483 N.E.2d 1207 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1984
Defendant, Booker Thompson, appeals his conviction of breaking and entering and petty theft.
For the reasons adduced below, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
On July 5, 1979, Thompson was indicted on both crimes by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury. On July 16, 1979, a capias was issued for Thompson's arrest because he had failed to appear for scheduled hearings in his case.
The state did not learn of Thompson's whereabouts until November 19, 1979. On that date the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office received a request by Thompson for a trial on all his outstanding cases, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R.C.
After Thompson's request for a trial on all his outstanding cases but before Cuyahoga County got custody of him, the Middlesex County Massachusetts Court granted Thompson's motion for reconsideration of sentence and his original sentence was vacated. Defendant was then transferred to Billerica House of Correction to serve two concurrent one-year terms. Thompson was released on May 7, 1980. He had obtained an early release because of good behavior.
In the meantime, Ohio had initiated extradition proceedings against the defendant for his return. Defendant was delivered to the Cuyahoga County Jail on May 9, 1980.
On June 10, 1980, Thompson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial as provided for under R.C.
On July 10, 1980, the appellant withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered pleas of no contest. Thompson was found guilty and referred to the probation department for a presentence report.
Appellant jumped bond again on November 3, 1980. Capiases were issued, and Thompson was returned to Cuyahoga County in December 1982. On December 13, 1982, appellant was sentenced to a term of two to five years for breaking and entering, and a term of six months for petty theft.
On January 12, 1984, Thompson was granted leave by this court to file a delayed appeal. Thompson's appeal raises two assignments of error.
Appellant contends that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R.C.
The appellee successfully argued, and the trial court held, that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers only applies to individuals while they are serving a prison term. Once they are released from prison, they lose any benefits which have not already accrued under the statute. In the instant case, this meant that Thompson lost his right to have the charges dismissed for failure to commence trial within one hundred eighty days because he was released from prison prior to the running of that time period. Once released, the trial court held his rights regarding a speedy trial became the same as any other individual,i.e., the right to a trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest. R.C.
So far as we can determine this is a case of first impression in Ohio. As such, our review of whether the trial court's interpretation of the statute is correct, is necessarily limited to an examination of the statute's purpose, its plain language, and relevant case law from other states.
The statute's purpose is set forth in Article I of R.C.
"The party states find that charges outstanding against aprisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produceuncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment andrehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party statesand the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditiousand orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints." (Emphasis added.)
It seems clear from this passage that the party states were concerned with obstructions to programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Thus, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is consistent with the statute's expressed purpose. Once a prisoner is released from prison and is not participating in any treatment and rehabilitation program, as in the instant case, there would be no need or reason to afford him any greater protections than an individual who had never been in jail. These are not the persons targeted by the statute to receive its additional benefits.
Further, a review of the statute's plain language reveals that the party states contemplated that the individual would be serving his prison term before and after this statute was utilized. Article III(a) of R.C.
There are also several instances where the statute's plain language contemplates the return of the prisoner to the sending state. The following are examples of such language:
"If trial is not had * * * prior to the return of the prisonerto the original place of imprisonment * * *." Article III(d).
"At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purpose of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sendingstate." (Emphasis added.) Article V(e);
"* * * [U]ntil such prisoner is returned to the territory andcustody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments * * * *264 are pending * * * shall be responsible for the prisoner * * *." (Emphasis added.) Article V(h).
Other indications that the party states intended to limit the agreement to individuals who remain in prison even after the out of state charges are resolved include:
"* * * [T]he prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state * * *." Article V(g); and
"Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition * * * shall void the request." Article III(f).
It is clear from the language quoted that the party states did not intend to include discharged prisoners within the statutory scheme. The statute provides solely for the delivery of a prisoner to a receiving state; the time in which the prisoner must stand trial; and the procedure in which the receiving state is to return the prisoner to the sending state so that he can complete the prison term. Therefore, the plain language of the statute indicates that trial court's interpretation of the statute is proper.
Finally, a review of case law from other jurisdictions supports the proposition that the individual must continue to serve a prison term for the statute to be applicable. It has been established that the statute is inapplicable to pretrial detainees. See Seymour v. State (1973),
Our research has disclosed one case, State v. Thomas (Iowa 1979),
Although Thompson was not entitled to a trial within one hundred eighty days of his request for disposition of the charges, he was entitled to a speedy trial under R.C.
Accordingly, we hold that under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R.C.
Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit. *265
Having determined that R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
CORRIGAN, C.J., and PATTON, J., concur.
"* * * he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition * * *."