History
  • No items yet
midpage
State v. Tennison
496 S.W.2d 219
Tex. App.
1973
Check Treatment

*1 аgainst Sheppard ceed compensation under workmen’s stat- cause of action Johnsons’ qualifies injuries, by utes barred the personal for an thereun- was award for der, compensa- year cause of action statute of limitations. two tion carrier not against does acсrue claim of the minor Insofar as the party third until amount of plaintiff Tommy is concerned by award made Accident Industrial Johnson by bar Limitations there is no limitations. by Board paid carrier until against claim until will not run his the claimant obtains a judgment final Farm, adjudged majority. reaches State in a competеnt jurisdiction court of $1,500, to him in the liable amount against such insurance carrier. When against claim subrogated to his enforceable occur, either of events these the cause of Sheppard. of a non-suit did taking His against action party matures the third in the assertion of prejudice either him by the suit authorized 6a Section asserting it as his Farm claim State must be filed such ei- cause of action correctly subrogee. The trial by ther carrier or insured judgment in Farm rendered favor State within years two from that date.” Sheppard against the amount found gives statute which State Farm represеnt jury damages rights as against to the claim Johnsons’ Tommy Sheppard liable which Sheppard is Tex.Ins.Code art. 5.06- Ann. Johnson. V.A.T.S., 1(3) (1967), provides: which af- judgment of the court is “(3) In the payment event of except as amount the re- firmed to the person coverage under the required against Sheppard. cоvery Farm Section and to the terms and so The trial court’s is reformed conditions coverage, of such insurer adjudge Farm recovery as to making payment shall, such extent against Sheppard $1,500 amount thereof, proceeds be entitled to interest from date of the trial resulting settlement or judgment. court’s from the any rights exercise of recov- ery of person against any person

organization legally responsible

bodily injury, disease, sickness or

death for payment which such is made.”

There is nothing in that statute or oth- er statute prevented the Johnsons Texas, Appellant, The STATE of from against proceeding Sheppard both and State Farm at the same time. There Judyth vir, Appellеes. no statutory provision that effected a waiv- TENNISON er of the against claim Johnsons’ No. 12042. Farm against Shep- because their suit Texas, Court pard before a disposition final successful Austin. of their against claim State Farm. May 30, 1973. bases Courts held that a compensation workmen’s carrier’s Rehеaring Denied June action, cause of subrogee as of a workman against a party, third until does not accrue is adjudged subrogor liable to its do not action,

exist as to State Farm’s as cause of

subrogee Shep- Johnsons, against

pard. claim, Its as subrogee adult *2 Gen., Hill, Atty. Harry L. C. John

Green, Gen., Austin, Atty. appel- Asst. for lant. Weldon, Davis,

Terry Byrd, L. Eisen- Clark, ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍Austin, berg appellees. for & PHILLIPS, Chief Justice. Appellees brought suit under Tort prоvisions of the Texas terms and 6252-19, Act, Ann. Claims Article Vernon’s The trial court rendered Statutes. pursuant appellees, to which judgment for appeal in this perfected Court. affirm.

We points six of us on The State before error,1 four, re- together, the first briefed plead and appellees late to the failure appel- prove duty appellees by owed to points. these lant. We overrule Tennison, while Appellee, Judyth S. State, fell in an anteroom employee entry building on the a state near the This Camp Mabry in Austin. by the building and maintained is owned required Appellee’s injury of Texas. and short- laminectomy performed, to be iliofemoral ly she contracted thereafter plaintiff-appellee entering judgment trial court No. One: The Point of Error pleading overruling appellant’s no of violation because there is motion for erred in duty 18b of article owed under sec. failure based plead gross willful, prove any wanton or appellee 6252-19 of violation omission; ly negligent appellee by appellant; Point of act or owed to trial erred Error No. Four: The The trial court of Error Two : Point No. plaintiff-appellee entering of law numbеr erred in its conclusion quoted viola no because there is evidence is that in that the rule of law used second, torts, under sec. 18b of by restatement, tion sec. 342 any willful, wanton article 6252-19 law this state is not the occupier’s grossly negligent licensee; act omission or appellant. Point court erred The trial Error No. Three: law the conclusion again its second which she thrombophlebitis for liability as li- spi- State’s court established consequence As a hospitalized. phle- censor as follows: complications of surgery nal and the bitis, seriously and will appellee is disabled liability for 2. “A licensor the rest of treatment require medical caused personal a licensee injuries to *3 her life. if: premises a the licensor’s condition on duty this owed gist The lawsuit is the has reason A. The licensor knows or appellee, Tenni- Judyth S. the State to realize to condition and should know the son, according Texas Tort Act under the risk of that it involves an unreasonable The trial court to the facts before us. licensees, ex- harm to and should overruled the State’s motion pect not that such licensees will discover pleadings failure or based on the danger, realize the proof duty and found of a violation of this measured duty that of a licensor is B. And to exercise the licensor fails care, ordinary a to warn the li standard of to reasonable care make the condition condition or make the condi censee of the safe or to warn the licensee the con- tion The standard of involved, safe for the licensee. dition and the risk and duty the trial is that found used C. The licensee does not know or Second, Torts, the Restatement of Section have to reason know of condition or 342 .2 the risk involved.” maintains appellee, that Ju- the It is well sеttled Tennison, dyth the host of licensee invitee duty only owes him a an- to warn and that under the doctrine correct known Inc., conditions, Weingarten, nounced in but Carlisle v. J. also a duty of reasonable 220, inspection (1941) to dis Tex. S.W.2d 1073 cover conditions, only and that such a duty that licensor owes to licensee host is charged in law knowledge with injure willfully, wantonly not to her what a inspection reasonable through gross negligence.3 would reveal. Genell, Flynn, Inc. v. 163 Tex. 358 S. further contends that the Act W.2d (1962); Halepeska v. Callihan imposes duty no due to a limi- Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d (Tex.1963). tation 18(b) contained Section V.C.S., of art. 6252-19 to “As to followed wit: the trial court in premise defects, government this the unit case is much narrower. The com- shall ments owe to claimant Section Restatement Torts by private persons expressly to a licensee on withhold the duty inspec- private tion property . .” from the host is, of a licensee. That (b) occupier’s duty 2. “The rule lie to fails exercise reasonable care Restatement, safe, make the licensees formulated in condition or to warn the Second, licensees of the as condition follows: and the risk in- ‘Dangerous volved, Conditions Known to Pos- (c) sessor the liсensees do not know reason to know condition possessor liability A of land is ” risk involved’ physical harm caused licensees if, only if, on the condition land but 3. Also see Chekanski v. Tex. & N. O. R. R. (a)the possessor Co., (Tex.Civ.App.1957, has knows or reason S.W.2d 935 e.) ; Knights writ know ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍of ref. n. condition and should r. Mendez v. Hall, (Tex.Civ. realize involves an Columbus unreasonable 431 S.W.2d 29 licensees, App.1968, hist) ; Clergy risk of harm to such and should writ no St. expect they Northcutt, (Tex.Civ.App. will not discover or 448 S.W.2d 847 danger, and, hist.). realize the no writ wilful, inspect obligation active, is under ence to negli- host no or wanton licensees, safety gence, exceptions there for the benefit or but are charged knowing knowledge and is not what rule. When licensor inspection a dangerous would reveal. The constructive and the licen- charged not, a licen- part to the host of see does on the arises see, under Section excludes licensor warn or make the condi- inspec- (Emphasis be tion reasonably could obtained Add- safe.” ed) tion. exception, hold under We before us discloses that The evidence knowledge of the licensor would include responsible Bright, person solely Mr. knowledge. constructive the ex- Otherwise Build- the maintenance of the floors of ception for the be de- would most self ing years, did so No. 14 for number of *4 feating. Any ruling the other would allow provided an unsafe manner. was not He ignorance in its be cloaked the of State by superiors or proper with instruction it agents liability unless and immune from matеrials, disregarded instruc- and he the employees can be established the had that tions with he was on materials which knowledge ob- actual of the natural and provided. gradually the The result is that consequences neglect. of own vious their increasingly floors and dan- became slick impose impossible This burden of would gerous, although that condition proof, only be ob- since this evidence can knowing Bright charged visible. is with tained an admission from who witnesses the that if he failed to add ammonia may have in the outcome a direct interest soap wax, the as direct- used remove litigatiоn. of the ed the instructions came with soap, soap the for the inadequate then Consequently, appellant’s we overrule 4 removal the and the became of wax floor points of and six the lack five addition, Bright extremely slippery. In knowledge dangerous actual condi- which, plyed oily mop this surface with an its tion on or servant. the expert testimony, of according to “was one court is af- The of the trial you dangerous things the can do.” most firmed. gradually The floors result was that the dangerous. increasingly slick and became Affirmed. judgment, Bright trial Under the court’s charged knowledge such with that SHANNON, Justice. danger- pattern maintenance of created ous condition. I dissent. 6252-19, art. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. § Broussard, 274 S. In Gonzalez v. defects, provides, that 18(b), premise as to 1954, n. r. (Tex.Civ.App. writ ref.

W.2d 737 shall government “. . . unit of e.) the San Antonio Court only any owe to claimant Pope stated speaking Judge privatе on private persons a licensee rule as follows: in the question .” property . . The then, duty owed defining the a licensor case is one of general that “The refer- a licensee. owes a licensee a with licensor to Mabry. No. The trial of Error Six: Five: The Point ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍Points Error No. failing findings in to find as triаl court erred of fact number court erred finding requested 11, appellant’s number fact in that there is no evidence 1, support finding of Texas nor neither such record any agent employee had actual thereof thereof of Texas servant dangerous con- slick or condition had Mаbry. Camp Camj) building at dition of the floor 14 at floors

223 concluded, injury. likely and the ma- of the condition to cause jority States, 272 agreed, this Court has Ford 200 F.2d See United v. Cir., Berger (U.S.Ct. App., 1952), to warn a licensee 10th condition 89, Shapiro, 20(1959), arises if the licen- A.2d . v. 30 152 N.J. 525, Prosser, seq., see or has know Law knows reason to 55 A.L.R.2d 60, in- p. (4th 1971). shоuld realize that and 380 ed. § volves unreasonable risk of harm duty imposed by 342 of Re licensees, expect and should that such espoused statement of Torts and licensees will not discover realize effect, majority, obliterates the common 1 danger.” (emphasis added) licen law distinctions bеtween invitees and occupiers imposes

I agree sees on owners and am unable the above single duty statement is law of reasonable care under gener Texas. Christian, al rule is that a circumstances. See Rowland v. licensor owes a licensee 97, duty only active, wilful, Cal.Rptr. 69 .2d 70 P.2d Cal references to negligence. (1968). wanton states the courts Carlisle v. some Wein J. garten, Inc., deliberately those distinc 137 Tex. abolished 152 S.W.2d Christian, supra, tions. Rowland v. Pick (1941), Drug Lewis, Renfro Co. Honolulu, City ard v. County Tex. 235 S.W.2d 609 An ex (1950). ception other general (1969), Haw. while rule is in that situa 452 P.2d *5 tion wherein courts have retained Burns Turn the licensor ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍them. v. dangerous condition, a (U.S.Ct. er Co., Constr. 402 F.2d 332 licensee not, App., Cir., 1968). does a duty arises 1st A.L.R.3d on the See 32 not, be seq. change may, may licensor warn or make the rea Such Texas,2 Broussard, sonably safe. desirable is not office Gonzalez 274 but it v. Court, court, ap (Tex.Civ.App.1954, S.W.2d 737 of this nor writ ref’d the triаl n. e.). prove r. Cummings, departure See Bass abrupt v. from (Tex. Civ.App. W.2d 438 so firmly n. jurispru writ ref’d established e.). r. dence this State. v. Buchholz See Steitz, 463 (Tex.Civ. S.W.2d Gonzalez, the danger licensee App., n.r.e.). par writ ref’d This is was actually known to the licensor. The ticularly so in fact this case in view of the licensee, child, leg broke his when Legislature purpose that the must have had stumbled over a rock play- located on a in deliberately choosing limit the liabili ground provided premises. at the licensor’s ty respect premise of the State with de Pope opinion in the in that noted Justice fects. connection, proof “There also is bottomed the find- presence owner knew of the of the rocks that, ing of fact “The trial court area; many he had on occa- ” Texas, servants, its knew sions seen them . . . or should known of the dangerous have ” generally Gonzalez conforms to the rec- conditions . . floors From ognized rule evidence, to warn licen- review of the I am sees dangerous opinion conditions arises that the trial could court well State, through instances wherein licensor concluded that the knows its serv- 1. The of law conclusion betwee'n invitees and licensees should bo licensor’s abolished. Southern Methodist Uni- ; obviously versity Keeton, Survey licensee is taken American Annual from Texas Institute, Law, (1971), Law, Law Restatement S.AV.L..T. (1965). secondary Torts see also the cited in materials Christian, supra. Rowland v. Many legal scholars, Page Dean Keeton among them, believe thаt the distinctions

ants, known of that condi- should have However, inadequate is finding

tion. showing support the since judgment, required. actual support the

record contains no evidence agents knew

finding that the State condition. a licen- law, ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍defining the clear; equally clear by licensor, is

see apply that obligation Court to of this judgment and would reversе

law. I appellant.

render HINOJOSA, Appellant,

L.L. Lopez, Brownsville, ap- Homero M. Appellee. LOVE, E. V. pellant. No. 769. Graham, Brownsville, Franklin Jr., T. appellee. Texas, Court of Civil Corpus Christi.

May 10, 1973. *6 OPINION

YOUNG, Justice. brought against

E. L. Love this suit V. promissory Hinojosa L. to recover aon note. The trial court entered against default the defendant. Defendant’s de- trial was motion for new оverruled appeals. fendant 16, 1972, plaintiff suit. On filed June served on Defendant was with citation filed, so No answer was 1972. June plaintiff sought and a de- granted Au- July fault on On 1972. 8, 1972, gust defendant filed his motion Sep- new trial which overruled overruling the The order tember neither motion for new trial recited that ap- attorney nor defendant’s defendant peared hearing. A at the facsimile into ev- note, was introduced trial, idence follows: at the

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Tennison
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 30, 1973
Citation: 496 S.W.2d 219
Docket Number: 12042
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.