State v. TaylorState v. Taylor
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bohling
Appellant has not filed a brief in this court. By his motion for new trial appellant preserved a number of questions for our review. A motion was filed by appellant to disqualify the shеriff and his deputies in selecting the venire of jurors. The trial court granted the motion as to the sheriff but overruled it as to the deputies and designated one of the deputies to select the venire. This action of the trial court was assigned as error. Appellant argues that the deputies were under the dominion and influence of the sheriff. From the record we are unable to ascertain any fact which disqualified the sheriff. True, the evidence disclosed that he took an active interest in the investigation of the case and was a material witness for the State. In view of this the trial court, out of an abundance of caution, sustained appellant‘s motion. That the sheriff took an active part in invеstigating the case did not disqualify him, as that was his sworn duty. The ruling of the trial court was not prejudicial to the rights of appellant. [See State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 119 S. W. (2d) 286, l. c. 288 (2, 3).]
When the jury was being selected the trial court granted a number of challenges for cause and refused others. The refusal to sustain a number of challenges was assigned as error. There was naturally much notoriety throughout the county with reference to the disappearance of Gilliland and the finding of his body. It would have been difficult indeed to have selected a jury of men who had not heard something about the occurrence. The record disclosed that the trial court in this case permitted full inquiry to ascertain whether any of the prospective jurors were prejudiced in any way against appellant. The jurors named in the motion were examined,
Appellant contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. Since the evidence was all circumstantial we will state the facts proven by the State in detail. Deceased, Palmer Gilliland, was unmarried. He at times lived alone and at other times had a family living in his home with him. He owned much livestock and about fifteen hundred acres of land in the northwest portion of Ozark County. The defendant, Ralph Taylor, lived on a farm owned by his father. On May 5, 1937, appellant, Floyd Taylor, went to the home of Gilliland on the pretext of purchasing some cattle. He spent the day with Gilliland driving about and looking at the livestock. That night Gilliland stayed at the home of appellant and the next morning they were seen together at appellant‘s home. A witness testified that he saw Gilliland sitting in appellant‘s car tieing his shoestrings; that he, the witness, was looking for his cows and rode on the running-board of appellant‘s car, which appellant was driving; that he went with them for a short distance to a point where he found his cows; that this was a short distance from the home of Ralph Taylor. This witness also testified that when he approached the car Gilliland said: “Come and go with me. Buoy is going to take me home. He will be back in a little bit.” This was early on the morning of May 6. A short time later two of the State‘s witnesses passed the home of Ralph Taylor. They testified they saw appellant and Ralph in a car сoming through the pasture near the house; that they stopped and one of them got an ax and returned to the car and thereafter they drove back toward the pasture and went in the general direction of where later the body of Gilliland was found. One of these witnesses testified that he later, at about 9:00 A. M., saw appellant and Ralph driving through Almarthа toward Gainsville. About 10:00 A. M. appellant and Ralph were seen in a restaurant and drinking establishment, owned by one Shaw, in Gainsville. Two witnesses testified that while in the restaurant they heard appellant state that he had purchased a team of horses and some fine cattle from Palmer Gilliland; that Gilliland was leaving the country; that he had taken Gilliland to highway number five and that Gilliland had said he was going to Arizona and then to California, that he was selling out. These witnesses testified that appellant concluded his remarks with reference to Gilliland in substance as follows: “Just between us, I believe Gilliland is through with this country. I don‘t believe he will ever be back here.” Gilliland was not seen alive by anyone after the early morning of May 6, when hе was with appellant. To understand the evidence next in sequence it is necessary to state when
Appellant testified at the trial and admitted being with Gilliland
Appellant assigned error for failure to submit an instruction on murder in the second degree. The evidence did not justify the giving of such an instruction. In addition to the faсts above related the evidence showed that the body of Gilliland was found lying in a depression or hole, face downward, with a sack spread over the head and shoulders. The coroner testified that the head was practically decomposed; that he picked up twenty-five or more small pieces of bone where the head had been. Another witness testified that a few days after the body had been removed and the offensive odor had subsided so that he could make a close examination, he took a pitchfork and lifted a mass or crust of broken bone and hair matted together from the spot where the head had been lying. This witness and the coroner testified that where thе head had been there was a depression of several inches in the earth. That is mute evidence showing a brutal and horrible murder. Evidently the head of the deceased had been beaten into the ground and the skull crushed into fragments. Further comment is unnecessary. An instruction on second degree murder was not justified because the facts proven showеd murder in the first degree and nothing else. Murder in the first degree may be shown by circumstances. [See State v. Lewis, 273 Mo. 518, 201 S. W. 80, l. c. 84 (3-6); State v. Page, 130 S. W. (2d) 520, l. c. 523 (1, 2).]
The trial court gave an instruction informing the jury in substance, that if from all the circumstances and the evidence they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Floyd Taylor killed Gilliland for the purpose of robbing him of his property, then such killing was murder in the first degree. Appellаnt urges that the State‘s evidence did not justify a finding that appellant intended to rob Gilliland of his property. To this we cannot agree. Appellant admitted getting over $400 worth of Gilliland‘s property immediately after Gilliland disappeared. The evidence justified the inference that appellant did not pay for the property and that he killed Gilliland fоr the purpose of getting the cattle and horses. Instructions of this nature have frequently been approved. [See State v. McGinnis, 158 Mo. 105, l. c. 121, 59 S. W. 83, l. c. 87; State v. White, 330 Mo. 737, 51 S. W. (2d) 109, l. c. 112.]
When appellant was on the witness stand being questioned about Gilliland staying with him on the night of May 5, the following occurred:
“Q. Now, back to the time Palmer stayed all night with you, what time did you go to bed that night? A. I don‘t remember. I expeсt we sat around and talked till probably late bed-time.
“Q. Was there anything said in that conversation about Palmer
The evidence disclosed that one Harold Bushong was an employee of Gilliland and that immediately after the disappearance of Gilliland Bushong took charge of and moved to the home of Gilliland. Appellant offered evidence by witnesses that Bushong had stated he received two letters from Gilliland, and also that Bushong had sold hogs belonging to Gilliland. The State objected to this evidence because it was hearsay and Bushong was present in court and could be called as a witness. Bushong had testified for the State at a previous trial. His evidence given at a previous trial was placed in the record in this case, but was not read to the jury. The evidence offered by appellant сoncerning these matters was for the most part hearsay as to statements alleged to have been made by Bushong. Such hearsay evidence was inadmissible and the ruling of the trial court was correct. The evidence in the record, as given by Bushong at a previous trial, was in our opinion very damaging to appellant. That probably accounts for the fact that appellant did not call him as a witness, but that did not justify the admission of hearsay evidence. The record also discloses that Bushong was an ex-convict, and perhaps that is the reason the State did not desire to vouch for his evidence.
Appellant also assigned error to the admission of evidence with reference to the appearance of “No Hunting” signs in the vicinity where the body was found, because the evidence failed to show the defendant had anything to do with the signs. There is no merit in this point. It was a circumstance to be considered by the jury. Practically every day, after Gilliland had disappeared, appellant was in the vicinity of these signs. He had his cattle, whiсh he claimed he bought from Gilliland, on Ralph Taylor‘s place. Appellant testified that he repaired the fences in this vicinity, and we may infer that if the signs were there he saw them. Appellant offered
A number of other assignments made in the motion for new trial have been examined with reference to the record in the case and found to be without merit. The information and verdict and other matters of record disclose no error.
The judgment is affirmed. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.