State v. Thompson, 07ca0035 (7-18-2008)State v. Thompson, 07ca0035 (7-18-2008)
OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant, Christopher Thompson, appeals from his conviction and sentence for aggravated robbery.
{¶ 2} On the evening of April 15, 2006, Donald Nigh was at
{¶ 3} Nigh told the intruders he had a few thousand dollars hidden around the house, and the intruders ransacked Nigh‘s home looking for the money. Before leaving, one of the intruders shot Nigh in the leg. Nigh called the police and requested an ambulance. After рolice arrived Nigh was taken to the hospital. The police dusted Nigh‘s house for fingerprints, including anything the suspects may have touched while ransacking the place. On a green metal lockbox discovered in the hallway, police found one latent print and lifted it. Police also found a shell casing but not the bullet that entered and exited Nigh‘s leg. Several days after this home invasion, when the blood stained carpet was removed, police found the bullet under the carpet.
{¶ 4} When the latent print recovered from the metal lockbox was run through the Springfield Police Autоmated Fingerprint Identification System, it matched Defendant‘s left
{¶ 5} While Defendant was in the intake area of the jail, Springfield Police Detective Douglas Estep approached Defendant and asked him if he wanted to come over to the police station and talk to him about this case. At that point Defendant said his girlfriend had found on the internet Detective Estep‘s statement about the latent print police found at the crime scene, and Defendant wanted to know where that fingerprint came from. Detective Estep told Defendant thаt is something they would have to talk about. Defendant went on to say that he has handled a lot of guns on the street. When Defendant subsequently said he didn‘t want to talk anymore about it, Detective Estep lеft it at that and did not Mirandize Defendant or question him.
{¶ 6} Defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery,
{¶ 7} Defendant has timely appealed to this court from his conviction and sentence.
{¶ 8} ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 9} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED VARIOUS STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE THAT WERE OBTAINED FROM MR. THOMPSON IN CONTRAVENTION OF HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, AS GUARANTEED BY THE
{¶ 10} Defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights against self-incrimination when it failed to suppress the statements he made to Detective Estep at the jail which were the product of custodial interrоgation
{¶ 11} Initially, we note that in reviewing a trial court‘s decision on a motion to suppress, we are guided by the following standаrd:
{¶ 12} “We are bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting those facts as true, we must independently dеtermine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court‘s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” State v. Retherford (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592.
{¶ 13} The trial court‘s findings of fact in this matter are as follows:
{¶ 14} “On May 31, 2006, upon learning that uniform patrol officers had arrested the defendant on outstanding warrants, Detective Estep went to the intake center at the Clark County Jail and introduced himself to the defendant. Detective Estep asked the defendant if he wanted to come over to the police department to talk about this case. The defendant informed Detectivе Estep that he was aware that the court statement in the case purported to link him to the crime by way of a
{¶ 15} “Ultimately, the defendant stated that he did not want to make a statement. Detective Estep honored the defendant‘s position and returned to headquarters.”
{¶ 16} Before interrogating a suspect who is in custody, Miranda rеquires that law enforcement officers inform the suspect of his/her right to remain silent, that any statements the suspect makes may be used as evidence against him/her in court, that the suspect has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-479. Absent these warnings, the suspect‘s statements are not admissible. Id.
{¶ 17} In Miranda thе Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedоm of action in any significant way. Id., at 444. In Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 301-302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, the Supreme Court explained that the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the pоlice that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Accord: State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 281.
{¶ 18} At the suppression hearing the parties agreed and stipulated that Defendant was in custody at the time he made his statements to Detective Estep. Moreover, it is clear that Defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights before he made his statements. Thus, the sole issue in this case is whether Defendant‘s statements to Detective Estep were the product of interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
{¶ 19} In overruling Defendant‘s motion to suppress his statements, the trial court concluded that Detеctive Estep did not interrogate Defendant within the meaning of Miranda because there were no questions, statements or remarks that Detective Estep should have known were reasonably likely tо elicit an incriminating response from Defendant. We agree. Detective Estep merely asked Defendant if he wanted to come over to the police department and talk to him about this case. At that point Defendant spontaneously volunteered the statements he made. One would reasonably expect that
{¶ 20} Defendant argues that this case is similar to State v. Lentz (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 449. We disagree. The police officer in Lentz testified that if he felt the suspect was familiar with the criminal justice system, hе would not read the person his/her Miranda rights. After the person had been arrested and while in transit to the police station, the officer would engage the arrestee in casual conversatiоn. The officer admitted he initiates these conversations to establish a rapport with the arrestee with full knowledge that the suspect may blurt out incriminating statements. These facts demonstratе an intentional police practice designed to elicit incriminating statements from the accused without the benefit of Miranda warnings. No such deceptive practice occurred in this case.
{¶ 21} Detective Estep was not engaging in casual conversatiоn with Defendant for the purpose of building a rapport or creating an atmosphere of camaraderie, hoping that
{¶ 22} Defendant‘s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
BROGAN, J. And DONOVAN, J., concur.
(Hon. Anthony Valen, retired from the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).