State v. ThomasState v. Thomas
APPEARANCES:
Carlos M. Crawford for Appellant
Nathan R. Heiser for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Douglas Thomas (“Thomas“), appeals the December 23, 2019 judgment entry of sentence of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
{2} On May 1, 2019, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Thomas on a single count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{3} On November 18, 2019, Thomas withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated-plea agreement, to an amended count. (Doc. No. 94). Specifically, in exchange for Thomas‘s change of plea, the State agreed to amend the aggravated-robbery charge to robbery in violation of
{4} On December 20, 2019, the trial court sentenced Thomas to a minimum term of 8 years in prison to a maximum term of 12 years in prison. (Doc. No. 97). The trial court further ordered that Thomas serve the prison term consecutively to the prison sentence imposed in another case.1 (Id.).
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Sentencing Appellant to the Maximum Prison Term as the Appellant‘s Actions Were Not the Worst Form of the Offense.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court Erred to the Prejudice of the Appellant by Improperly Sentencing Him to Consecutive Terms of Incarceration in Contravention of Ohio‘s Sentencing Statutes.
{6} In his assignments of error, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by imposing a maximum, consecutive sentence. Specifically, under his first assignment of error, Thomas argues that the trial court erred by imposing a maximum sentence without concluding that he committed the “worst form” of the offense or that he posed “the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 3). In his second assignment of error, Thomas specifically argues that his consecutive sentence is not supported by the record.
Standard of Review
{7} Under
Analysis
{8} First, we will address Thomas‘s argument challenging the trial court‘s imposition of the maximum term of imprisonment for his robbery conviction. “It is well-established that the statutes governing felony sentencing no longer require the trial court to make certain findings before imposing a maximum sentence.” State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 29, citing State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-67, 2016-Ohio-2882, ¶ 14 (“Unlike consecutive sentences, the trial court was not required to make any particular ‘findings’ to justify maximum prison sentences.“) and State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 9 (“The law no longer requires the trial court to make certain findings before imposing a maximum sentence.“). Rather, “‘trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the statutory range.‘” State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Noble, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing State v. Saldana, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20.
{10} ”
{11} “Although the trial court must consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in
{12} At Thomas‘s sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entry, the trial court considered the
{13} In assessing whether Thomas is likely to commit future crimes, the trial court found that: Thomas committed the offense while under post-release control; that he was unfavorably terminated from previous “community-control supervision“; and that he has not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for criminal convictions. (Dec. 20, 2019 Tr. at 7). See
{14} On appeal, Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a maximum term of imprisonment without finding that he committed “the worst form of the offense” or that he posed “the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes” as the trial court was required to do under
{15} Because the trial court considered the applicable sentencing criteria under
{17} Thomas further argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.”
(4) * * * [T]he court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{18}
{19} On appeal, Thomas concedes
{20} Thomas‘s argument is without merit. Rather, the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences is supported by the record. Specifically, the record supports the trial court‘s conclusion under
{21} For these reasons, Thomas‘s assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr