87 P. 433 | Wyo. | 1906
An information was filed in the District Court of Sheridan County bjr the County and Prosecuting Attorney against the defendant, charging, “that A1 Thompson, late of the county aforesaid, on the 12th day of March, A. D. 1906, at the County of Sheridan, in the State of Wyoming, being
The defendant demurred to the information on the ground “that the said information does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense punishable by the laws of the State of Wyoming.”
The District Court sustained the demurrer, and the County Attorney refusing to amend, and electing to stand on the information, the court rendered judgment dismissing the action and discharging the defendant, to which exceptions were duly taken, and the County Attorney has filed a bill of exceptions in this court under the provisions of Sections 5378-9 and 80, Revised Statutes, 1899.
The provisions of our statutes under which this information was filed are contained in Sections 2586-7-8-9, Revised Statutes, 1899, and are as follows:
“Sec. 2586. Eight hours shall constitute a day’s work for all coal miners and laborers now employed, or who may be hereafter employed, in any coal mine in this state, except in cases where it may be necessary to work more than eight hours per calendar day for the protection of property or human life; Provided, That in all such cases the miners and laborers so employed and working to exceed eight hours per calendar day shall be paid upon the basis of eight hours constituting a day’s work.”
*146 “Sec. 2587. In all contracts hereafter made between any owner, lessee or operator of any coal mine, with any such miner or laborer for his services as such, the word day when used shall be construed to be eight hours; Provided. That nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to prohibit or prevent any such owner, lessee or operator from operating his or its coal mine more than eight hours in any twenty-four.”
“Sec. 2588. The eight hours in this chapter provided for, shall be construed to mean eight hours of actual labor and shall not include the time consumed in going to and returning from work.”
“Sec. 2589. Any owner, lessee or operator, his or its agent, employees or servants, violating- any of the provisions of this chapter, shall be fined not less than fifty dollars, nor more than three hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than three months, or both.”
The foregoing quotations contain the .entire statute upon the subject; and if the defendant does not come within the class of persons enumerated in Section 2589, then it is clear that the information charg-es no offense. The first section of the statute enacts that eight hours shall constitute a day’s work for all coal miners and laborers employed in any coal mine; but does not attempt to fix the number of hours that shall constitute a day’s work for any other class of persons employed in or about the'operations of the mine. The second section defines the meaning- of the word day when used in any contract made between the owner, lessee or operator of a coal mine with such miner or laborer for his services as such. It is only in contracts between the operators of coal mines, and a miner or laborer in the mine and for his services as such, that the word day is to be construed to be eight hours. Thus it will be seen that by those sections of the act miners and laborers are treated as a distinct class of employees; and it is nowhere in the act declared, in terms, to be unlawful for them to work more than eight hours in any twenty-four. Tjie object of
Construing- the several sections of this act together, which must be done in order to arrive at a correct construction of the penal section, we are of the opinion that the words “employees or servants” as therein used were not intended to and., do not. include the miners and laborers employed in the mine and mentioned in the first two sections of the act; and for that reason, the facts stated in the information in this case, do not constitute a violation of the act in question and that the District Court did not err in sustaining the demurrer. The Attorney General has frankly stated in his brief that, after a careful examination of the question, he has arrived at the same conclusion.
. Counsel have discussed in their briefs the constitutionality of the statute, but as we hold that the information charges no offense under the statute, that question is not properly before us for consideration. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Affirmed.