593 P.2d 1390 | Idaho | 1979
On June 20, 1977, an information was filed in the District Court in Cassia County charging the appellant and two other men with the commission of grand larceny on May 28,1977. The public defender, Gleason D. Anderson, was appointed to represent all three men. Appellant appeared before District Judge Sherman J. Bellwood on June 20, 1977, and was read the information. Appellant desired more time to consider his plea, and was given until June 27, 1977. At that time, and after thorough explanation of his constitutional rights, appellant pleaded guilty as charged. Judge Bellwood accepted the plea as being freely and voluntarily made, and ordered a presentence report prepared.
A sentencing hearing was held on August 5, 1977, before District Judge George Granata, Jr: The presentence report was reviewed, and an indeterminate sentence not to exceed ten (10) years was imposed. The appellant, no longer represented by counsel, filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis on September 12, 1977, and also a motion for reduction of sentence which was denied by Judge Granata on September 16, 1977. Though the appellate record does not contain it, an application for post-conviction relief was filed on September 27,1977. The Cassia County prosecutor filed an answer and motion for summary disposition of said petition on October 27, 1977, and Judge Granata dismissed the petition on November 8, 1977. Judge Granata’s Order of Dismissal contains the following language:
The defendant-appellant contends that (the trial court) refused to recognize Rule 25(c). That appears to be the only ground stated by the defendant for his seeking post-conviction relief.
Here appellant argues he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because of the failure of the trial court to inquire at arraignment about the possibility of conflict of interest prior to taking appellant’s guilty plea. Appellant makes a related claim of incompetence of counsel by reason of trial counsel’s failure to object to his joint representation of three co-defendants. We do not find it necessary to address those issues even assuming they might otherwise involve “fundamental error,”
The cases involving conflict of interest typically arise from joint representation at trial. See e. g. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In a trial context while a slight conflict may require separate representation, People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 (1968), joint representation at the arraignment stage would ordinarily not invalidate a voluntary guilty plea, and certainly not where, as here, the record is completely silent as to the actual existence of a conflict. As we originally stated in State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho. 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968), joint representation of multiple defendants is not inherently violative of the constitutional right to counsel. That principle has been recently re-affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra. Accordingly, no “fundamental error” is presented on this record, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. That rule deals with the consequences of a trial judge’s disability during the pendency of a criminal case.
. Compare Pulver v. State, 93 Idaho 687, 471 P.2d 74 (1970) (overruled on other grounds in State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975)); and United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973) with United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977).