69 Iowa 717 | Iowa | 1886
It is insisted that this latter instruction is erroneous, for the reason that, under it, the jury were warranted in considering the fact of the breaking and entering in determining whether the act was done with the intent charged. It is argued that the act of breaking and entering the building, standing alone, evidences no intent beyond the act itself, and the question whether the act was done with the specific intent charged must be determined alone from the other facts and circumstances of the transaction. But this view is not sound. It often occurs in human experience that the mere fact that a particular act has been done affords the best evidence of the motive or intention with which it was done. If one was to break and enter a building which was known to be on fire, the reasonable presumption from his act would be that his intention was either to attempt the extinguishment of
We have examined the record with care, and we find no ground upon which we think the judgment should be disturbed. It will therefore be
Affirmed.