{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Forrest D. Thompson, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas imposing a prison sentence for his community-control violation.
{¶ 2} In March 2000, appellant was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury on 15 counts of gross sexual imposition, nine counts of rape, one count of kidnapping, and one count of attempted rape. In June 2002, appellant entered a guilty plea to three counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of sexual battery. The court accepted appellant’s plea, found him guilty, and entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts in the indictment. On July 24, 2002, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, at which time it imposed a four-year prison sentence on the sexual-battery count. The court further imposed a five-year period of community control on the gross-sexual-imposition counts, to be served upon completion of the prison term. At the hearing, the trial court cautioned appellant that if he violated the terms of his community control:
*46 [The court] can add additional conditions, or [the court] cаn revoke the community control and impose a sentence on each of these counts.
If the court has to impose a sentence ' on these counts because of a revocation, the sentence will be the maximum sentence of 18-months, and those sentences would run consecutive to each other. The total would be four-and-a-half years.
{¶ 3} The trial court journalized the sentence in a judgment entry filed July 26, 2002. That entry included language that “[s]hould the Defendant violate the terms of community control, as to [the gross sexual imposition сounts], the Court may impose a sentence of 18 months * * * as to each count; said sentences to run consecutive to each other.”
{¶ 4} On February 26, 2010, a probation officer filed a request for revocation of probation. The trial court conducted a revocation hearing on June 10, 2010, during which appellant argued that the trial court’s sentencing entry did not include essential language informing appellant of the specific prison term that would be imposed in the event of a community-control violation as mandated by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and State v. Brooks,
{¶ 5} After the probation officer testified regarding the Pickaway County conviction, the trial court revoked community control upon a finding that appellant had violated the conditions. The cоurt imposed a 12-month prison term on each of the gross-sexual-imposition counts to run consecutive with each other and with the sentence in the Pickaway County case. On July 7, 2010, the trial court filed a revocation entry journalizing its oral pronouncement of sentence.
{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error:
Thе trial court erred by imposing a prison sentence for a violation of community control sanctions when the original sentencing entry failed to indicate the specific prison term Appellant faced for such violation.
{¶ 7} Under his single assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court could not impose a prison term for his community-control violations because it did not notify him at sentencing of the specific prison term that it would impose
{¶ 8} R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) authorizes trial courts to impose community-control sanctions on certain felony offenders. R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) provides that if a sentencing court decides to impose an authorized community-control sanction at a sentencing hearing, that court “shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, [or] if the offender commits a violation of any law, * * * the court may impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term on the offender and shall indicate the specific prison term that may be imposed as a sanction for the violation.”
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.15(B) reiterates the three options available to the sentencing court and further provides that if a prison term is imposed upon an offender for violating a community-control sanction, the prison term specified “shall be within the range of prison terms available for the offense for which the sanction that was violated was imposed and shall not exceеd the prison term specified in the notice provided to the offender at the sentencing hearing pursuant to [R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) ].”
{¶ 10} In Brooks,
{¶ 11} Regarding the content of the notification, the court, noting R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)’s use of the term “specific” to modify “prison term,” held that to strictly comply with the statute, a trial court must, “in straightforward and affirmative language, inform the offender at the sentencing hearing that the trial court will impose a definite term of imprisonment of a fixed number of months or years, such as ‘twelve months’ incarceration,’ if the conditions are violated.” Brooks at ¶ 19. The court emphasized that a trial court could not simply notify
{¶ 12} In the present case, appellant concedes that the trial court suffiсiently informed him at the sentencing hearing that it would impose a definite term of imprisonment of 18 months on each of the three gross-sexual-imposition counts if he were to violate the conditions of community control. Appellant, however, cites a number of cases in which appellate courts have held that a trial court must notify an offender of the specific prison term it will impose for a community-control violation both at the sentencing hearing and in the subsequent journal entry as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term. See, e.g., State v. McWilliams, 9th Dist. No. 22359,
{¶ 13} We dеcline appellant’s invitation to follow the foregoing case law for several reasons. First, decisions of other appellate districts are not controlling authority for this court. Hewitt v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1087,
[W]hile the written notices, standing alone, may have been insufficient to comply with Brooks, supra, the court’s oral notification at the sentencing hearing sufficiently apprised appellant of the specific term. See State v. Kelly, Butler App. No. CA2005-06-149,2006-Ohio-1664 [2006 WL 846002 ] (despite fact that judgment entry utilized terms “up to” when referring to potential term of imprisonment, transcript of sentencing hearing clearly reflects that trial court informed appellant of specific imprisonment to be imposed for violating conditions of community control, and, therefore, notification was in compliance with relevant sentencing statutes and the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Brooks); State v. Moffit, Summit App. No. C.A. 22957,2006-Ohio-3340 [2006 WL 1791298 ] (where defendant was notified, at sentencing hearing, of specific prison term he would receive if he violated terms of community*49 control, court’s statements at sentencing hearing also served to сlarify trial court’s judgment entry containing “up to” language; “[consistent with the Brooks Court, ‘[i]t would be overly rigid in [this] case to find that the offender’s knowledge of the maximum term for the offense [does] not satisfy the notice requirement of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)’ ”). Id., at ¶ 7, quoting Brooks, at ¶ 32.
Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 14} Moreover, even if the trial court were required to includе a Brooks notification in the sentencing entry, the entry in this case sufficiently apprised appellant of the specific prison term for violation of community control. As noted above, the sentencing entry notified appellant that if he violated the terms of community contrоl, “the Court may impose a sentence of 18 months * * * as to each count; said sentences to run consecutive to each other.” Appellant contends that the court’s use of the permissive “may” in the entry is insufficient to satisfy Brooks, as it “merely stated the maximum penalty instead of the specific term.”
{¶ 15} This court rejected a similar argument in State v. Point, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1162,
First, both Brooks and R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) describe the prison term that an offender must be notified of as the term that “may be imposed” for a violation of community control. Neither Brooks nоr R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) require the trial court to inform the offender of the prison term that the trial court “will” impose upon a community control violation. Indeed, it would be pure speculation for a trial court to advise an offender, without knowing the facts and circumstances of the future violаtion, what prison term, if any, it would impose. The Brooks court expressly noted this concern and stated that the specific prison term, if any, the offender is advised of “is not necessarily what the offender will receive if a violation occurs.” Id. at ¶ 21.
Second, requiring a trial court to notify an offender of the specific term it may impose for a community control violation is consistent with the dominant purpose of current sentencing procedures: truth in sentencing. Brooks at ¶ 25. A trial court has the discretion to impose a prison term less than the term it notified the offender оf at sentencing. The Brooks notification require*50 ment sets the maximum prison term a trial court may impose for a community control violation. A trial court could choose a lesser term, or no prison term at all, depending on the facts and circumstances involved. R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). As noted, this is consistent with the use of the рermissive term “may” in R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and in Brooks when describing a trial court’s power to impose a prison term. Thus, it is more accurate to notify offenders of the specific prison term that the offender could receive, which informs the offender of the maximum prison term the trial court could impose.
Id. at ¶ 11-12.
{¶ 16} In so concluding, this court cited State v. Reed, 3d Dist. No. 4-05-22,
{¶ 17} The present case illustrates why trial courts are permitted to use the term “may” when notifying offenders about the specific prison tеrm to be imposed for future community-control violations. When sentencing appellant on the community-control violation, the trial court did not impose the maximum prison sentence of three consecutive 18-month prison terms; rather, the court determined that the facts аnd circumstances of the case warranted something less than the maximum, choosing instead to impose three consecutive 12-month prison terms. Appellant wrongly contends that the trial court was required to speculate as to the exact prison term it would impose for future community-control violations. As we stated in Point, “[t]he syllabus in Brooks, coupled with a reasonable reading of the entire Brooks’ decision, indicates that the court was emphasizing the need to notify the offender at sentencing of a specific prison term, not that the trial court would necessarily impose that specific prison term if the offender violated community control.” Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, even if the trial court were required to include a Brooks notification in its sentencing entry, the language utilized there satisfied R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and Brooks. Point.
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s single assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.