726 N.E.2d 530 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1999
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *757
Ray Thompson, Jr. appeals his conviction for violating R.C.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FORMER JEOPARDY."
At the time of the incident underlying his conviction, appellant was an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF). A nurse employed by SOCF filed a conduct report alleging that appellant threw a styrofoam cup full of feces at her, hitting her in the hair, face, arms, chest and left leg and ruining the medication that she was distributing to other inmates. A hearing officer determined that there was probable cause to believe that Class II, Rules 15 and 19 were violated.1 The hearing officer's report indicates that appellant pled guilty to the rules violations and referred the matter to the Rules Infraction Board (RIB). At the RIB proceeding, appellant was informed of the right to be heard in his defense. However, no witnesses testified at the proceeding. Appellant was found guilty and was given fifteen days in disciplinary control, required to reimburse SOCF for the medicines he had destroyed and ordered to reimburse SOCF for the cost of an HIV test performed on appellant. The managing officer of SOCF modified the RIB's disposition by excluding the reimbursement for the medicines he destroyed. *758
After the proceedings at SOCF, appellant was indicted on two counts of Harassment by Inmate, a violation of R.C.
In his only assignment of error, appellant argues that the disciplinary proceedings at SOCF were a criminal penalty, thus precluding the state from charging him a second time under the principles of double jeopardy.
We review a trial court's double jeopardy analysis as a mixed question of law and fact. That is, we accord due deference to the trial court's findings of fact, but independently review the trial court's application of the law to the facts. State v. Duncan (Nov. 30, 1998), Licking App. No. 97CA134, unreported. See, also, Garrity v. Fiedler (7th Cir. 1994),
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution protects against three types of violations: (1) prosecuting a defendant again for the same conduct after an acquittal; (2) prosecuting a defendant for the same crime after conviction; and (3) subjecting a defendant to multiple criminal punishments for the same conduct. United States v. Halper
(1989),
We have previously determined that administrative sanctions of an inmate by prison authorities do not bar a criminal prosecution for the same conduct by reason of double jeopardy protections. See e.g., Statev. Procter (1977),
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same conduct. Hudson citingHelvering v. Mitchell (1938),
R.C.
Conferring authority to punish upon an administrative agency is primafacie evidence that the General Assembly intended the punishments imposed by RIB's in Ohio's penal institutions to be civil in nature. Cf. Hudson,supra (conferring authority to debar bankers and impose monetary fines upon federal banking agencies is prima facie proof of Congress' intent to provide for civil, rather than criminal, sanctions.) See, also, Wong Wingv. United States (1896),
Turning to the second stage of the Ward test, we must decide whether the regulatory scheme is so punitive in effect, that regardless of the legislature's intent to provide a civil punishment, the result is a criminal penalty. Hudson, at 459. Only the "clearest proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id. citing Ward, at 249. Furthermore, the Hudson court suggested that the factors considered inKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963),
(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint";
(2) "whether it has historically been regarded as punishment";
(3) "whether it comes into play only upon a finding of scienter";
(4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence";
(5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime";
(6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and
(7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned."
First, because appellant was already affirmatively "restricted" by virtue of being incarcerated prior to the administrative sanction at issue, the additional restraint suffered by appellant has minimal impact on our decision. Second, disciplinary proceedings against prisoners have historically not been regarded as criminal punishment. See Garrity,supra; United States v. Rising (10th Cir. 1989),
Taking into account all of the Kennedy factors, the proceedings of SOCF were not criminal in nature and thus, the subsequent prosecution did not violate the double jeopardy clause. As the Eleventh Circuit noted inUnited States v. Mayes, et al. (1998),
*761Prison discipline cases do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine. This is because, in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems "criminal" and "punitive" as we commonly understand those terms. With that in mind, we recognize that many of the Kennedy factors may weigh in the appellants' favor and support their argument that the disciplinary regulations constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
* * *
We have some flexibility in determining the extent that we choose to utilize the considerations enunciated in Kennedy for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis. * * * We therefore exercise our discretion to attribute less significance to Kennedy's list of consideration in this particular case, primarily because it arises in the prison context. In this unique setting, we must take into account the fact that a prison's remedial and punitive interest are inextricably related. As the Second Circuit observed, "[p]unitive interests and remedial interest are nowhere so tightly intertwined as in the prison setting, where the government's remedial interest is to maintain order among a population of criminals" and where "remedial concerns require 'punishing' individuals for violent or other disruptive conduct." United States v. Hernandez-Fundora [supra.]
We also agree with the Third Circuit's view that:
Newby,[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause was ever intended to inhibit prison discipline * * *. If a prison disciplinary sanction bars subsequent criminal prosecution, the prison authorities will be forced to choose between instituting a disciplinary proceeding or awaiting a criminal prosecution. The process of conducting a criminal investigation and prosecution may take considerable time. The difficulties and delay that a criminal prosecution entails would leave the prisoners who violated the prison rules without a prompt resolution of charges and hinder prison administration and discipline.
Under these circumstances, we decline to classify the regulations as "criminal" for the exact same reasons the Eleventh Circuit did in Mayes:
Mayes,[W]e cannot conclude that the regulations authorizing the prison disciplinary sanctions imposed against these appellants are so punitive as to override the government's intent to create remedial administrative penalties for inmate misconduct.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant's only assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this Entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Kline, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: _____________________________ William H. Harsha, Judge