STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2013-10-186
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
7/14/2014
2014-Ohio-3080
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2013-05-0758
Scott N. Blauvelt, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
RINGLAND, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Raymond Taylor, appeals his conviction and sentence in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for menacing by stalking.
{¶ 2} On May 29, 2013, the Butler County Grand Jury indicted Taylor on one count of menacing by stalking, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of
{¶ 3} On August 23, 2013, Taylor withdrew his not guilty by reason of insanity plea and plеd guilty to the menacing by stalking charge. After holding a plea hearing, the trial court accepted Taylor‘s guilty plea and released him on a personаl recognizance bond with the condition that he comply with the court‘s pretrial release orders. The trial court also informed Taylor it would consider а community control sentence, as provided in the plea agreement, if he complied with the pretrial release orders. The trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing for October 3, 2013. However, on October 2, 2013, a capias was issued based upon allegations that Taylor had violated the terms of his pretrial release, including failing to appear for his presentence investigation interview. Taylor was subsequently arrested.
{¶ 4} On October 3, 2013, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court noted Taylor failed to show up for his presentence investigation interview, and the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: * * * Would your client like to now be interviewed for presentence investigation while he‘s in the Butler County Jail?
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t even want to get on probation, I‘m just ready to take it to trial and plead a not guilty plea.
THE COURT: Well we‘re way beyond that, sir. You‘ve already been found guilty. You‘ve already pled. We are set for sentencing. So here are the choices.
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. You can call me (phonetic) my time right now, if you‘d like.
THE COURT: Well the choice is to proceed, if you and your attorney decide you want to waive a presentence investigation report, you can do that and we‘ll proceed with sentencing - -
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t wаnt no probation or nothing like that.
THE COURT: - - or we can order a presentence investigation report and continue this out about five or six weeks. You‘ll be held in Butler County Jail without bond. THE DEFENDANT: That‘s cool.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you want to be sentenced today or do you want to wait until - -
THE DEFENDANT: Sentenced today, I want to get sentenced today.
THE COURT: - -be sent to prison?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, today.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understand that that means you‘ll be sentenced to prison.
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t care, all I got 11 more months to do if they give me the max.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He‘s indicating that he wants to waive his PSI. I would not object to that if that‘s what he wants to do.
THE DEFENDANT: No due respect to you, Your Honor, I just want to get this over with.
THE COURT: Fair enough, fair enough.
The court then proceeded with the sentencing hearing and sentenced Taylor to a prison term of 15 months. Taylor appealed, assigning the following error:
{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A HEARING ON HIS ORAL PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA.
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Taylor asserts he made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea which the trial court denied without conducting a hearing. Taylor contends his statement: “I‘m just ready to take it to trial and plead a not guilty plea” was an orаl presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As such, Taylor argues the trial court was required to conduct a hearing on his motion to determine whether a rеasonable and
{¶ 7} Pursuant to
{¶ 8} The state contends Taylor did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, but rather his statements at the sentencing hearing merely reflected his desire to be sentenced that day and “get this case over with.” However, we find Taylor made a presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea when he stated, “I‘m just ready to take it to trial and plead a not guilty plea.” Although Taylor failed to use the words, “I move” or specifically request to “withdraw” his prior guilty pleа, his statements reflected his desire and intent to plead not guilty and take the matter to trial. The trial court did not inquire any further regarding whether or why Taylor
{¶ 9} Because Taylor made a request to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, Xie required the trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable and legitimate basis for the motion. Although the court in Xie did not set forth the type of hearing required for a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the triаl court here failed to hold any hearing or otherwise inquire as to the basis of Taylor‘s request to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. See State v. Hurlburt, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-231, 2013-Ohio-767, ¶ 7. In light of Taylоr‘s statements at the outset of the hearing, we find it was unreasonable for the trial court to proceed with sentencing.
{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing, we sustain Taylоr‘s sole assignment of error as the trial court failed to conduct a hearing on Taylor‘s oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The matter is remanded to the trial сourt, and the trial court is instructed to hold a hearing on Taylor‘s motion “to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.” Xie at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Witherspoon at ¶ 10.
{¶ 11} Judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.
PIPER, J., concurs.
S. POWELL, J., dissents.
S. POWELL, J., dissenting.
{¶ 12} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s decision as Taylor never moved to withdraw his guilty plеa prior to sentencing, thereby eliminating any obligation on behalf of
