State v. ThompsonState v. Thompson
Defendant, John Thompson, was charged by bill of information with armed robbery, a violation of
FACTS
On the evening of December 28, 1984, Stuart Lagarde, nick-named Jay, his sister, Mimi, and his brother, Michael, left the Louisiana Superdome following a basketball game. They proceeded to their car which was parked on Poydras Street near the intersection of LaSalle Street, across from the Superdome. As the trio approached their car, Mimi noticed a man, who she later identified as defendant, walking very fast towards them. As the three victims entered the car, defendant forced his way into the back sеat of the car. Defendant brandished a .357 magnum revolver at the trio and demanded all their valuables including the car. Defendant then ordered Jay to start the engine and turn left on LaSalle Street. As Jay turned left he deliberately crashed the car into a parked vehicle. Defendant became very upsеt and threatened to kill Jay who then grabbed defendant‘s gun. A fight ensued for possession of the gun. Jay shouted to his brother and sister to leave the car. Jay pushed defendant out of the car causing defendant to drop the gun. Defendant then ran away escaping with a wallet and money taken from the trio. Jay retrieved the gun, summoned Superdome security police who notified the New Orleans Police. All three victims gave a physical description of defendant to the police.
Several weeks later on January 17, 1985, Mimi and Michael saw a picture of defendant in the newspaper and recognized him as their assаilant. They relayed this information to their father who notified the police. The newspaper clipping was also mailed to Jay who had returned to college at the University of Virginia.
Later, all three victims identified defendant from photographic lineups conducted by the district attorney‘s office. Defendant was then arrested and charged with armed robbery.
During jury selection, two prospective jurors were excused by, and on the motion of, the trial judge. Both jurоrs were excused after discussions with the judge in chambers. Defendant alleges that the trial judge abused his discretion and committed reversible error by excusing these jurors without allowing defendant to voir dire
The court may disqualify a prospective petit juror for service in a particular case whеn for any reason doubt exists as to the competence of the prospective juror to serve in the case. (Emphasis added).
This discretionary right of the trial judge cannot deprive defense counsel of a reasonable opportunity to determine a basis for challenges for cause and the intelligent еxercise of peremptory challenges. State v. Duplessis, 457 So.2d 604 (La.1984); State v. Monroe, 329 So.2d 193 (La.1975). However, it does grant to the trial judge the authority to disqualify a prospective juror when for any reason doubt exists as to the competency of that juror to serve.3
In dismissing the two jurors the Court stated:
“Let‘s go back over the two the court excused.
Juror No. 17, was Linda Bаrnes, for the record, that Miss Barnes was in chambers. Miss Barnes informed the Court that her son recently was convicted of the charge of armed robbery, and is presently doing fifteen years at Angola. She did not want to have to go into that, but she did inform the court that that fact by itself would keep her from being a fair and impartial juror. For that reason, the court excused her ... And, for the record, the court excused her because of the personal embarrassment it would hаve caused her to have to go through that, and as to Juror No. 339, Mr. Steven Washington, in chambers, the court questioned Mr. Washington, and Mr. Washington did not feel that he would givе this trial his full attention as he went up earlier this morning as a potential juror into Section “A“, where a first degree murder trial was beginning, and he at that time, realized that his stepson was involved in that first degree murder case, and was apparently very shaken up by it in my conversation with him, and he felt that that would keep him from giving this trial his full attention, and because of the embarrassment involved, he asked the court to excuse him, so as not to have to talk about his stepson‘s involvement in thе murder case.”
A further measure of the discretion of the trial judge is the scrutiny of his decision on review. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the trial judge‘s regulation of the scope of voir dire should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Murray, 375 So.2d 80 (La.1979); State v. Clark, 325 So.2d 802 (La.1976). Defendant‘s cоmplaint that his voir dire was unconstitutionally restricted, and that the
It has long been held that defendant‘s right in the empanelling of a petit jury is not one of selection but one of rejection of jurors. State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937), appeal dismissed, Dallao v. State of Louisiana, 58 S.Ct. 51, 302 U.S. 635, 82 L.Ed. 494, rehearing denied, 58 S.Ct. 138, 302 U.S. 777, 82 L.Ed. 601; State v. Lee, 180 La. 494, 156 So. 801 (1934); State v. Foster, 164 La. 813, 114 So. 696 (1927).
The purpose of vоir dire is to allow the parties to intelligently exercise their challenges to insure a fair trial. Voir dire is an important right given to both the State and the defendant tо aid selection of an impartial jury. State v. Monroe, supra.
Since defendant has only a right of refusal he is not unfairly prejudiced by the Court disqualifying two jurors deemed to be a threat tо the fairness of the trial, where bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d 31 (La.1983). In order for the trial judge to protect the proceedings from prejudicial error, it is necessary to give the presiding judge the authority to disqualify prospective jurors. State v. Kohler, 434 So.2d 1110 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
The two jurors who were dismissed were dismissed for good cause. The trial judge exercised his discretion pursuant to
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
A. Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to аnother from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weaрon.
B. Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.