Defendant, who received a one-year suspended sentence after entering a conditional no-contest plea to a charge of simple domestic assаult, 13 V.S.A. § 1042, argues on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) finding him competent to stand trial and enter a plea, and (2) failing to engage in the colloquy required by V.R.Cr.E 11(c). Because we agree with defendant’s second argument, we vacate the plea and conviction without addressing his first argument.
At arraignment, after defense counsel stated that he had substantiаl questions about defendant’s capacity to understand the proceedings, the district court ordered an out-patient evaluation of defendant’s competency. Thе examining psychiatrist’s report to the court, which was based on a one-hour interview, indicated that defendant is a person with mild mental retardation, having an intelligence quotiеnt below 70. The report also noted that defendant is illiterate and has a history of alcohol abuse. According to the report, defendant has a severely limited fund of information and a severely compromised’ ability to engage in abstract reasoning.
The examining psychiatrist also addressed in his report, albeit briefly, defendant’s understanding of the legal process and the specific *385 charge against him. The psychiatrist concluded that defendant was “marginally competent” to stand trial, but acknowledged that defendant’s “incomplete understanding of the events of the assault as well as his mental limitations will undoubtedly handicap his defense preparation.”
Both-the psychiatrist and defendant testified аt the competency hearing, held a few months later. The psychiatrist restated his conclusion that defendant was marginally competent. He testified that defendant had “sort оf an understanding” of the legal issues, and opined that if the situation “were spelled out [defendant] could have a good global understanding of what he apparently or allegedly had done.” The psychiatrist also stated that he thought defendant would be able to understand different aspects of the legal system if they were explained to him carefully. Based on the psychiatrist’s testimony, and notwithstanding defendant’s testimony demonstrating his limited understanding of the proceedings against him, the court found defendant competent to stand trial.'
Seven mоnths later, defendant appeared for a status conference before a different judge. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant did not want to have a trial, but expressed serious reservations about his client’s level of understanding. Counsel requested that the court be especially careful in assuring that defendant understood the rights he was giving up. When the judge asked defendant what a trial was, defendant responded, presumably referring to one of the police officers who had questioned him on the night of the assault, “He’ll come back. At the trial he’ll come back here. . . . Same deal over. And I don’t want it.” The judge then asked defendant if he understood that a trial would be about whether or not he hit the victim. Defendant replied, “I did hit her. I’m guilty.” The judge explained that at trial, the victim would testify and the State would have to prove that defendant hit her. Defendant responded, “I did it. ... I don’t nеed to prove it.”
Following a few more brief exchanges between defendant and the court, the court announced that it would accept the plea. Defense сounsel then asked the court if he could question defendant. In response to further questioning from his counsel, defendant explained that the role of the jury is to “talk to me.” Asked abоut the job of the judge, defendant replied, “I might win. . . . Well, she might win and I might lose.” Counsel then asked:
Q: Do you know in a trial who decides if you hit [the -victim] or didn’t hit [the victim]?
*386 A: Yeah.
Q: Who?
A: I hit her.
Q: But in a trial who would decide that?
A:- Her.
■COUNSEL: This is my concern, Judge.
THE COURT: Well, it’s a valid concern.
Nevertheless, the court declined to rеvisit the competency issue, reasoning that the first judge had held a full hearing on the issue, with the benefit of the psychiatrist’s report and testimony. The court accepted defense counsel’s request for a conditional plea, which reserved defendant’s right to appeal the competency issue. Defense counsel did not raise any issue regаrding V.R.Cr.E 11. This appeal followed.
’ Because we conclude that the second judge failed to satisfy Rule 11(c) before accepting defendant’s plea, we need not decide either whether the first judge erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial or whether the second judge erred in refusing to reconsider the first judge’s competency ruling. Even assuming thаt the second judge was justified in relying on the initial competency determination, the record does not support his acceptance of defendant’s plea.
A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to enter a plea; the trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutiоnal rights is knowing and voluntary. See
Godinez v. Moran,
Here, given defense counsel’s continuing difficulty in communicating with his client, and the closе question over whether defendant was competent to stand trial, it was imperative for the court at the status conference to assure that defendant fully understood the rights he would be waiving by entering his plea. Instead, the court accepted defendant’s no-contest plea after only a brief colloquy that hardly touched on the requirements of Rule 11(c).
From this brief colloquy, we may assume that defendant was aware of the nature of the charges, and even that the plea was free of coercion, but we cannot be assured that defendant was aware of the direct consequences of entering the plea, let alone the particular potential penalties involvеd. Considering that the court was fully aware of defendant’s mental limitations, its failure to engage defendant in the required Rule 11 colloquy undermines confidence in the outcome of thе proceedings and thus was plain error. See
State v. Johnson,
Because we find plain error in accepting the plea, we need not address defendant’s request that we limit
State v. Thompson,
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
Rule 11(c) of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Advice to Defendant. The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
(2) the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, and the maximum pоssible penalty provided by law for the offense to which the plea is offered and, when applicable, that-the court may also order the defendant to make restitutiоn to any victim of the offense;
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already been made;
*387 (4) that if his plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there -will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by so pleading he waives the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury or otherwise, and thе right to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(5) if there is a plea agreement and the court has not accepted it pursuant to subdivision (e)(3) of this rule, that the court is not limited, within the mаximum permissible penalty, in the sentence it may impose; and
(6) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which he has pleaded, that his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.