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State v. Thompson
275 N.W.2d 370
Iowa
1979
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*1 rate-making equa- applying IV. = profit) X rate of (rate tion base return Iowa, Appellee, STATE of profits found that of the the commission be company during period the test company’s dealing because of the increased THOMPSON, Appellant. Robert Paul Directory Company, another GTE sub- sidiary. Directory Company, in addition to No. 61951. publishing telephone directories advertising Supreme also sells in the direc- company, Court of Iowa. tories. The commission determined that Feb. Directory Company collected unreasonable profits company. Accordingly, from the profits

the amount of unreasonable were generated to the income for the com-

added through the sale of advertisements in

pany Again the

the directories. commission used standard to determine the reasona- cost X profits of the and a rate base

bleness = analysis. rate of return income company argued,

The as it had in Automatic, profit-

connection with

per-sale method be used. The commission rejected argument.

again Under our review, outlined, previously

standard of we company challenge has failed in its

find

to this determination. Bearing

V. in mind that the bur proof upon we company,

den of say

cannot the actions the commis any way 17A.19(8),

sion in violated § The claim of an unconstitutional

Code.

taking property is derivative of the claim employed by

that the methods the commis were We have

sion unreasonable. found

they were not. evidence for

There was substantial findings. is sub

the commission’s Evidence “.

stantial when reasonable adequate

mind it as to reach a accept would ” City of Davenport . conclusion. . Bd., Emp.

Pub. Rel.

(Iowa 1978). reversing was in error We therefore reverse the commission.

trial court and remand case for an order

reinstating the decision of the commission.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. concur, except

All Justices REYNOLD J., ALLBEE, J., C.

SON, who take no

part.

371 years two or a fine not to exceed $5000 both. The district correctional services rec- ommended a suspended jail sentence with probation; the prosecutor made no recom- mendation. The Magistrate Judicial sen- tenced defendant years to two in the re- formatory. He felt stated he a substantial was appropriate term and that a state insti- tution would offer rehabilitative services defendant needed. He also stated: charge

The brings the defendant be- fore the County Clinton District Court was originally a of charge burglary in the degree, second felony. a class C There- through after negotiations with the Clin- ton County Attorney’s office the charge was reduced to that of theft in the third degree, aggravated an misdemeanor of- fense. The felony class C possi- carries a ble term of years. ten An aggravated possible misdemeanor a carries term of years. two It is the opinion of the Court charge reduction of the from a class aggravated C to an misde- justify meanor does not the Court’s al- probation lowance of or deferred sen- tence. appealed.

Defendant point I. We first out that this case is not challenge a to a court’s discre- Clinton, Wolfe, Jr., appellant. John J. Peckenschneider, tion under State v. 236 Turner, Gen., Atty. Richard William R. C. (Iowa), challenge N.W.2d 344 or a to the Gen., Armstrong, and Mervin D. Atty. Asst. responsibility of a court to con- Woodin, County Atty., Asst. Clinton Clin- all sider facts which will assist the court in ton, appellee. exercise the of its discretion. Kendall, This court stated in 167 (Iowa): UHLENHOPP, Justice. It was the the trial of court to propriety This of sen- appeal involves any ascertain and facts that all would plea tencing procedure employed on a of assist in proper exercise of its discre- guilty third-degree theft under 714.- §§ tion in fixing sentence, 1(1) 714.2(3), 1977 Supplement. and Code whether in or out of the record. Thompson

Defendant Robert Paul we on review second-degree originally charged weigh pertinent bur- all and consider glary. burglary proper sentence, He in his matters in determining did not admit original including offense, statement to officers or in subse- nature of circumstances, quent proceedings. attending In accordance with a defendant’s age, character bargain prosecutor propensities reduced the plea chances of theft, his o charge third-degree carries reform. The courts owe a which penalty a not as much imprisonment to exceed as to defendant in iter- tencing, punish original not on the basis of the mining proper sentence. reduction, and the the crime and the but on the basis fit both ment should brought of the facts which are out before individual. Magistrate relating and, to the crime— case concerns the II. The course, pertinent relating the other data act on the possibility that the accused’s suggest the accused. We do not what may have constituted a question occasionin *3 the sentence should be. than the one to which he higher crime AND REMANDED REVERSED FOR may, court guilty. A pleaded RESENTENCING. limits, within a severe sen statutory impose ground the that tence for a lower crime on HARRIS, All Justices concur except higher committed a actually the accused REES, LARSON, JJ., ALLBEE and who involved if the facts crime on the occasion dissent. commit the court show the accused before HARRIS, (dissenting). Justice or the defendant ad higher ted the crime prosecutor orig not the mits it—whether or reversed, The trial court is not for any higher crime. This is inally. charged the discretion, error or abuse of simply but part making punishment of the fit the alluding to the fact that defendant had 24B Criminal Law 1980 at crime. C.J.S. § originally charged been greater with a of- (“The give regard should due court ample grounds fense. There were sup- of the offense and the attend to the nature port Explaining the sentence. the basis for . . . . Punishment ing circumstances the sentence the trial court described de- commensurate with the fendant’s always be extensive criminal record as fol- lows: crime”). may A court not how- impose a severe sentence for a lower ever . . The defendant’s criminal his- ground on the that the accused actu- crime tory showed numerous arrests which were higher the committed a crime unless ally 28, 1976, alcoholic related. Also on March the court show the accused

facts before there is charge petty shown a of larceny or higher the crime the defend- committed judgment and that the was by satisfied prosecutor origi- it—even if the ant admits serving defendant’s May a sentence. On nally charged higher the crime and reduced 21, 1977, charge a second of petty larceny charge. controlling defendant; consideration is lodged against the was however in whether the accused fact committed the the records show the case to pend- be still ” crime, ing. . . prosecutor not whether the higher originally charged original charge it. The gave The trial court a second reason for higher may may crime not have of the denying probation: the defendant had a true, and the accused does not admit been problem and, with alcoholism the trial court higher charge by pleading guilty to the felt, a state institution could accord defend- lower ant services needed for his alcoholism. Certainly

III. We are troubled in the there can be no claim that the any way defendant was in as to Magistrate appears to misled case because the court’s intentions. accepting Before his thought justified grant have he was not plea the explained to the defend- in view ing probation or deferred sentence ant: original charge and reduction higher of the

thereof, distinguished from the facts re as “THE Okay, COURT: and that’s one actually lating to the offense defendant thing understand, I you fully want that opinion committed: “It is the of the Court charge, this is a reduced the Court is free to of the from a class that a reduction you appropriate. sentence as the Court sees aggravated to an misdemeanor C Court, You arguments you can make justify not the Court’s allowance of does can ask the things Court for certain but it’s probation or deferred sentence.” We thus sentencing complete- Court’s decision on court resen- Do ly. you return the case to district understand that? Yes,

“THE DEFENDANT: sir.” The trial court and we on review should weigh and pertinent consider all matters in right It is clear that the trial court was determining proper sentence, including the was originally on the facts. The defendant offense, nature the attending circum- trial court indicated. The charged as the stances, age, not, character question majority suggests, pro- is as the pensities whether the defendant shown to have and chances of his reform. The higher question committed the crime. The courts owe a to the as much as is whether court should be to defendant in determining a proper sen- commenting reversed for on the fact punishment tence. The should fit both the charge was made. crime and the individual. [Authority.]” Delano, I. 161 N.W.2d Where, here, as probation requested is (Iowa 1968) we stated our standard for re “ and denied we have said: ‘From these judgment view: “A in a criminal case will pronouncements it is clear that a trial court sentencing pro not be disturbed because of has a *4 to hear an application parole showing cedures unless there is a of abuse but has wide discretion in what must be discretion, procedural prejudicial conduct considered in granting or denying the appli- defendant, which circumstances manifest ” cation. [Authority.]’ Peckenschneider, injustice, inherent unfairness and or con supra, 236 N.W.2d at 347. For a discussion duct which offends the sense of fair of the reasons underlying the broad discre- Moreland, play.” See also State v. 252 tion accorded a trial court in passing sen- (Iowa 1977); N.W.2d 465 State v. Pecken tences, Cole, see v. 37, State 168 N.W.2d schneider, (Iowa 1975). 236 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1969); 40-41 York, Williams v. New unchanged This left standard was in the 241, 247, 1079, 337 1083, U.S. 69 S.Ct. 93 814.20, recent criminal code revision. See § 1337, (1949). L.Ed. 1342 Code, Supp., The federal courts R.Cr.P., generally have 22(3)(d), Under rule a held sentencing that a required, sentencing judge court is now as was done may in the consider crimi case, give its nal reasons for the activities for which no was filed. imposition of sentence. require- But Buchkoe, See Collins v. (6 493 F.2d 343 Cir. ment was added to in conducting aid us 1974); Weston, U. S. v. (9 448 F.2d 626 Cir. same review described in Delano. See 1971), 1061, cert. 748, den. 404 92 U.S. S.Ct. Note, Judgment Sentencing Proce- 30 (1972); L.Ed.2d 749 Onesti, U. v.S. 411 dures, 598, (Febru- 60 Iowa L.Rev. 608-609 (7 1969); F.2d 783 Cifarelli, Cir. U. S. v. 401 1975). ary (2 1968), F.2d 512 Cir. cert. den. 393 U.S. 987, 465,

II. Defendant 89 S.Ct. 21 (1969); contends L.Ed.2d 448 S., abused its discretion and denied him due Humes v. U. (10 186 F.2d 875 1951). Cir. process under the Fourteenth Amendment agreed. State courts have Anderson v. Peo of the United Constitution States when it ple, 46, 139 Colo. 337 (1959); P.2d 10 State considered the fact he was initially charged Burton, v. 21, 52 Ohio St.2d 368 N.E.2d 297 second-degree burglary. majority (1977); Blight, State v. 38, 89 Wash.2d 569 agree. seems to But the authorities hold (1977). P.2d 1129 Federal cases generally otherwise. hold that sentencing a court may consider Kendall, 909, v. 167 charges State N.W.2d 911 criminal which have not prose been (Iowa 1969) we quoted earlier authorities cuted to judgment. See Horowitz v. Hen which described the of a trial court in derson, (5 514 1975); F.2d 740 Cir. Houle v. imposing sentences: S., (5 U. 493 1974); F.2d 915 Cir. U. v.S. Metz, (3 1972), 470 F.2d 1140 Cir. cert. den. “It was the of the trial court Davenport S., 919, v. U. 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. any ascertain and all facts that would assist 1558, (1972); 30 L.Ed.2d 311 U. proper in the exercise of its S. ex rel. discretion in Long Pate, fixing sentence, (7 v. 418 1969), whether in F.2d 1028 Cir. 952, out of the record. 1877, cert. den. 398 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 26 [Authorities.] 374 S., (1970); embarks, v. The majority Jones U. 113 authority,

L.Ed.2d 294 without 233, (D.C. 307 F.2d 190 Cir. U.S.App.D.C. proscribing on new venture in certain 919, 733, 83 9 1962), den. 372 U.S. S.Ct. cert. inappropriate remarks by have (1963). 724 authorities L.Ed.2d Some judge. The venture is nothing addressed to may court con- even held pure but form. charges for which a defendant has sider I would affirm. Swieg, v. 454 F.2d acquitted. been U. S. Rose, 1972); (2 v. 183 Neb. 181 Cir. REES, LARSON, JJ., ALLBEE join (1969). in this dissent. permissible have held it is Other courts charges court to consider in return for a which have been reduced exchange for a

guilty plea or dismissed in plea charges. 17.S. v. Ma-

guilty on other 1974); (10 Cir. U.

jors, 490 F.2d (2 1965). Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 Cir.

S. Marines, 535

The case of U. S. v. F.2d (10 1976) ques the identical presented Cir. JENSEN, Appellant Merle D. felony charge tion involved here. A Cross-Appellee, exchange guilty plea for a on a dismissed The sen substituted misdemeanor that de tencing court considered fact Schreck, Dennis SCHRECK and Jerome *5 originally charged with a fendant had been Appellees Cross-Appellants. the maximum sen imposed and then This was held tence for the misdemeanor. Schreck, Dennis SCHRECK and Jerome see Austin v. permissible. to be In accord Appellees Cross-Appellants, S., (9 1969); v. U. 408 F.2d 808 Cir. v. 144, (1972); Hanley, 108 Ariz. 493 P.2d 1201 LeFevre, (D.C.N. F.Supp. Micelli v. RANDOLPH, Appellant Howard Y.1978). Cross-Appellee. Consideration of such information does No. 59612. Burke, In Townsend v. have limitations. 736, 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690

334 U.S. S.Ct. Supreme Court of Iowa. (1948), a sentence was overturned because 21, Feb. con- materially untrue information was Tucker, In U. v. 404 U.S. sidered. S. (1972), 30 L.Ed.2d 592 a sentenc-

S.Ct. improper held

ing procedure was because obtained in violation of the de-

convictions right to counsel

fendant’s constitutional

were considered. A defendant should have opportunity to comment on the truth of explicitly if relied on

any such information Read,

by the trial court. U. S. v. 534 F.2d S., (9 1976); v. U. 500 F.2d 582

858 Cir. Post Rosner,

(8 1974); 485 F.2d 1213 Cir. U. S.

(2 1973); Espinoza, 481 F.2d Cir. U. S. (5 1973). in the

553 Cir. Defendant surrounding deny

case does not the facts deny Neither does he

the earlier re- greater

the fact

duced.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Thompson
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Feb 21, 1979
Citation: 275 N.W.2d 370
Docket Number: 61951
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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