107 Wash. App. 141 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2001
CrRLJ 3.1 provides that the right to counsel accrues “as soon as feasible” after arrest. We are asked to decide whether the Supreme Court exceeded its powers in enacting the rule. We hold the court did not exceed its powers, the rule is valid, and the results of the breath tests in these cases were properly suppressed.
Four cases are consolidated in this discretionary review. Each Respondent was stopped by a State Patrol officer, arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), given Miranda
In the cases against Templeton, Marsh, and Marginean, the district court suppressed the results of the breath test, holding the advisement of rights failed to satisfy CrRLJ 3.1. The Post court refused to suppress. On appeal, the superior court held that suppression was required in all four cases. We granted discretionary review, and affirm the superior court.
II
CrRLJ 3.1
Neither the state constitution nor the federal constitution confers a right to counsel immediately upon arrest. Under the Sixth Amendment (and our state constitution article I, section 22), a defendant has a right to counsel at any critical stage in a criminal prosecution.
Our Supreme Court is well aware that CrRLJ 3.1 “goes beyond the requirements of the constitution.”
A court rule need not be grounded in a right conferred by the constitution or legislature; a rule has legitimacy if there is a nexus between the rule and the procedural powers or responsibilities of the court. In this regard, two cases are particularly germane. In State v. Smith
State v. Fields
Our review of the history of the rule and relevant cases persuades us it is a proper exercise of the court’s procedural powers. The rule was adopted in 1973 as part of the Criminal Rules for Justice Court. Two purposes have been identified for the rule: to ensure that arrested persons are aware of their right to counsel “before they provide evidence which might tend to incriminate them,”
Because of the transitory character of intoxication evi
State v. Fitzsimmons
Then in City of Spokane v. Kruger,
This history emphasizes the procedural aspect of the rule. CrRLJ 3.1 involves the taking and obtaining of evidence, an arena delegated to the court by statute and falling within the court’s inherent power to govern court procedure. Because of the transitory nature of intoxication, the rule affects preservation of exculpatory as well as incriminating evidence.
We hold that the court did not exceed its powers in enacting the rule. Advisement of the CrRLJ 3.1 right to counsel is required before administration of the breath test.
Ill
The State argues the advisement of rights in these cases was sufficient to comply with the rule, because Respondents were advised upon arrest of the right to counsel before answering any questions, and the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Numerous questions were asked before administration of the breath test. Given this sequence of events, the State argues Respondents were aware of their right to talk with an attorney before giving the breath sample.
Properly worded Miranda warnings may be sufficient to advise a person of the rule-based right to counsel even if the warnings do not mirror the language of the rule.
The State relies upon Juckett, which involved three defendants. The issue was whether or not JCrR 2.11 requires a specific warning about the right to counsel before the breath test. One defendant received Miranda warnings
• It is apparent from the Juckett court’s opinion and from its reasoning that the Miranda warnings for both defendants contained the language excluded here (“you have the right at this time”). In contrast, Templeton and the others were advised only that they had the right to counsel before or during questioning. This implies the right is limited to the context of questioning, and that when questioning ends, so does the right to counsel. The advice thus did not make clear that defendants had the right to talk to an attorney at this time—that is, prior to the breath test. For that reason, the warnings given did not sufficiently advise the defendants of the right to counsel under CrRLJ 3.1.
IV
The State argues that even if the warnings were inadequate, the inadequacy did not prejudice the Respondents. The State relies upon three cases that we find are either not helpful, or support suppression.
In State v. Trevino,
Finally, in State v. Copeland,
These cases simply illustrate the reason for the rule in DUI cases. The transitory nature of the evidence the State seeks to take—and that the defendant has a right to preserve—-justifies the requirement that a defendant be advised of his right to counsel before the evidence is lost. Here, failure to give the advice required by the rule was not
Affirmed.
Becker, A.C.J., and Appelwick, J., concur.
Review granted at 145 Wn.2d 1015 (2002).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
See RCW 46.20.308(2); Gonzales v. Dep’t of Licensing, 112 Wn.2d 890, 895, 774 P.2d 1187 (1989).
CrRLJ 3.1 replaced JCrR 2.11 and is nearly identical to CrR 3.1. See 4B Lewis H. Orland & Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice, task force cmt. at 455 (5th ed. 1997); see also State v. Trevino, 127 Wn.2d 735, 742 n.9, 903 P.2d 447 (1995). Cases discussing the relevant part of any of these rules are relied upon without reiteration of this similarity. We refer generally to the court rule right to counsel.
“The right to a lawyer shall accrue as soon as feasible after the defendant has been arrested, appears before a committing magistrate, or is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest.” CrRLJ 3.1(b)(1).
“When a person has been arrested he or she shall as soon as practicable be advised of the right to a lawyer. Such advice shall be made in words easily understood . ...” CrRLJ 3.1(c)(1).
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977) (accused is entitled to a lawyer at the time judicial proceedings are initiated against such person); Heinemann v. Whitman County, 105 Wn.2d 796, 800, 718 P.2d 789 (1986) (state constitution confers right to counsel at critical stage of proceedings).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972); Heinemann, 105 Wn.2d at 800.
State ex rel. Juckett v. Evergreen Dist. Ct., 100 Wn.2d 824, 829-30, 675 P.2d 599 (1984).
Heinemann, 105 Wn.2d at 801; State v. Zwicker, 105 Wn.2d 228, 242, 713 P.2d 1101 (1986).
Heinemann, 105 Wn.2d at 802.
RCW 2.04.190; see also State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974); State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 212, 616 P.2d 620 (1980).
Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981).
Household Fin. Corp. v. State, 40 Wn.2d 451, 455, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 501.
84 Wn.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974).
Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 502-03. In other cases the court has upheld court rules that are procedural but have a substantive impact, such as the speedy trial rule. See State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980); State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (1975). See also Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn.2d 538, 637 P.2d 656 (1981) (jury procedures).
85 Wn.2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975).
Fields, 85 Wn.2d at 128-29 (citing RCW 2.04.190).
Fields, 85 Wn.2d at 129.
State v. Trevino, 127 Wn.2d 735, 746, 903 P.2d 447 (1995).
City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wn.2d 733, 739, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
67 Wn.2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
Heater, 67 Wn.2d at 739.
93 Wn.2d 436, 441, 610 P.2d 893, vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, 101 S. Ct. 390, 66 L. Ed. 2d 240, aff’d on remand, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980), overruled on other grounds by City of Spokane v. Kruger, 116 Wn.2d 135, 803 P.2d 305 (1991).
100 Wn.2d 824, 675 P.2d 599 (1984).
Juckett, 100 Wn.2d at 828-29 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972)).
93 Wn.2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980) (Fitzsimmons I).
Fitzsimmons I, 93 Wn.2d at 441.
Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977, 101 S. Ct. 390, 66 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1980).
State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wn.2d 858, 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980) (Fitzsimmons II) (quoting Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 502).
State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 212, 616 P.2d 620 (1980) (citing Smith, 84 Wn.2d at 501).
116 Wn.2d 135, 803 P.2d 305 (1991).
State v. Schulze, 116 Wn.2d 154, 162, 804 P.2d 566 (1991).
See Heater, 67 Wn.2d at 739-40; Fitzsimmons I, 93 Wn.2d at 444-45.
See RCW 2.04.190.
RCW 46.61.506(5); Heater, 67 Wn.2d at 739.
RCW 46.61.517.
State v. Hutton, 57 Wn. App. 537, 541, 789 P.2d 778 (1990) (Miranda warnings need not track the language of CrR 3.1(c)(1) word for word to convey advice that counsel will be appointed without charge if necessary).
Juckett, 100 Wn.2d at 827 (emphasis added).
Juckett, 100 Wn.2d at 831 (emphasis added).
116 Wn.2d 154, 804 P.2d 566 (1991).
Schulze, 116 Wn.2d at 164.
127 Wn.2d 735, 903 P.2d 447 (1995).
Trevino, 127 Wn.2d at 746.
130 Wn.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996).
Copeland, 130 Wn.2d at 283.