State v. Thoma

Minnesota, Appellant, STATE THOMA, Christine DeSh

Debra Jeanette Denn, Olga Vasser, Marnie Marie

awn Davis, Respondents.

Engelhardt Minnesota, Appellant,

STATE LANNON, Respondent.

Rachel Marie CX-97-466, C8-97-465, C1-97-

Nos. and C6-97-710. CX-97-564 Appeals of Minnesota.

Court of

Sept.

ing in being her bill understated $12.37. arraignment, attorney At her Thoma’s noted problems that she had serious medical and that it a experience had been traumatic for court, taking plea her. The after Thoma’s stayed adjudication, guilty, stating that it give keep Thoma a chance to III, Humphrey, Attorney Hubert H. Gen- prosecutor offense off her record. When eral, Paul, appellants. St. for objected adjudication, to the the court Costello, Costello, Hughes Martin J. & St. policy adjudi- stated that it a staying had Paul, C8-97-465, appellant for State CX- petty cation on misdemeanor thefts of food or 97-466, Cl-97-467, and CX-97-564. monetary similar items with minimal value. Lindstrom, Kari A. Scott Joint Prosecution Respondent Christine DeShawn Vasser Association, Shakopee, appellant for charged shoplifting was with worth $100.37 C6-97-710. of Similac and other infant care a items from supermarket. arraignment, At PerkMo, Paul, Vasser’s de- Arlene M. Asencio for St. fense counsel noted that a Vasser had child respondent Thoma. expensive. and that infant formula was Rosenberg, Special Leslie J. Assistant accepted guilty plea trial court and Defender, Minneapolis, State Public for re- stayed adjudication, giving Vasser “credit for Vasser, spondents Denn and Lannon. you young the fact that have a child and are Labine, Paul, Stephen Sage, N. Mark St. working, and the items related to the respondent Davis. directly.” child TOUSSAINT, Considered and decided Respondent Marnie Marie Denn was NORTON, C.J., RANDALL, and charged shoplifting with two items awith SCHUMACHER, WILLIS, HARTEN and total value of supermarket. from a $13.06 JJ., FOLEY, and J.* accepted The trial court guilty plea Denn’s stayed adjudication any

and giving without OPINION reasons, apparently but policy based on the Thoma, respondent noted in the case of who SCHUMACHER, Judge. arraigned day was on the same in the same prosecution appeals These from misde- given court and also petty meanor and misdemeanor of ad- Respondent Olga Engelhardt Davis was judication purposes have been combined for charged shoplifting with worth of coffee $7.73 jurisdictional considering issue of the arraign- and other merchandise. At Davis’s appealability ment, Davis, noted who was 68 Respondent tion. Rachel Marie Lannon old, years record, had a clean that the theft pleaded guilty, stayed, and had amount, involved minimal it and that underage drinking driving. seemed to be an isolated incident. The court (1996). § Stat. 169.1218 The other four de- also noted that there was diver- pleaded guilty petty fendants to certified type sion for this of offense and stated that § theft. Minn.Stat. up even a misdemeanor could show on 3(5)(1996). accept jurisdiction, re- accepted Davis’s record. The court Davis’s verse, and remand. guilty plea stayed adjudication. FACTS Respondent charged Rachel Lannon was Respondent Debra underage Jeannette Thoma was with drinking driving, a misde- price charged changing tags with on fruit meanor offense for which a conviction must vegetable trays supermarket, at a reported result- to the commissioner * VI, judge Appeals, § Retired of the Minnesota Court of art. serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. case, any pretrial the offender’s driv-

safety suspension of 169.1218(b)(1996). except dismissing trial court an order § er’s license. Minn.Stat. complaint probable for lack cause to plead arraignment, Lannon decided At has committed believe defendant prosecutor’s agree- exchange for the dismissing complaint or an order offense would be no executed ment that there * * * pursuant to Minn.Stat. 631.21 Lannon, questioned trial court time. The in to eliciting need to be licensed 1(1). 28.04, Minn. R.Crim. P. subd. The stayed adju- trial court drive to school. The stays adjudication argues state that of are days, requiring that Lannon dication for 90 pretrial Respondents they orders. contend prosecution of pay sentences, for the costs appealable only felony $50 are in The court ex- comply with other conditions. cases. in plained that it felt it was not adjudication stayA of is intended to avoid license, lose her driver’s interest that Lannon state, however, necessity of trial. The school, to to

which she needed drive orders,” may appeal, as various or adjudication stayed. therefore should be by dismissing that avoid trial ders Kiminski,

prosecution. See v. 474 State (dismissal 385, (Minn.App.1991) ISSUES N.W.2d 389 complaint solely question of on of law based right appeal have a of 1. Does the state (Minn. 11, appealable), review denied Oct. adjudication? nonfelony stays of 1991). appeal This court has an considered “special there circumstances” Were allowing from an order the defendant to adjudication in supporting stays of these offense, plead guilty to a lesser over the cases? objection, analogous a circumstance to state’s adjudication. stay a Krotzer State v. ANALYSIS Favre, (Minn.App.1988). that supreme 1. The court has held jurisdictional Fame not discuss the does ba judicial power” the trial court has “inherent appeal, sis for the nor does it note adjudication “special if stay circum jurisdictional problem. Davidner v. Da See judi warranting this “unusual stances” exist vidner, 491, 493, 5, Minn. 7 304 Krotzer, v. 548 ].” cial State measure[ (1975) (appellate duty to court’s determine (Minn.1996). 252, 254-55 Krotzer N.W.2d jurisdiction sponte); Chapman v. sua cf. felony charge third-degree involved a 438, 279, 288, Dorsey 41 230 Minn. N.W.2d stays criminal sexual conduct. The issue of (1950) (appeals on the merits 443 decided adjudication nonfelony arisen in also has appellate juris that do not address issue of stay adjudica appeal eases. In an from a jur precedential on diction prosecution, tion in a misdemeanor assault isdiction). supreme court later clarified that a in supreme The court Krotzer held adjudication only “sparing should be used proba- may impose trial court conditions of ly” time, tion, part including probationary purpose avoiding for the adjudication. stay of 548 at 256. of a N.W.2d injustice resulting from the however, The inclusion of criminal in clear abuse discretion the exercise adjudication a “sen- does not make a charging function. First, constitutes a final tence.” a sentence (Minn. 540, adjudication, of conviction. See judgment, or 556 541 State N.W.2d 2(1) 1996) 28.02, (judgment Minn. R.Crim. P. subd. original). final sen- of conviction is considered jurisdictional question The has arisen Krotzer, however, tencing). Under to whether state these and other cases as special cir- stays any if it finds right has a cumstances. may appeal The state a sen- Second, legislature’s prerogative it is the tence case. R.Crim. punishment for the offense. prosecution, P. howev- to define the Osterloh, er, e.g. may appeal 208 (Minn.1978) (legislature power Stays has appropriate only are offense, punishment “special

define and court is circumstances.” merely power). N.W.2d 254. This court’s the executor of that conclusion stays orders” court Krotzer conceded there was may suggest they must be reviewed statutory authority tion, unequivocal under the “clear and error” stan [if considered as sentenc- Kim, Kyu dard. See State v. Joon ing dispositions], 548 N.W.2d at 254. The (Minn.1987) (standard primarily court Krotzer relied order). pretrial review state’s power to charges court’s dismiss criminal court, however, applied This has other stan support judicial authority the inherent dards of review falling orders stay adjudication. Id. at 255. The category suppression outside the of the or functions effect as a continu- usually appeals. ders involved these See dismissal, fairly ance for which can be char- Cain, (Minn.App. 427 N.W.2d “pretrial acterized as a order.” 1988) (applying abuse of discretion to may appeal, We conclude that the state as examination). psychological adverse orders,” stays appealed We conclude the orders here are supreme cases. We note that the any applicable reversible under standard of granted has further review of several including unequivocal review the “clear and adjudication. See State v. error” standard. Cash, (Minn.1997) (supreme N.W.2d 735 supreme recently court has more is- propriety stays adjudi- court considered sued this caution: driving cation in misdemeanor while intoxi- It was not our intention [in that Krotzer] cases); Foss, (su- cated 556 N.W.2d at 540 disagreement by mere the trial court with preme propriety court considered of status of prosecutor’s charging exercise of the case). adjudication in misdemeanor assault “special discretion would constitute circum- Rather, argues 2. The state that stances.” there are no it was our intention that “special judicial sup- circumstances” these cases to the inherent recognized port stays adjudication. in that case Respondents sparingly ar- be relied purpose gue apply avoiding injus- that this court should a deferential resulting prosecutor’s tice from standard of review and affirm clear the trial court abuse discretion the exercise of orders. charging function. court in Krotzer and succeed- Foss, 556 origi- N.W.2d at 541 ing suggested cases has not what standard of nal). applied stays review should stay justi- Under Respondent argues tion. Lannon that court, only if fied after reviewing the clear abuse of discretion standard for review case, circumstances of the determines that sentencing departures applied. should be charging decision was a But we have held that a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The court in Moreover, is not “sentence.” sentencing Foss described the misdemeanor assault be- departures judicial are not “unusual mea- apparently “typical fore it as case” of that sures,” stays adjudication. as are kind. Id. The court noted that to the extent Best, generally State v. the crime was less serious the trial court was (court (Minn.1989) has broad discretion to in sentencing, free be lenient as staying depart aggravating if mitigating or circum- imposition, going without so far as to present); stances are cf. adjudication. Id. (describing stay adjudications at 254 as measures”). judicial not, “unusual We need In prose the four misdemeanor theft however, appropriate cutions, Thoma, Vasser, decide the Denn, standard of Davis, review because the acknowledges the state there were these eases are applica- mitigating reversible under circumstances in and the thefts ble standard. volved minimal amounts. But these factors reversed, accepted, and re- prosecutor’s agreement Jurisdiction in the were reflected manded. petty as misdemeanors. certify the thefts that trial court believed To the extent the RANDALL, Judge (dissenting). fully miti recognize certification did circumstances, the court was free gating respectfully I dissent. (to the sentencing. id. be lenient Cf. issue, The first does the state have the serious, assault was less extent misdemeanor sentencing dispositions right of sentencing, court could have been lenient dispositive. that are not felonies is The state imposition). There was no by staying a sentence case. can adjudication, also to basis need Minn. R.Crim. P. These order, “special cir for such an because and, five cases before us are not felonies Krotzer and required cumstances” under therefore, appealable. the sentences are not present. Although the trial were not Foss and, astonishing The state makes the petty court was concerned me, adjudi- argument meritless respondents with adjudications would burden disagree. I cation are orders”. records, support in the criminal there is no sentencing have four levels of in Minnesota Moreover, respon for this assertion. record severe, ranging from the most incarceration already leniency by had been shown dents prison, in a Minnesota state down to the least mis the certification of the offenses severe, descending In demeanors. order, incarceration, stay the levels are (which coupled execution is with terms of respondent Lan- The trial court in probation jail that can fines and local include driving prosecu underage drinking and non’s (which time), stay imposition coupled is stayed adjudication because Lannon tion probation with terms of that can include fines license if the convic would lose driver’s time), jail local and and reported. adjudicated tion and were (which coupled probation with terms (court 169.1218(b) com notifies Minn.Stat. time). jail can include fines and local safety person is missioner of when It is not this court to de facto overrule underage drinking to have committed found Supreme case of the Minnesota driving, resulting suspension in license and (Minn.1996). Krotzer, In days). Although loss of a driver’s for 30 Krotzer, supreme court first dismissed the license, days, even for 30 is a serious sanc judiciary claim that somehow the the state’s tion, imposed every under it is sanction “infringing” power prosecutors was on the trial age who chooses to drive. The drinker pertinent charges, to select and stated to relieve an offender of the court’s desire part: consequences of her conviction collateral However, prosecutor’s power to file “special circum does not itself constitute charges prosecute an individual was and warranting stances” infringed upon here. As Krotzer not any showing prose Neither is there states, in- County prosecutor the Carver clearly charg cution abused its discretion Krotzer, vestigated allegations Therefore, ing Lannon with the offense. we charges, obtained a filed criminal adjudication, along with reverse the disposition plea, and recommended adjudication granted court to the court. The trial then sentence prosecutions, and remand for plea postponed acceptance of the proceedings. further probation, placed Krotzer on but this did carefully de- not affect DECISION disposition The final a crim- fined role. ultimately a matter for the inal case is The Olson, presiding judge. As we stated appealable orders.” The range by “special legislature once the has defined supported offense, particular it punishments for a must be reversed and circumstances” and imposition of the sen- cannot ‘condition remanded. prior approval tenee “pretrial.” It can be done full after a prosecutor.’ of the hearing and fair in which the trial court makes a enough determination that there is Krotzer, added) (emphasis at 254 evidence on the record to make a determina- (citations omitted). by proof beyond tion a reasonable doubt that The court used the term “final guilty. Nothing the defendant is in Krotzer case”, disposition of a criminal not jail indicates that Krotzer’s time on the seri- stage order” to define at what the Krotzer third-degree ous criminal sexual case was when the issue of Krotzer’s conduct was made without the judge nothing arose. There is even having to listen to the evidence on the rec- remotely “pretrial procedure” connected to ord, and then make a determination that judge a trial when listens to the facts of the enough there was evidence to find that Krot- case, and then makes a determination that zer had committed the charged, crime before (legally the defendant “did it” called a deter- moving sentencing phase. on to the guilt), imposes mination of and then including defendant various im- The Krotzer held prisonment jail. county imposition improper it was not for the district court in probation, including restitution and incar- this case to sentencing options follow the jail county part ceration in a of a sen- permitted by section and to order tence, part of a hearing omnibus days Krotzer to serve 60 as a condi- evidentiary where issues and other related probation. tion of his 60 months on question matters are decided before the Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 256 add- guilt sentencing or innocence then even ed). up. come operative word the above cite is Anyone familiar with the Minnesota Rules “sentencing options.” spite In of the unam- Procedure, of Criminal changed which were biguous phrases words and substantially approximately years ago state here argument makes the incredible procedure who is familiar with the for han that the in the cases at cases, dling criminal is aware that the origins “pretrial appeals” they issue are because “oc- hearing of the omnibus were to combine the curred before trial” and “had a critical im- probable hearing former cause with the Ras pact on the outcome of the ease.” From a hearing. Henry McCarr, mussen 7See W. practical standpoint, majority the vast of all (1990) § Minnesota Practice (chronicling 1.5 criminal issues decided in this state are de- history of Minnesota Rules of Civil Proce cided “before trial.” That is because a noting probable hearing dure and cause tiny percentage of criminal defendants ever hearings Rasmussen were combined into om go through a full Straight up criminal trial. hearing); nibus See also State ex rel. Ras guilty pleas negotiated guilty pleas Tahash, 539, 553-55, mussen 272 Minn. majority the guilty of cases. Pleas of (1965) 13-14 (setting forth “pretrial” simply because “there will not be a procedures to be in resolving pre followed trial.” issues). suppression trial It is from this pretrial hearing that the state has a limited Commonly, arraignments on misde- right appeal pretrial from orders of the petty misdemeanors, meanors and and some- court, excepting a dismissal for lack of during times or after an omnibus hearing on probable cause on an dismissing a com felony, a attorney might defendant and his plaint pursuant to Minn.Stat. 631.21. See complete negotiated plea prosecu- with the P. R.Crim. tor and then offer it to the trial court. Yet reject

I majority’s analysis out-of-hand the changes moment the discussion pre- imposition of criminal in- senting suppres- evidence on either side of a time, cluding jail type is not a of sentence sion motion to discussions that result merely judgment because guilty plea, of conviction is past the focus has moved by specific entry. simply not formalized pretrial appeal state’s limited rights spelled put do not county jails Minnesota citizens in out 28.04. many evidentiary- impact,” being “critical where issue decided was not As to raised on). impact” being case

rulings during a trial have a “critical relied case. That does If our court assump- wants to make that they appealable matter of mean as a nonappealability tion that of less than instance, during a right under 28.04. For felony sentences has changed by been case trial, interlocutory appeals even on critical fiat, then let us be honest and state that totally issues can be taken on a discre- assumption. Attempting get around the basis, tionary right. not as a matter of This clear against appealing nonfelony rule sen- distinguishes appeals during trial from the by calling “pretrial,” tences represents, them appeal right state’s under 28.04. me, credibility. a loss of Yet, both could be on issues deemed critical Until Minn. P. specifically R.Crim. 28.04 is thus, prosecutor; obviously the buzz amended a statute or definitive case mak test, impact” I word “critical is not the ing exception a clear reject argument contrary. the state’s adjudication, I ap would dismiss the state’s appeal right under 28.04 is limited peal outright. in these spe cases Until that evidentiary to the and other matters that exception out, spelled cific is we are bound to place surrounding hearing. take the omnibus interpret penal strictly statutes in favor of limitation, appellate Without courts defendant and the state. See prosecution be with the inundated Olson, (Minn. every wanting right as a matter of 1982) (holding ap that strict construction is midtrial, single ruling, pretrial, adverse plied interpreting criminal statutes with all posttrial they not like. did reasonable doubts resolved favor of ac cused). by jury finding After a verdict or a you guilty by judge, then move on to the us, On these combined cases before sentencing phase. Then the state has the appealing sentencing dispositions state five cases, right charged but not in on crimes that are less than felonies. nonappealable misdemeanors and misdemeanors as These are all issue. I dissent appeal outright. and would dismiss the state’s we have here. logical, If cannot then we we can at NORTON, Judge. If going least be honest. this court is join I Judge the dissent of Randall. Supreme assume that the Minnesota exception has carved out a de facto to the prohibiting sentencing appeals

rule in nonfel- cases,

ony say then let us that. In State v.

Cash, (Minn.1997), 558 N.W.2d 735 this court

and the reviewed nonfelony case. The case SOCIETY, NATIONAL AUDUBON appealability did not address the al, Appellants, et Thus, sentences. neither State v. Cash nor v. (Minn.1996), v. MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL represent legal ruling stating a definitive AGENCY, Respondent, in less than recognized exception cases are a to the no- nappealability governing rules less than felo- Corporation, Potlach defendant- ny accepted pri- sentences. The rule is that intervenor, Respondent. appeals or decided on their that do merits No. C5-97-391. jurisdiction appellate not address the issue of precedential juris- Appeals Court of Minnesota. Chapman Dorsey, dictional issue. 23, Sept. 279, 288, (1950); Minnesota, Winberg University see also (Minn.1993) (rejecting Appeal’s particular reliance on case

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Thoma

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date Published: Sep 16, 1997

Citation: 569 N.W.2d 205

Docket Number: C8-97-465, CX-97-466, C1-97-467, CX-97-564 and C6-97-710

Court Abbreviation: Minn. Ct. App.