State v. ThompsonState v. Thompson
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Torpy, Pleus, Monaco
State challenges a downward departure sentence. We conclude that the trial court improperly departed and, therefore, reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.
In August of 2000, Appellee was involved in a traffic accident. A dispute with police who were investigating the incident culminated in his arrest and conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer. Appellee was placed on two years’ probation in March of 2001.
On November 8, 2001, Appellee was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based upon an accusation that he intentionally drove his pick-up truck towards his mother-in-law. While this charge remained pending, Appellee was arrested for resisting a police officer with violence, arising out of an incident wherein Appellee struggled with and kicked a police officer who was investigating a disturbance involving Appellee.
Appellee subsequently pled no contest to violating his probation (based on the new arrests) and to the two new felony charges. A sentencing hearing was scheduled for August 8, 2002. At the sentencing hearing, several defense witnesses testified that Appellee had been abusing alcohol. Indeed, each of the three incidences for
Although the statutory list of mitigating circumstances upon which downward departure may be based is not intended to be exhaustive, the legislature has clearly prohibited departure on the basis of substance abuse or addiction.
The defendant‘s substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor... and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range.
Here, the only stated basis for the court‘s conclusion that departure was appropriate was a finding that Appellee abuses alcohol causing him to act in an unsophisticated manner. This basis for departure contravenes the plain language of the statute. Although the trial court properly could have imposed a departure sentence based on factors not specifically enumerated in the sentencing statute, it could not do so based on a factor specifically excluded as a valid basis for departure. The departure sentence here, therefore, cannot be affirmed.
The record in this case is unclear as to whether Appellee was induced to enter the plea by some promise or agreement as to a specific sentence, because the plea colloquy is not contained within the record on appeal. On remand, therefore, the court should determine whether Appellee entered an open plea to the court without agreement for a particular sentence. If so, the court should simply sentence Appellee
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur.