Defendant first assigns as error the admission of his alleged “confession” into evidence. From defendant’s brief it is not entirely clear whether this assignment of error relates solely to his signed statement or also relates to the two inculpatory statements allegedly made by him to Officer Sutton and Sergeant Helms prior to his making the signed statement. The first statement was made before he was arrested. When Officer Sut *216 tоn first saw him and before Sutton said anything to him, defendant said he had “shot the sucker” and was looking for the police to turn himself in. The second statement was made after he had been arrested for murder and was -being held at the Monroe Police Department. When Sergeаnt Bill Helms— whom defendant knew — walked in, defendant spontaneously inquired : “Bill, is the dude dead ?”
Miranda
warnings are only required to be given when a person is being subjected to “custodial interrogation”; that is, “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived оf his freedom of.action in any significant way.” (Emphasis added.)
Miranda v. Arizona,
Defendant also, gave Sergeant Helms a signed statement setting forth the details of the shooting of the deceased. When this statement was offered into evidence, defendant objected and the court properly held a
voir dire
to determine the volun-tariness of the statement.
Jackson v. Denno,
“The court at this time finds that the statement was freely, voluntarily and intelligently made, that the defendant was not under the influence of any intoxicating bevеrage or narcotic drug, and that Officer Helms had known him for' a-: number of years and that he was normal and rational, and that he was advisеd of his constitutional rights before he made any statement and waived his right to have an attorney present by affirmatively stating he did not want an attorney present after being advised that he had a right- to have an attorney present.”
*217
It is a well-established principle in North Cаrolina that a person may intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to legal counsel.
State v. Turner,
“. . . After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waivе these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. ...”384 U.S. at 479 ,16 L.Ed. 2d at 726 ,86 S.Ct. at 1630 .
The findings of the trial judge that defendant waived his right to legal counsel and freely and voluntarily made the signed statement are fully supported by competent and uncontradicted evidence. These findings, thеrefore, are conclusive on appeal and this Court cannot properly set aside or modify them.
State v. Thacker,
Defendant next alleges that the trial judge erred in his chаrge to the jury by stating the State’s contention regarding the intoxication of defendant and not stating defendant’s contention. A judge is not required by law to state the contentions of the parties, but when he does give the contention of the State on a particular phase of the case, it is error to fail to give defendant’s opposing contention arising out of the evidence on the same аspect of the case.
State v. Cook,
“Officer Sutton on cross examination testified that he smelled a faint odor of alcоhol about the defendant at the time he had him in the car; he didn’t smell it out on the street but he smelled it when he got him in the police car.
“Officer Helms testified that the defendant, before he made a statement to him about what occurred there, said he *218 had had eight or nine drinks and a number of beers, but didn’t say exactly when he had had them.
“The defendant would contend that you should consider that in this case. (Emphasis added.) . . . The State would contend that he was not intoxicated, that the officers knew him and that they testified that he was not. That is a matter for you to determine.”
The. trial judge further charged on the effect of intoxication as follows:
. . [V] oluntary intoxication is not a legal excuse for crime. However, if you find that the defendant was intoxicated, you should consider whether this condition affected his ability to fоrmulate the specific intent which is required for the conviction of first degree murder. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed the deceased with malice and in the execution of an actual specific intent to kill, formed after premeditation and deliberation. If, as a result of intoxication, the defendant did not have the specific intent to kill the deceased, formed after premeditation and deliberation, he is not guilty of first degree murder. Therefore, I charge you that if, upon . considering the evidence with respect to the defendant’s intoxication, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant formulated the specific intent required for a conviction of first degree murder, you will not return a verdiсt of guilty of first degree murder, but will consider whether' you find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, as I have heretofore charged you, or not guilty.”
The general rule in this State is that objections to the charge in reviewing the evidence and stating the contentions of the parties must be made before the jury retires to afford, the trial judge an opportunity for correction; otherwise they áre deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.
State v. Tart,
Lastly, defendant contends that thе trial court erred in its charge by not defining “reasonable doubt.” In the absence of a special request, the trial court is not required to define the term “reasonable doubt.”
State v. Vestal,
Defendant has had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error. The jury’s verdict is fully supported by the evidence, and the judgment must therefore be upheld.
No error.