[¶ 1] The State appeals from a district court order granting Evan Joseph Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence. We reverse the district court’s order granting Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence found inside his bedroom and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.
I
[¶2] A law enforcement officer with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force sought and obtained a search warrant to search a residence. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, the officer stated he received information from a University of North Dakota college student that Nathe and unknown counterparts were part of a drug trafficking organization in the Grand Forks area that distributed marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, ecstacy, MDMA, DMT and other types of research chemicals. The Task Force had previously conducted an investigation and discovered Nathe resided at a single family dwelling, located at 1817 1st Avenue North in Grand Forks. As part of the investigation, the Task Force conducted a garbage pull at the residence. During the garbage pull, the Task Force found a pays-tub containing identifying information for Nathe and a receipt from Jimmy Johns with the name and phone number of another individual, along with items containing marijuana residue. These items included a small zip lock baggie, two screens, and two large plastic bags. Finding probable cause existed, the magistrate issued a search warrant providing:
You are hereby commanded to conduct this search of the residence of 1817 1st Ave North in Grand Forks, and that such search shall be for the purposes of looking for and seizing all controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and any funds derived from the sale of controlled substances, fruits of the crime and cellphones utilized in the initiation and conduction of illegal activities.
On October 24, 2013, the Task Force executed the search warrant. The Task Force found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the common areas and in bedrooms, including Taylor’s bedroom. Specifically, the Task Force found a handgun and marijuana in Taylor’s bedroom. The Task Force also found checks, a passport, and a title to a vehicle all belonging to Taylor in his bedroom. Taylor did not grant the Task Force permission to search his bedroom. Taylor was arrested.
[¶ 3] Taylor was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The information was later amended, to charge Taylor with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Taylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his bedroom, arguing law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, he asserted law enforcement violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by searching his private bedroom without a separate warrant. Taylor did not dispute that the search warrant executed was validly obtained; rather, he argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom requiring a separate search warrant.
[¶ 4] The district court held two hearings on the motion to suppress. At the hearings, testimony revealed the residence included common areas, including a kitchen and living room, along with four separate bedrooms. Nathe’s bedroom was on the first floor and Taylor’s bedroom was in the basement. Nathe did not own the residence. Three out of four of the individuals who resided at the single family
[¶ 5] The district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence, concluding the evidence found in Taylor’s bedroom was not lawfully seized under the search warrant because Taylor was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and no exigent circumstances existed which would have justified entering Taylor’s bedroom without a search warrant. The State appealed.
II
[¶ 6] On appeal, the State argues this Court should reverse the district court’s order granting Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence because law enforcement did not exceed the scope of the search warrant. The State contends it would be an impossible task for law enforcement to specifically articulate in a search warrant the exact location of drugs within a residence.
[¶ 7] This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress as follows:
We affirm the decision of a trial court on a motion to suppress, after resolving conflicting evidence in favor of affirming the decision, unless we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the decision or the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence. Recognizing the importance of the trial court’s opportunity to observe witnesses and assess their credibility, we accord great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact in suppression matters.
City of Jamestown v. Jerome,
[¶ 8] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
State v. Holly,
[¶9] “A search warrant must describe with particularity the places to be searched and items to be seized.”
State v. Stewart,
[¶ 10] Taylor argues the district court’s grant of his motion to suppress should be affirmed because the State failed to meet its burden of proof after Taylor made a prima facie case of a Fourth Amendment violation. Taylor seems to contend that because the State did not convince the district court it had overcome the prima facie showing of an expectation of privacy in his bedroom, it had not properly raised the issue of whether law enforcement exceeded the scope of the warrant on appeal. We disagree.
[¶ 11] “A person alleging his rights have been violated under the Fourth Amendment has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of illegal seizure. However, after the defendant has made a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the State to justify its actions.”
City of Fargo v. Sivertson,
Proof by Affidavit having been made this date by Devan Greuel, agent with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force, and that there be reasonable grounds to believe that the crime(s) of Possession of Marijuana, Possession of other controlled substances, Possession of Drug paraphernalia and/or Possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver may be taking place in the County of Grand Forks, North Dakota and that evidence and or proceeds of those crimes may be found at or in a residence in Grand Forks, ND, located at 1817 1st Ave North.
As I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the crime(s) Possession of Marijuana, Possession of other controlled substances, Possession of Drug paraphernalia and/or Possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver have occurred in the County of Grand Forks, North Dakota and that such crimes are contrary to the laws of the State of North Dakota and that evidence and or proceeds of those crimes may be found at or in a residence located at 1817 1st Ave North, in Grand Forks, ND.
Additionally, the warrant limited the search to drug trafficking related objects: “You are hereby commanded to conduct this search ... for the purposes of looking for and seizing all controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and any funds derived
[¶ 12] The State primarily relies on
Driscoll,
The search warrant made no mention of Driscoll or her personal property. When the application for the search warrant was made, however, police had no knowledge of exactly who was responsible for the drug activity. But, police had probable cause to believe drug activity was taking place in the apartment unit, which provided the requisite justification to search. Further, it was not necessary that the search warrant particularize exactly where the drug evidence would be found in the apartment unit.
Id. at ¶ 14. As such, we concluded law enforcement did not need to obtain a warrant to search Driscoll’s purse because, under the warrant, police were permitted to search any item that could reasonably house the objects of the search. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 20 (“Viewing these facts as a whole, it was not only reasonable for police to believe the purse could contain evidence of narcotics activity, but it was also reasonable for police to view Driscoll, and her property, as being intimately involved with the apartment unit and the drug activity apparently occurring there.”).
[¶ 13] We agree that
Driscoll
is similar to this case. Like in
Driscoll,
law enforcement did not know exactly who was involved in the drug trafficking organization. Law enforcement had received the name of one individual, Nathe, from an informant, but knew other unidentified individuals were involved. Law enforcement conducted preliminary investigations to confirm where Nathe resided. Law enforcement completed a garbage pull and found objects consistent with drug activity in the garbage verifying a nexus between the evidence of criminal activity sought and the residence to be searched. Law enforcement applied for and obtained a search warrant to search the residence where they believed drug activity was taking place. Under
Driscoll,
because Taylor’s bedroom qualifies as part of the residence for which the search warrant was obtained and the bedroom could have reasonably contained the object of their search, drug trafficking evidence, law enforcement did not exceed the scope of the search warrant unless he had a greater expectation of privacy in the bedroom sep
[¶ 14] In Gatlin, this Court explained elements it applies in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy:
A reasonable expectation of privacy has two elements: 1) the individual must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) that expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable.
Several factors that contribute to determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists include: Whether the party has a possessory interest in the things seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the premises.
[¶ 15] The record reflects that Taylor would have some sort of possessory interest in the items seized and the place to be searched. The record does not reflect whether Taylor could exclude others from the bedroom or whether he had a key for the bedroom. The district court made no findings, and the record is silent as to what if any steps Taylor took to preserve the bedroom as private. It appears from the district court’s memorandum that the bedroom door was not closed, as it stated: “The officers ... looked into the Defendant’s bedroom, observing .what appeared to be marijuana on top of the refrigerator.” The record does not reflect who owned the house or Taylor’s status as a renter or a guest. Based on the facts of this case, we are not persuaded that Taylor has shown he had a separate reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom above that which applied to the residence covered by the warrant. This is not to say that a person may never have a separate expectation of privacy in a bedroom, because as noted above, “[wjhether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given area must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”
Kitchen,
[¶ 16] While acknowledging that it is not of precedential authority, Taylor argues
United States v. Greathouse,
[¶ 17] The pertinent facts of
Great-house
were that the kitchen, bathroom, and living areas were occupied in common; the defendant’s bedroom door was closed and had a “Do Not Enter” sign posted on it; there was no lock on the door, no number, or separate doorbell; the officers were immediately advised the defendant was a renter; the defendant testified he was the only person in the residence who had access to the room; and it was apparent to the officers there was no familial relation between any of the residents.
Id.
at 1274. Even if we were to adopt the reasoning in
Greathouse,
the facts of this
[¶ 18] Taylor argues law enforcement violated his reásonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom, by searching his bedroom, because he was not named in the search warrant for the residence. Taylor relies on
United States v. Davis,
[¶ 19] In Davis, law enforcement applied for a warrant for what appeared to be a single family dwelling naming Davis as the- subject of the investigation. Id. at 1247-48. When executing the search warrant, officers discovered there were two separate apartments which did not appear to be part of the main house, and did not search those areas. Id. at 1248. Davis used and occupied the entire residence. Id. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from Davis, as bedrooms do not necessarily invoke the same privacy rights as a separate residence. In addition, as noted in Davis, “search warrants for a street address which later turns out to include separate residences or apartments have been upheld when officers have reason to believe it is only a single family dwelling under the control of one person.” Id. Again, we are not persuaded. As we have held:
There is no constitutional requirement that a search warrant name the person who owns or occupies the described premises. The specificity required by the Fourth Amendment is not as to the person against whom the evidence is to be used, but rather as to the place to be searched and the thing to be seized. Indeed, probable cause might well be established to suspect that illegal activity, evidence thereof or contraband, was at a given location without implicating any particular person.
State v. Frohlich,
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found.
Ill
[¶21] We reverse the district court’s order granting Taylor’s motion to suppress evidence found inside his bedroom and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.