47 Conn. 546 | Conn. | 1880
The object of the statute under consideration, like that of other statutes upon the same subject, is to prevent the unlawful traffic in intoxicating liquors. One section forbids all unlicensed persons to keep such liquors with intent to sell them. Keeping such liquors for such purpose would be perfectly harmless, if it could be certain that nothing would follow from it. But the statute takes it for granted that where such liquors are thus kept, opportunities will present themselves for carrying the intent into execution, and sales of the liquor will in fact be made. For this reason the keeping of such liquors for such a purpose is regarded as equivalent to the selling of them. Another statute forbids the keeping open on the Sabbath day of any place in which it is reputed that intoxicating liquors are exposed for sale. The keeping open of such places, if that was all, would be no worse than the keeping open of the places without such liquors and without such reputation. But the legislature saw that if such places were suffered to be kept open intoxicating liquors would be sold in them, and that keeping open was only another name for selling liquors; and all experience verifies the conclusion. Drunkards frequent such, places as flies frequent the shambles of a butcher; and one could as easily be prevented as the other. It might as well be claimed that the statute against keeping open such places on Sunday is unconstitutional, as that the statute under consideration is so. The language of the statute is as follows:—“ Every person who shall keep a place in which it is reputed that intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, without having a license therefor, shall,” &c. This court, in the case of State v. Morgan, 40 Conn., 44, said that “this statute was intended to reach places where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, and
It is little to the purpose to talk about natural rights in such cases, and the danger of convicting innocent men upon insufficient evidence. The crime of selling intoxicating liquors is peculiar. - Other crimes seek concealment, but the business of selling such liquors cannot be successfully carried on in secrecy. The occupation requires the broad light of day. A liquor establishment is as well known to the community in which it exists, as a grocery, dry goods, mechanical or manufacturing establishment would be. Its customers are easily distinguishable from others; they can be easily recognized at a distance. They loiter about the establishment as drones about a hive, and constitute a sign for the place as unmistakable as one in letters over the door. The ground upon which the defendant claims the statute to be unconstitutional is, that the crime is made to consist in the reputation of the place, irrespective of its actual character. Here is the defendant’s error. The crime consists in the character of the place; and its reputation, unexplained and uncontradicted, is taken as conclusive evidence of its character as a place where intoxicating liquors are in fact sold.
The counsel for the defendant on the argument of the case to the jury claimed, and asked the court to charge the jury, that the statute in question was unconstitutional, and that the jury were judges of the law as well as of the fact, and that if they conscientiously believed that the statute was unconstitutional they had a right to so decide. The court charged them that they were judges of the law as well as of the facts, but that they were as much bound by the law as the judge
The whole objection then lies to the fact of the judge’s reference to a supposed opinion of this court. Now it can really have made little difference whether the court had actually made such a decision, so long as the judge was right in his view of the law and this court was prepared to sustain him in that view. The most that can be said is that the jury were misled into taking the only view of the law that they could correctly have taken. The defendant lost a possible chance of the jury’s erroneously deciding the law in his favor. This ground for a new trial does not commend itself to our sense of justice. But we need not decide whether, if that were the precise state of the case, it would be a sufficient ground for granting a new trial. This court had in fact decided the question as to the validity of the statute. In the case of State v. Morgan, before referred to, the court had this very statute under consideration, and then gave it snch a construction as to take it wholly out of the question now made with regard to its constitutionality. The point now made against its constitutionality is, that it undertakes to punish a man for the reputation which his house has acquired, while such reputation may have no basis of fact, and may have grown out of the mere idle or malicious talk of his neighbors. The passage we have before quoted from the opinion in that case shows that the court construed the statute as intending
There is no error in the judgment below and a new trial is not advised.
Iii this opinion the other judges concurred..