State v. ThompsonState v. Thompson
¶1 Brandon Keith Thompson appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to murder as well as the court‘s ruling binding him over on a charge of aggravated murder. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Following a confrontation, Thompson shot his unarmed roommate (Rоommate) several times. One shot severed Roommate‘s femoral artery, causing him to quickly bleed to death. Thompson told police that at the time of the shooting, Roommate was charging at him up a flight of stairs and threatening to kill him and that he was not aiming to hit Roommate but only to scare him so he would stop coming toward Thompson. The State charged Thompson with aggravated murder, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and obstruction of justice.
¶3 At the preliminary hearing, Thompsоn argued that he should not be bound over on the aggravated murder charge, because his prior conviction for third-degree aggravated assault, on which the State relied to support the aggravated murder charge, could not serve as a predicate offense to elevate this homicide to aggravated murder. After examining the statutory language, the court rejected Thompson‘s argument and bound him over on the aggravated murder charge.
¶4 Initially, Thompson intended to argue that he acted in self-defense, and his attorneys were preparing a defense along those lines for trial. In the course of this preparation, however, Thompson‘s attorneys became increasingly concerned about their ability to
¶5 In light of this evidence, Thompson‘s attorneys came to believe that the “best-case scenario at trial” would be a finding of “imperfect self-defense, which would have . . . reduce[d] the aggravated murder [charge] down to murder” but would not have resulted in acquittal. They were also concerned that there was a real possibility Thompson “could be convicted of . . . aggravated murder.”
¶6 Thompson‘s attorneys managed to negotiate a plea deal in which the State would drop Thompson‘s aggravated murder charge and allow him to plead guilty to murder, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and obstruction of justice. Thompson‘s attorneys discussed the details and viability of Thompson‘s self-defense claims with him and explained the potential sentences he would face under each scenario. After discussing the matter with his attorneys, Thompson decided to accept the deal and plead guilty.
¶7 At the plea hеaring, the court conducted a standard plea colloquy. Thompson confirmed that he understood the terms of the plea, that his plea was knowing and voluntary, and that by changing his plea to guilty, he was forgoing his right to present a defense. The prosecutor read the factual basis for the plea, and the court asked Thompson, “[I]s that what happened?” Thompson responded, “For the most part, yes.” The court asked Thompson, “Okay, any clarifications you want to put on the record?” Thompson replied, “No.”
¶8 At that point, Thompson‘s attorney stated that he wanted to “put on the record” that in Thompson‘s mind, “he was defending himself” and that the incident was not, “in his mind, an intentional murder.” The attorney went on to clarify that Thompson “knowingly caused the death of the victim . . . , and that‘s why he‘s entering his plea because he thinks it‘s in his best interest to do so.” The court then found that the facts supported the plea and that it was knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, it accepted Thompson‘s guilty plea.
¶9 Prior to sentencing, Thompson obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that he was not adequately informed regarding self-defense and did not know the State had the burden of disproving a claim of self-defense; that his attorneys falsely told him that he would serve only eleven years in prison with the plea bargain, despite the minimum sentence for his murder charge being fifteen years; and that he was coerced to plead guilty by threats of prosecution against his girlfriend.
¶10 The district court held an evidentiary hearing оn Thompson‘s motion to withdraw his plea, at which Thompson and his former attorneys each testified. Following the hearing, the district court found counsel to be “much more credible” than Thompson. The court found that Thompson had been adequately informed regarding self-defense and his potential sentences and that Thompson had not been coerced into pleading guilty. Based on these findings, it determined that Thompson‘s plea was knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the court denied Thompson‘s motion and рroceeded to sentence him. Thompson now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 Thompson first asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the State‘s burden to disprove self-defense, he was misinformed regarding the potential consequences of pleading guilty to murder, and his attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty. He further
¶12 “We will overturn a sentencing court‘s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when we are convinced that the court has abused its discretion.” State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶ 7, 140 P.3d 1288. In doing so, “[w]e review a district court‘s compliance with the constitutional and procedural safeguards surrounding the entry of a guilty plea for correctness,” State v. Collins, 2015 UT App 214, ¶ 1, 359 P.3d 664, but “[w]e will disturb findings of fact made in connection with a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if they are clearly erroneous,” Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶ 7.
¶13 Thompson also challenges the district court‘s bindover decision. “Bindover determinations are mixed questions of law and fact to which we grant some deference.” State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 1204 (quotation simplified). But because the bindover determination turned on a question of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 951.
ANALYSIS
I. The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Discretion in Denying Thompson‘s Motion to Withdraw His Plea
¶14 Thompson raises two arguments with respect to the court‘s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. First, he asserts that the court erred in determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Second, he alleges that the court‘s inquiry into his claim of self-defense at the plea hearing was inadequate and that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea on the basis of that inadequacy. We reject both of Thompson‘s arguments.
A. Thompson Has Failed to Adequately Challenge the District Court‘s Factual Findings in Support of Its Determination That His Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary
¶15 The ultimate question to be determined in a motion to withdraw a plea is whether the defendant‘s plea was knowing and voluntary. State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 23, 279 P.3d 371. In resolving that question, “the burden of proof is on the defendant, who must show that [the] plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made” by demonstrating “either that he did not in fact understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he was waiving by pleading guilty, or that he had such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶16 On appeal, Thompson asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because (1) he did not understand that the State would carry the burden of рroof on his self-defense claim, (2) his attorneys misinformed him of the consequences of pleading guilty, and (3) his attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty. The district court addressed each of these claims in its ruling on Thompson‘s motion to withdraw his plea. The court found that “[h]aving weighed the contrasting testimonies of [Thompson] and his former counsel,” counsel was “much more credible.”
¶17 With respect to the self-defense claim, the court found that “former counsel thoroughly discussed and explained to [Thompson] . . . imperfect self-defense, perfect self-defense, and the viability of those defenses,” that “former counsel took ample time to explain and present the realities of each option,” and that Thompson “then took time to consider the issues and contemplate whether to take a plea.”1
¶18 As to sentencing, the court found that “[f]ormer counsel thoroughly explained the
¶19 Finally, with respect to Thompson‘s claim of coercion, the court found that none of former counsel‘s “conversations or tone of voice were ever threatening or could be construed as forcing [Thompson] to do something he did not want to do.” It also found that Thompson “was not coerced or threatened by the State or former defense counsel to accept a plea deal in order to avoid prosecution” of his girlfriend and that “[a]ny perceived notions that [he] was required to plea to avoid [his girlfriend] being prosecuted were solely a product of [Thompson‘s] own thoughts and mispercеption.”
¶20 To successfully challenge a district court‘s factual findings on appeal, an appellant must “establish[] a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings,” generally by “identify[ing] and deal[ing] with supportive evidence” through the process of marshaling. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶¶ 40–41, 326 P.3d 645. “[A] party challenging a factual finding . . . will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal.” Id. ¶ 42. This is the case with Thompson.
¶21 Thompson does not address the basis of the court‘s findings or its credibility determinations. He dоes not analyze the actual statements and information the court had before it or discuss whether that evidence was adequate to support its finding at the plea withdrawal hearing that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Further, in discussing the court‘s factual findings, Thompson merely attempts to reargue his position, relying solely on his own testimony at the plea withdrawal hearing to the exclusion of all other evidence supporting the court‘s findings—most notably, his former attorneys’ testimony on which the court primarily relied.
¶22 Thompson‘s failure to engage with the evidence on which the district court relied precludes him from carrying his burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the court‘s findings were clearly erroneous or that the court exceeded its discretion in determining, based on those findings, that Thompson‘s plea was knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, we have no basis to conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion in denying Thompson‘s motion to withdraw his plea.
B. Thompson Has Not Adequately Challenged the Court‘s Determination That There Was a Factual Basis to Support the Plea
¶23 Thompson next asserts that the court‘s inquiry at the plea hearing into his self-defense claim was insufficient and that the court therefore did not have enough information before it to ascertain whether there was an adequate factual basis for the plea. We agree with Thompson that when, as here, self-defense is put at issue before the court, the factual basis for a plea of guilty to first-degree murder must include the аbsence of self-defense. But Thompson has not adequately challenged the district court‘s finding that there was a factual basis to support his plea.
¶24 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that “pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence.” Id. at 38 n.10 (quotation simplified); see
¶25 Thompson asserts that a claim of self-defense is similar to a claim of innocence in that it alerts the court to the possibility that the defendant does not understand all the elements of the charge against them. Our supreme court has recently explained that because the absence of self-defense is an element that must be proved by the State, evidence that a defendant does not understand that element or the State‘s burden with respect to it can support a determination that a plea is not knowing and voluntary. Arriaga v. State, 2020 UT 37, ¶¶ 20, 29, 469 P.3d 914.
¶26 However, Thompson does not address the district court‘s finding that there was an adequate factual basis for the plea. Instead, he asserts that the court could not have had enough information to ascertain whether his plea was knowing and voluntary in the absence of further inquiry into his self-defense claim. As he puts it, “the failure of the district court to inquire further into [his] conflicting claims of innocenсe and guilt is sufficient alone to justify reversal and remand.” But Thompson has pointed us to nothing suggesting that a particular form of inquiry into this conflict is constitutionally required or that the lack thereof establishes a standalone basis to withdraw a guilty plea.
¶27 Our plea withdrawal statute identifies a single ground that can support withdrawal of a guilty plea: “A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.”2
¶28 While a court‘s failure to comply with certain procedures may be fatal to the extent that it demonstrates that the plea was unknowing or involuntary, such a failure is not alone sufficient to support a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g., Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶¶ 25–26; Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 842. Our supreme court has “traditionally granted sentencing courts substantial discretion to employ methods tailored to determine whether a specific guilty plea is knowing and vоluntary” and has “stated that such a determination does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation.” State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶ 11, 140 P.3d 1288 (quotation simplified). Thus, the appropriate analysis under the plea withdrawal statute is not whether the court completed a particular checklist but “whether there is evidence that
¶29 The court in this case found that there was a factual basis for the plea. Furthermore, following the plea withdrawal hеaring, the court found that Thompson did indeed have a complete understanding of his self-defense claim and that his guilty plea—including his tacit admission that his conduct was not legally justified by self-defense—was knowing and voluntary. Apart from his general assertion that the court needed more information to reach this conclusion, Thompson has failed to explain why these findings were erroneous or why the evidence supporting them was insufficient. Thus, Thompson has not demonstrated that the district court exceeded its disсretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
II. The District Court Did Not Err in Its Bindover Decision on the Aggravated Murder Charge
¶30 Thompson next asserts that the district court erred in binding him over on the aggravated murder charge because his previous aggravated assault conviction could not serve as a predicate offense to support the aggravation element.3
¶31
(a) Any act under this sectiоn is punishable as a third degree felony, except that an act under this section is punishable as a second degree felony if:
(i) the act results in serious bodily injury; or
(ii) an act under Subsection (1)(b)(ii) [involving choking] produces a loss of consciousness.
(b) Aggravated assault that is a violation of
Section 76-5-210 , Targeting a law enforcement officer, and results in serious bodily injury is a first degree felony.4
¶32 Thompson asserts that the legislature intended for only second- and first-dеgree-felony aggravated assaults to constitute predicate offenses that can support an aggravated murder charge, since additional details of what constitutes those offenses are found in subsection (2) whereas all the details of what constitutes a third-degree felony are found in subsection (1). The State, on the
¶33 When interpreting a statute, “we look first to the best evidence of a statute‘s meaning, the plain language of the act,” and “we do not look beyond a statute‘s plain language unless it is ambiguous.” State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, ¶ 6, 51 P.3d 729 (quotation simplified). Although Thompson asks us to examine legislative history in support of his arguments regarding the legislature‘s intent and also asks us to apply the rule of lenity, we are unable to do so in light of the unambiguous language in the statute. See State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258; see also McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, ¶ 6.
¶34 The statute at issue in this case unambiguously includes all three levels of aggravated assault in subsection (2). And there is no reasonable basis for reading subsection (2) as pertaining only to second- and first-degree felonies and not to third-degree felonies. The underlying elements of all types of aggravated assault are contained in subsection (1). Subsection (2) then identifies the three potential felony levels that can apply to aggravated assault charges. In doing so, subsection (2) performs the same function with respect to all three levels—it identifies all elements requirеd for each, some of which come from subsection (1), some of which are explicitly defined in subsection (2), and one of which comes from another statutory provision. None of these felonies is fully defined in the absence of subsection (1). Furthermore, subsection (1) does not define the felony level of any of the actions it outlines and does not refer specifically to third-degree-felony aggravated assault. Thus, there is no basis in the statutory language to determine that third-degree-felony aggravated assault falls within subsection (1) while the other two levels fall within subsection (2), as Thompson maintains. Rather, the most reasonable interpretation of the statutory language is that all levels of aggravated assault are addressed by subsection (2) and can therefore constitute predicate offenses for aggravated murder.
¶35 Accordingly, the district court did not err in binding Thompson over on the aggravated murder charge based on his previous aggravated assault conviction.
CONCLUSION
¶36 Thompson has failed to establish that the district court exceeded its discretion in determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Further, the court‘s alleged failure to adequately inquire into Thompson‘s self-defense claim does not provide an independent basis for him to withdraw his guilty plea. Finally, the court did not err in binding Thompson over on the aggravated murder charge.
¶37 Affirmed.