherwise the judgment will stand, the defendant to pay costs.
Affirmed.