State v. ThomasState v. Thomas
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Owens, Alexander, Johnson, Madsen, Sanders, Ireland, Bridge, Chambers, Fairhurst (en banc)
OWENS, J.
We granted review in this case to resolve a question regarding the proper sentencing for firearm enhancements when a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, at least two of which carry a firearm enhancement. Contrary to the holding in State v. Harvey, 109 Wash.App. 157, 34 P.3d 850 (2001), the Court of Appeals held in the present case that
We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court committed no sentencing error.
FACTS
For acts committed on June 29, 1998, Gregory Thomas was found guilty on July 26, 2001, of two counts of second degree robbery and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. Second degree robbery is a class B felony, for which the maximum sentence is 10 years.
Consistent with
Thomas appealed, arguing that under Harvey his total enhanced sentence should not have exceeded 10 years. Rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had correctly calculated Thomas‘s total enhanced sentence as 13 years. Thomas, 113 Wash.App. 755, 54 P.3d 719. We granted Thomas‘s petition for review. State v. Thomas, 149 Wash.2d 1009, 69 P.3d 875 (2003).
ISSUE
Where a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses, does
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review. At issue is the meaning of certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW. The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998). The appellate court‘s paramount duty is “to discern and implement the intent of the legislature.” State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). Where the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, the legislature‘s intent is evident, and the statute may not be construed otherwise. Id.
Statutory Limits on Sentences with Firearm Enhancements. Under
Thomas‘s argument ignores the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. The sentencing grid in
The second sentence in
In sum, nothing in the plain language of
Also unavailing is Thomas‘s reliance on the rule set forth in Harvey:
When the base sentences are to be served concurrently, the total sentence, including enhancements, may not exceed the statutory maximum sentence of the highest level felony among the crimes for which the defendant is convicted. For example, if a defendant is ordered to serve two sentences for Class C felonies (maximum five years) and two sentences for Class B felonies (maximum 10 years), with all sentences to be served concurrently, the total sentence (including enhancements) may not exceed 10 years, the statutory maximum for the most serious (Class B) felonies.
109 Wash.App. at 166, 34 P.3d 850. In its opinion in the present case, the Court of Appeals sought to explain and distinguish the outcome in Harvey by asserting that the holding was “founded upon the principle of [In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wash.2d 239, 955 P.2d 798 (1998) (expressly overruled by statutory amendment) ], that when base sentences are concurrent, weapon enhancements must also be concurrent.” Thomas, 113 Wash.App. at 761, 54 P.3d 719. However, the Harvey decision did not strictly apply that principle, nor does that principle explain the more far-reaching rule in Harvey. Harvey was sentenced on six counts, which were to run concurrently. The longest base sentence was 96 months, and three of the other five counts had firearm enhancements of 36, 36, and 18 months. The trial court, presumably sentencing Harvey under the statutes effective in June 1997, ordered the firearm enhancements to run consecutively to the 96-month base sentence but ordered the two 36-month enhancements to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the 18-month enhancement. Consequently, although the principle of Charles (which made all enhancements run concurrently) would have produced a total sentence of 132 months (96 plus 36), the trial court‘s total sentence was 150 months (96 plus 36 and 18). Reviewing the 150-month sentence, the Court of Appeals reduced Harvey‘s sentence to 120 months by applying, not the principle of Charles, but the altogether new rule stated above that, no matter how many concurrent offenses have enhancements, the total sentence for all offenses cannot exceed the statutory maximum
The Harvey court provided no authority for the rule, nor did the court explain two of the rule‘s shortcomings. First, the requirement that Harvey‘s sentence be reduced from 150 months to 120 months necessarily required the sentencing court to reduce to 84 months the 96-month base sentence for a crime that had no weapon enhancement. We are aware of no statute permitting a firearm or deadly weapon enhancement on one offense to result in a reduction in the sentence for another unenhanced crime. Second, where a defendant is being sentenced concurrently for multiple offenses, at least one of which is a class B felony, the Harvey rule will invariably result in a maximum total period of confinement of 10 years. In the present case, whether Thomas was armed with one weapon in each robbery, one weapon in the first robbery and several in the second, or several weapons in each robbery, his maximum total period of confinement could not exceed 10 years. The sweeping Harvey rule, in effect, negates the statutory provisions mandating firearm enhancements for individual offenses. For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Harvey court‘s determination that
CONCLUSION
WE CONCUR: ALEXANDER, C.J., JOHNSON, MADSEN, SANDERS, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS and FAIRHURST, JJ.