STATE OF OHIO v. SRILATHA THADUR
Case No. 15 COA 018
COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
February 4, 2016
2016-Ohio-417
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court, Case No. 14 TRD 7577. JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: RICHARD P. WOLFE, II DIRECTOR OF LAW, ANDREW N. BUSH ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF LAW, 1213 East Main Street, Ashland, Ohio 44805
For Defendant-Appellant: CHARLES A. KOENIG, TODD A. LONG, KOENIG & LONG, 5354 North High Street, Columbus, Ohio 43214
{¶1} Appellant Srilatha Thadur appeals from her conviction, in the Ashland Municipal Court, on two misdemeanor counts of vehicular manslaughter. Appellee is the State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On August 19, 2014, while it was still daylight, appellant was operating a Mercedes-Benz automobile eastbound on State Route 302 in Ashland County, Ohio, when she completely failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of 302 and U.S. Route 42. Her automobile thereupon struck a Chrysler van that was travelling southbound on Route 42. The collision resulted in the deaths of two passengers in the van, Loretta Meacham and Autumn Meacham. The driver of the van, Joshua Morr, and a three-year-old passenger survived the crash.
{¶3} Appellant was subsequently charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, both misdemeanors of the first degree, and failure to yield at a stop sign, a minor misdemeanor.
{¶4} On February 20, 2015, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered pleas of no contest to two amended charges of vehicular manslaughter (
{¶5} On April 17, 2015, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The court was inter alia provided with a PSI report, an accident reconstruction report, and several character reference letters regarding appellant. Following said hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive ninety-day terms for each count, for a total sentence of one-hundred and eighty days in jail.
{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF THE MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2929.21.
{¶8} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE FACTORS REQUIRED BY OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2929.22.
{¶9} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED UPON APPELLANT THE LONGEST JAIL TERMS AUTHORIZED BY LAW, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE SENTENCING LIMITATIONS REQUIRED BY ORC 2929.22(C).”
I.
{¶10} In her First Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred in sentencing her to maximum consecutive sentences on the two vehicular manslaughter counts, in light of the sentencing requirements of
{¶11} Generally, misdemeanor sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed upon review if the sentence is within the limits of the applicable statute. State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 05CA0006, 2006-Ohio-1558, ¶ 21, citing State v. Pass, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-92-017, 1992 WL 386011. See, also, State v. Chadwick, 5th Dist. Knox No. 08CA15, 2009-Ohio-2472, ¶ 30. An abuse of discretion implies the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 404 N.E.2d 144. Furthermore, there is no requirement that a trial court, in sentencing on misdemeanor offenses, specifically state its reasons on the record. State v. Harpster, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 04COA061, 2005-Ohio-1046, ¶ 20.
{¶12} We first note there is no requirement of mandatory jail time for a violation of
{¶13}
{¶14} In addition,
{¶16} In regard to the aforesaid statutory “overriding purposes” of misdemeanor sentencing, the record before us indicates appellant, who is a medical doctor pursuing her residency requirements, has no prior criminal record, no prior convictions involving operation of a motor vehicle, and no demonstrated substance abuse issues. There was no allegation via the plea that appellant at the time in question was driving recklessly or operating under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The trial judge, in his colloquy with appellant at sentencing, seemed convinced that the deadly collision was basically “the fault of you not paying attention as you approached that intersection.” Tr., April 17, 2015, at 12. The judge also noted that ” *** I get that this is a dangerous intersection” and that “there are quite a few accidents in that area.” Sentencing Tr. at 8.
{¶17} However, the trial court observed that appellant, despite her medical training, had done very little on the day in question to assist the crash victims from the van. See Sentencing Tr. at 13-14. In addition to Loretta Meacham and Autumn Meacham, who were ejected and fatally injured, a three-year-old child in the van was having breathing difficulties and had turned blue. Appellant mostly stayed in her car after the crash, although she told the court at sentencing that she had suffered a concussion at the scene and felt as if she were in a dreamlike state. See Tr. at 17. It was then up to some passing motorists, including an off-duty nurse, to assist the victims before first responders
{¶18} Accordingly, we find the trial court, at sentencing, adequately considered the offender‘s conduct and the impact of the offender‘s conduct per the statute.
{¶19} In regard to the consistency in sentencing argument, appellant bears a significant burden and must provide us with the detail necessary to establish that the sentence is inconsistent with other relevant sentences. See State v. Friesen, 3rd Dist. Crawford No. 3-05-06, 2005-Ohio-5760, ¶ 16 - ¶ 19. Ohio courts have recognized that consistency in sentencing does not necessarily mean uniformity. See State v. Ryan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020283, 2003-Ohio-1188, ¶ 10 (addressing felony sentencing). As an appellate court, we may decline to compare a particular defendant‘s sentences with similar crimes in this or other jurisdictions unless there is an inference of gross disproportionality. State v. King, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT06-0020, 2006-Ohio-6566, ¶ 26 (addressing felony sentencing). Appellant herein does not refer us to any cases from the Ashland Municipal Court, but she cites a vehicular homicide case and a vehicular manslaughter case from two other appellate districts and three vehicular manslaughter cases from the Fifth District.1 Of the latter three cases, none of the sentences were more than thirty unsuspended jail days.
{¶21} Accordingly, upon review, we find the trial court properly considered the aforementioned facts as part of its
{¶22} Appellant‘s First Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
II.
{¶23} In her Second Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erroneously failed to consider the factors for misdemeanor sentencing under
{¶24}
(A) Unless a mandatory jail term is required to be imposed *** a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a misdemeanor or minor misdemeanor has discretion to determine the most effective way to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.21 of the Revised Code.
Unless a specific sanction is required to be imposed or is precluded from being imposed by the section setting forth an offense or the penalty for an offense or by any provision of sections 2929.23 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence upon an offender for a misdemeanor may impose on the offender any sanction or combination of sanctions under sections 2929.24 to 2929.28 of the Revised Code. The
court shall not impose a sentence that imposes an unnecessary burden on local government resources. (B)(1) In determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor, the court shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses;
(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of persistent criminal activity and that the offender‘s character and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will commit another offense;
(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender‘s history, character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger to others and that the offender‘s conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to the consequences;
(d) Whether the victim‘s youth, age, disability, or other factor made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made the impact of the offense more serious;
(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in general, in addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section;
(f) Whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender‘s service in the armed forces of
the United States and that was a contributing factor in the offender‘s commission of the offense or offenses; (g) The offender‘s military service record.
(2) In determining the appropriate sentence for a misdemeanor, in addition to complying with division (B)(1) of this section, the court may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.21 of the Revised Code.
{¶25} “***”
{¶26} Even where a record is silent, we must presume the trial court considered the proper factors enumerated in
{¶27} Appellant essentially maintains that of the (B)(1)(a) through (g) factors set forth above, only (B)(1)(a) is applicable to her. We disagree, and find (B)(1)(d) (the impact of victim‘s youth, age, disability, or other factor on the seriousness of the offense) and (B)(1)(e) (likelihood of future crimes in general) would apply as well. At the sentencing hearing, despite having earlier stated that the intersection was dangerous (Tr. at 8), the trial court noted that although there is a gradual curve on Route 302 eastbound ending more than one-thousand feet before the intersection on U.S. Route 42, the curve had nothing to do with the accident. Tr. at 9. The court also recognized that a sign is posted on 302 more than 1,700 feet from the intersection warning drivers of an upcoming stop sign. Id. The court also referenced the daylight and dry pavement at the time of the accident, and observed that appellant had been driving a “very capable automobile.” Id.
{¶29} Nonetheless, based on our review of the record, we find the trial court properly considered the factors of
{¶30} Appellant‘s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶31} In her Third Assignment of Error, appellant contends the imposition of maximum sentences was in contravention of the misdemeanor sentencing limitations set forth in
{¶32}
{¶33} Because appellant has no known prior criminal history, the “conduct and response to prior sanctions for prior offenses” criterion of
{¶34} However, upon review, we are unpersuaded the trial court‘s implicit determinations under
By: Wise, J. Farmer, J., concurs. Gwin, P. J., dissents.
JWW/d 106
HON. JOHN W. WISE
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
{¶36} I respectfully dissent.
{¶37} The trial court in the case at bar places great emphasis on the appellant‘s failure to use “ordinary care.” (T. at 27).
{¶38} The State of Ohio criminalizes the negligent operation of a motor vehicle that results in another‘s death.
{¶39} In the case at bar, the trial court imposed the absolute maximum penalty for each count, consecutively upon a person who has no history of criminal or traffic offenses. Appellant‘s transgression was the failure to perceive and to stop at a stop sign, a charge that the state dismissed as part of the plea negotiations. No jury was empaneled. No witnesses or testimony was produced. The sole evidence in this case is the reconstruction report, the pre-sentence investigation report and the victims’ statements. The trial court conceded that this is a dangerous intersection at which many accidents have occurred and that rumble strips had not been installed at the time of the accident. (T. at 8-9).
{¶40} The overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To achieve
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses.
{¶41} As previously noted, a fatality is inherent in every case charged under
(b) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender has a history of persistent criminal activity and that the offender‘s character and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will commit another offense.
{¶42} In the case at bar it is undisputed that appellant has no criminal or traffic violation history to consider. Nothing in the record suggests a “substantial risk” that appellant will commit any other criminal offense.
(c) Whether the circumstances regarding the offender and the offense or offenses indicate that the offender‘s history, character, and condition reveal a substantial risk that the offender will be a danger to others and that the offender‘s conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive, or aggressive behavior with heedless indifference to the consequences;
{¶44} The trial court was concerned about appellant‘s actions subsequent to the collision. However, appellant had suffered a neck injury with whiplash and had been diagnosed with a concussion and a brain hemorrhage. At the time of sentencing, appellant was undergoing treatment. (T. at 18).
(d) Whether the victim‘s youth, age, disability, or other factor made the victim particularly vulnerable to the offense or made the impact of the offense more serious.
{¶45} The victims were not particularly vulnerable as this was a traffic accident. However, the impact upon the surviving child and the families cannot be understated; however, we must be mindful that this type of impact will happen in every case brought under
(e) Whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes in general, in addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1)(b) and (c) of this section.
{¶46} No indication in the record that appellant will commit any future criminal offenses. The opposite is true in this case as any criminal offenses would have a serious and negative impact on her ability to practice medicine.
(g) The offender‘s military service record.
{¶47} Appellant never served in the military.
{¶48} In addition to the above-cited factors, before a trial court can impose any jail sentence, let alone the maximum jail sentence in a misdemeanor case, the court “shall consider the appropriateness of imposing a community control sanction or a combination of community control sanctions under sections 2929.25, 2929.26, 2929.27, and 2929.28 of the Revised Code.” No evidence is contained in the record that the trial court in this case considered any sanction other than jail.
{¶49} Finally, a “court may impose the longest jail term authorized under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code only upon offenders who commit the worst forms of the offense or upon offenders whose conduct and response to prior sanctions for prior offenses demonstrate that the imposition of the longest jail term is necessary to deter the offender from committing a future crime.
{¶50} While the deference to the families and survivors of the crash cannot be understated and by no means trivialized, I find the sentence in the case at bar hard to
{¶51} I do not find that the overriding purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing is promoted or furthered by the maximum consecutive sentencing in the case at bar. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.