State v. Taylor

representations were with deceive, made intent add nothing they would to the allegation were fraudulently quotation false and (Internal made.” marks omitted.) Id., however, 82. That language, concerns the sufficiency of pleading, prove not the facts needed to allegations complaint or to withstand motion summary judgment. agree, therefore, in opposing court that the defendants’ motion for sum- mary judgment, plaintiffs plead failed to toor raise genuine issue material fact that telling after plaintiffs again 31, 2005, wall on October repaired to satisfaction, their said defendants prior 30, did anything December to lead the plaintiffs repair to believe that town would wall. is affirmed. opinion

hi judges this other concurred. STATE OF CONNECTICUT CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR

(AC 30757) Harper, Bear, Robinson and Js. officially January

Argued September 8, released special with Amarante, public defender, Erika L. special public defender, whom D. Kirby, was Laura appellant for the (defendant).

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant attorney, state’s whom, were John A. brief, Connelly, and Daniel H. Miller, special attorney, state’s deputy assistant state’s attorney, appellee (state).

Opinion HARPER, J. The defendant, Christopher Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after trial, of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes 14- 224 (b) and reckless driving violation of General Statutes 14-222 (a). § The defendant claims (1) because the term “accident,” in 14-224 (b), § does not encompass intentional conduct, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for responsi- evading bility and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the road on which he was driving was within scope of 14-222 For (a). these reasons the defendant asserts that the trial improperly court denied his motion for a judgment as to both charges. reject the first claim and with agree second claim. we Accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction under 14-224 (b) and reverse the of conviction under 14-222 (a).

On the basis of the presented trial, at jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 2007, the defendant struck victim, Luigi Legorano, with his motor vehicle while driving on Whittier Avenue in Waterbury. Whittier Avenue is a residential street that runs south east, perpendicular to Clematis Avenue on the south end and Eastern Ave- nue on the east end. portion The of Whittier Avenue between the last house on the street and Eastern Ave- nue is way, one in an running easterly direction. The remainder of Whittier Avenue two-way is a Thus, street. in compliance posted signage, may vehicles enter may Avenue, but vehicles Avenue from Whittier Eastern Whit- Avenue. Avenue from Eastern not enter Whittier Clematis Avenue only be accessed from tier Avenue can end of the street. on the southern home, which at his brother’s living The victim was immediately of Whittier Avenue located on the end day one-way portion the street. On the before incident, catch with his playing the victim was his broth- in the in front of and friend street nephews back positioned The victim was with his er’s home. defendant, who Eastern Avenue. facing southerly in a direction his automobile operating Whittier Avenue Avenue, turned onto Eastern one-way por- way down the traveling wrong began nephew, The victim’s who was tion of Whittier Avenue. the defen- Avenue, spotted Eastern positioned facing alert and shouted the victim to dant’s automobile down toward him traveling him that a vehicle then one-way of Whittier Avenue. The victim portion around, his shouted to the turned raised hands and brought his defendant stop vehicle. The stop five in front of approximately vehicle to feet his victim informed the defendant that he the victim. The way and one-way down a street driving wrong his around. The instructed the defendant turn vehicle words, and the victim and the exchanged defendant ultimately his vehicle, defendant struck the victim with After the victim ground. striking him to knocking his the vehicle in vehicle, put with one-way portion of Whittier reverse, backed down the Avenue onto Eastern Avenue and left the scene. police shortly arrived the incident and inter- after who had sister-in-law, viewed witnesses. The victim’s of with portion incident, provided police a observed plate the license number of the vehicle that had struck plate num- the victim. Police determined that the license After registered ber matched vehicle the defendant. scene, brother, officers left the the victim’s Carrado Dunne, and a Addona, friend, Jason drove through the neighborhood, looking for the vehicle that had struck the victim. and Dunne Addona located the vehicle parked away a short distance outside a on house Sunset police Avenue. Addona called the to notify them that he and Dunne had located the vehicle.

Responding tip, Raymond Rose, to Addona’s an offi- cer the Waterbury police with department, went to Sun- set Avenue and confirmed the defendant’s vehicle parked of a front home on Sunset Avenue. Rose knocked door and the defendant answered. The defendant admitted Rose that he had struck the vic- tim his on vehicle Whittier Avenue. The defendant

was arrested and in a three charged count information with: responsibility in (1) evading violation 14-224 (b); driving reckless in violation of and (a); operating vehicle in the wrong direction a one- way street violation of General Statutes 14-239 (a). The first two counts were tried to the jury, and the third count was tried to the On September 24, court. 2008, the defendant was convicted all three counts.1 materially On grounds similar to those raised this appeal, the defendant filed a judgment motion acquittal as to the conviction of evading responsibility driving. reckless The court denied the motion for a judgment of as to both counts. Additional facts will be set forth necessary. as

The defendant claims that because there was insuffi cient evidence to his conviction evading responsibility driving, and reckless the trial court improperly denied his motion for a acquit by tal. We begin setting general forth the principles 1 appealed count, The defendant has not from his conviction on third operating one-way wrong a vehicle in the direction street violation §of 14-239.

57 “The claims. review of the defendant’s that our govern of denial of motion appellate review a standard by judicial settled has been a is whether . to be determined . . The issue decision. reasonably concluded, from the could have which inferences the reasonable established and facts that the cumulative facts, could be drawn from those beyond a doubt reasonable guilt effect was to establish omitted.) State v. quotation . .” marks (Internal . . 625, 955 A.2d cert. Bonner, App. 621, 636, Conn. have 955, (2008). A.2d 421 denied, 289 Conn. “[W]e analysis in employed two-part appellate consistently sufficiency evidence to sustain a review of the of the . . we construe the evi First, criminal conviction. . the ver sustaining in the most favorable to light dence upon the facts so Second, we determine whether dict. reasonably drawn inferences there construed and the have jury reasonably from the could concluded guilt the cumulative force the evidence established beyond . . . That a reasonable doubt. the evidence circumstantial rather than direct does not diminish the . of that . We must probative force evidence. be jury may draw mindful, however, [although proven, reasonable, logical inferences from facts [it] may conjecture.” to speculation (Internal resort McKiernan, State v. quotation marks 78 Conn. omitted.) App. 182,191-92, denied, cert. 826 A.2d “ A.2d 66 which do not have 902,832 (2003). [Inferences a basis facts the evidence cannot be established sustain a verdict.” State upon drawn or relied Jackson, 257, 264, Conn. 407 A.2d 948 (1978).

I The defendant first claims that the evidence was respon- insufficient to his conviction evading sibility in 14-224 (b). Specifically, violation defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence a jury

for to conclude he that was involved in an acci- dent. The defendant asserts the term it accident, as only is used in 14-224 (b),2 encompasses § unintentional conduct. The defendant argues that because the state’s evidence indicated that his conduct in vic- striking the tim with the vehicle intentional, there is insufficient support evidence to his conviction under 14-224 (b). § with the disagree defendant’s claim. This court addressed a similar State claim Rembert, App. 598 A.2d 1101 In (1991). Rembert, the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a group teenagers but boy instead struck young boy’s and the mother, who were standing nearby. Id., 147. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion judgment charge respon- of evading sibility in 14-224, violation of reasoning statute apply did not to Id., intentional conduct. 146. The state appealed, court arguing improperly concluded that the term “accident” as used in 14-224 did not to apply conduct, intentional in the and, alternative, that even if the statute to apply did intentional conduct, there sufficient evidence to jury’s guilty Id., verdict. 146-47. This court reversed acquittal. 149. Id., not, however, We did “engage the exercise of term defining the ‘accident’ within the meaning Id., 148. we Rather, 14-224].” [§ “ample held that evidence existed permitting to find that the defendant drove his car at the teenagers, injure intending them, and that he instead uninten- tionally . . struck the defendant [the victim]. [S]ince actually intended to car, strike with the teenagers part: (b) provides person General Statutes relevant “Each operating knowingly a motor vehicle who is in an involved accident which physical injury person any irtfury damage causes ... other or or property stop may shall at once and render such assistance as be needed give name, operator’s registration shall his address and license number and person injured irvjured damaged number to the or to owner of the property, any or to officer . . . or witness .” ‘accident’ constituted an instead hitting victim] [the Id., word.” 148-49. any definition under a situation case, presented with In the we are present Rembert, in we to that Rembert. in As was true similar 14-224, in § to the term “accident” no reason define see support in to the record there is sufficient evidence as term.3 any definition the jury’s verdict under the differing offered and the state The defendant on Whittier Avenue how the collision accounts of the state’s witnesses The and several of occurred. victim to show that the tending to a of events testified series intentionally his vehicle into the victim drove in the street. defen- standing while the victim was he not indicated that did testimony, however, dant’s instead, vehicle, with his but intend to strike the victim in front unintentionally leaped the victim so after did past attempting while he was to drive of his vehicle victim. the in term “accident”

The defendant asserts that the conduct encompass intentional (b) does therefore, support is insufficient to and, the evidence The defendant claims that there his conviction. that the collision demonstrating insufficient evidence conduct because under was caused unintentional intentionally his version of the events the victim acted 4 vehicle, in the the state’s by leaping front of under in intentionally striking the events he acted version of to jury required, however, victim. The was not the version of the the accept either the state’s events or entirety. in its “It the defendant’s version events 3Although argument appeal is that word the state’s main “accident” encompasses conduct, both intentional and unintentional the state also asserts, alternative, that there sufficient evidence any defendant’s conviction under definition of word. 4 testimony reiterate, however, that the defendant’s own indicated that, perspective, striking with his from his his conduct the victim vehicle was unintentional. jury

function consider the evidence and judge credibility . jury of witnesses. . The is free to part all or accept reject testimony.” of a witness’ Sanders, State emphasis (Citation omitted; added.) App. 732, 738, 674, denied, 738 A.2d cert. Conn. A.2d 1250 (1999). case,

In this although testimony there was indicating defendant acted intentionally, the defendant intentionally testified that he did not act but rather unintentionally struck the victim with his vehicle as he past Thus, to drive the victim.5 there attempting was sufficient record for the conclude that the collision was the result of uninten- part tional conduct defendant, thereby on of the constituting any an accident under of definition term. As such, we affirm the defendant’s of conviction evading responsibility in of violation 14-224 (b). §

II The defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to his of conviction reckless driving in violation of 14-222 We (a). agree. § provides part:

Section 14-222 in relevant (a) per- “No operate any son upon any public shall motor vehicle state, any or highway any specially road char- municipal any tered association or of district ... or any for or parking any area ten cars more or upon private road a speed on which has been limit established or upon any property ... school recklessly, having width, traffic regard highway, and use such road, property school or area, the intersection parking of streets and weather conditions. ...” 5 Pezzuti, in State v. App. 840,848,800 644, denied, Conn. As 70 A.2d cert. 931, denied, (2002), 1136, 261 Conn. 806 A.2d 1069 cert. 537 U.S. 123 S. Ct. 922, (2003), L. Ed. 2d 827 tins is a case in which “the own defendant’s testimony appeal claim . . contradicts on .” [his] driv- scope to reckless 14-222 is limited Thus, (a) roads, school those place highways, takes ing that expressly are enumer- areas that parking properties the state information, In a substitute ated in the statute. on a driving with reckless charged the defendant its (a). 14-222 In in violation of “municipal road” the court driving, of reckless charge instruction guilty to find the defendant you “In order stated: one, prove that, the state must driving, reckless operated municipal motor vehicle on recklessly operated vehicle road; two, and he said streets, width, traffic, use, intersection of [regard] conditions of said road.” and the weather driving conviction for reckless Therefore, to sustain a and in accor- (a), charged, in violation of as instruction, was the state’s court’s it dance with the doubt that the beyond to establish a reasonable burden recklessly and that he did so on defendant drove Williams, road. See State 385, municipal is axiomatic that the (1991) (“[i]t 599 A.2d proof beyond a reasonable doubt state’s burden every applies comprising to each and element quotation marks omitted]). offense charged” [internal that the evidence was insufficient alleges municipal that Whittier Avenue was a road.6 to establish presented of at After a review the evidence thorough there evidence trial, we conclude that was insufficient Avenue, specifically, the of Whittier regarding character entity it it was what owned or controlled and whether jury for private, or to conclude that Whittier 6 by specific “municipal road,” which used note that the term was by jury charge, state substitute information and the court in its does in its appear (a). challenge not The defendant does not state’s assumption “municipal term to a that is within road” refers road specifically highways in 14- the definition of those roads and enumerated legal adequacy (a), challenge 222 does of the court’s nor he instruction as to this offense. a municipal

Avenue was road purview within the of 14-222 (a). At trial, the state offered into an map aerial Waterbury depicting Whittier Avenue and sur- judicial streets. The took rounding court notice that map was “an aerial map city Waterbury 2004. And . . that . . . the direction of north is cor- it, rect and that the on streets the names et cetera.” The map, however, only contained names, street house boundary numbers and lines. There was nothing map entity that indicated what owned or maintained the streets it depicted, private or whether the streets are open to the public, map any nor does the contain information from which the reasonably could infer these facts.

Also, testimony was there from Rose that Whittier Avenue within patrol Waterbury his area as a police officer, patrol and that while on he is generally looking for of traffic laws and also calls in taking “violationfs] the area.” Rose also that testified he arrived on Whittier day only Avenue on the of the incident after he was dispatched response an call. did emergency Rose not testify, however, as to whether Whittier Avenue was a municipal road or whether patrol his area was ownership limited to roads under the or control Waterbury. Additionally, there testimony there were street on Whittier signs indicating Avenue a portion only one-way of Whittier was open to evidence, traffic. There was no however, as to what entity posted those signs entity street or what responsible maintaining signs.7 those street present substantially In the there case is less evidence as to the character question by road in than in either of the cases relied the dissent. Peirson, dissent, State v. The first case relied on 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. Hackett, (1964), binding court; see State 204 A.2d on this 135, 225, App. 127, denied, 904, Conn. 72 804 A.2d cert. Conn. A.2d 262 810 Peirson, (2002); persuasive. jury presented 270 nor do we find it In the was following regarding question: with the evidence the character the street in of (1) patrol assigned area; it (2) was one of three streets to an officer’s there

63 in a whole and as a evidence, when construed This verdict, is jury’s the supporting most favorable to light street; (3) were numerous restaurants on the there a railroad station was area; (5) street; in was a taxi stand (4) was theater the there there a on the moving in both street; street (6) there vehicular traffic on the was on the street; (8) parked was directions; there (7) of the were on both sides cars issue, day (9) street; incident at police the of the and on a call box crossing the traffic when be to avoid vehicular officer had to careful the Similarly, Peirson, supra, in second case relied v. the 662-63. street. State 108, Harrison, App. dissent, 618 A.2d 1381 by State v. 30 Conn. on the jury aff'd, 758, (1994), it had before (1993), 638 A.2d the 228 Conn. 601 question substantially regarding road of the in evidence the character more Harrison, present jury that there In the court noted the did in the case. than patrolled street; (2) police the (1) regularly the town evidence that: was signs businesses; (3) the control on there were traffic street was lined street; posted stop street; (4) signals (5) on there was there were the department by speed limit; of (6) state the street was maintained the and transportation. Id., 119. apparent dispositive, Although that the evidence no factor is it is one roadways in regarding in Peirson and Harrison the character the substantially greater probative in than the evidence both amount and value present jury logical then, It and the in the case. Peirson before probative Harrison, jury substantially of a had more evidence more when the upon concerning the of the to base its conclusions character nature which roadways issue, reviewing the court would hold that evidence at case, verdict, support jury’s present in the where the the and sufficient probative substantially value, we con- in both and evidence is less amount juiy’s There- the insufficient to the verdict. clude that evidence was factually distinguishable fore, from the cases relied the dissent are present case. the establishing was a road within We reiterate that Whittier Avenue purview (a) crime reckless §of 14-222 was an essential element of the beyond driving, prove doubt. which the state had the burden to a reasonable Williams, supra, proof v. “It is fundamental that See State 398. beyond guilt . . The in a criminal case must be a reasonable doubt. concept] provides presump for the doubt concrete substance [reasonable elementary principle whose tion of innocence—that bedrock axiomatic and criminal enforcement lies at foundation the administration our time, by impressing upon need law. ... At the same [fact finder] accused, subjective guilt to reach a state of near certitude of the of the society symbolizes significance standard that our [reasonable doubt] liberty (Citations omit attaches to the criminal sanction thus to itself.” quotation Reynolds, 1, 105, ted; omitted.) internal marks State Conn. denied, 1614, (2003), A.2d 224 cert. 124 Ct. 158 L. Ed. U.S. S. concerning (2004). Respectfully, light 2d 254 of the dearth of evidence Avenue, agree Whittier we with the the character of do dissent conclude, beyond present case sufficient for doubt, municipal that was a road. reasonable it support not sufficient to the defendant’s conviction for 14-222 driving reckless in violation of was (a).8 It the burden establish, beyond state’s to doubt, reasonable municipal that Whittier Avenue was a record, road. The however, any does not contain evidence from which the without jury, resorting speculation and conjecture, infer could that Whittier was a municipal Avenue road. Because there was insufficient evidence to the defendant’s conviction reckless in violation driving upon dissent relies additional in evidence the record that the dissent supports open public. the that claims conclusion Whittier Avenue was the Specifically, jury reasonably the dissent states could conclude that public Avenue Whittier because there was evidence that the defendant day arrest, it had used on the of his there was evidence that other individuals way wrong past, the had driven down Whittier in the Avenue and there was public. no evidence that the the road closed off to that, Respectfully, disagree conjunction we when viewed with the other presented case, supported finding evidence in this this evidence that municipal Avenue Whittier was a road. Viewed in the the context of other us, facts before the evidence that the had used Whittier Avenue day wrong of his that arrest and other individuals had traveled way past logically support finding down Whittier in the Avenue does not open public. regard that Whittier Our Avenue was to the in this conclusion is bolstered the fact the defendant the other individuals to whom operated wrong dissent refers had their vehicles direction on thus, obey Avenue, and, posted signage stating Whittier had failed to “do Thus, persuaded by not enter.” we are not the dissent’s assertion that evi- dence that some members used had Whittier Avenue in a posted signage supports manner that was in violation an inference that open public. it was to the Moreover, accept premise we do not as valid the that a lack of evidence public supports that a street was “closed to the an off’ inference that the public. Certainly signage indicating street is evidence of some barrier or strong that a street was closed to the be would evidence that the private. agree, however, street was do the context of the present facts, supports signage a lack of such barriers or a reasonable public. that the road It inference was not defendant’s burden to municipal road; demonstrate that Whittier Avenue was it was not a beyond prove, doubt, state’s burden to a reasonable that Whittier Avenue municipal was a road. upon relies, The additional which the dissent when viewed in conjunction case, with the other evidence in this was not sufficient find, beyond doubt, a reasonable that Whittier Avenue was a municipal road. defen- denied the improperly court (a), of § as to that a motion for dant’s charge. only to the conviction is reversed as

The judgment with direc- and the case is remanded driving reckless of to that offense. of as judgment to render tion respects. all affirmed in other The J., concurred. opinion BEAR, In this in part dissenting ROBINSON, J., concurring majority opinion. I join part I of the with and part. agree opinion II because however, part from of the dissent, I to find jury had sufficient evidence I conclude of reckless defendant, Christopher Taylor, guilty driving. driving the defendant with reckless charged state “municipal road” in violation of General Statutes guilty be found 14-222 For the defendant to (a).

§ prove operated he driving, the state must reckless “any state, public highway vehicle on a motor municipal associ- any any specially or road of chartered any any parking ... or in area ation or of district upon any private road on which ten cars or more or upon any has ... speed limit been established or width, property recklessly, regard school to having road, property or traffic and use such school highway, parking area, the intersection streets and the weather ...” General Statutes (Emphasis added.) conditions. “municipal road” Although 14-222 the term does (a). fairly encómpassed 14-222 it is appear (a), set forth in General “highway” within the definition 14-1 (40). Statutes “any to “highway” defines include (40)

Section road, street, avenue, public highway, state or other the control alley, driveway, parkway place, or under any political of the state or subdivision of state, appropriated opened dedicated, or travel or Accordingly, required other use . . .”. the state was prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ave- Whittier Waterbury (1) nue was a road under the control of political (2) subdivision of the state and was under political control subdivision’s because it either opened appropriated dedicated, or travel other use. applied

Our courts have this definition to cir- factual cumstances similar to the case at bar. In State v. Peir- (1964),1 son, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 204 A.2d 838 charged operating defendant was a motor vehicle suspended with license violation of General Stat- guilty, utes 14-215.The him found and he there- after moved set the verdict, to aside which the court appeal, challenged Id., denied. 660-61. On he the denial claiming of his motion to set verdict, aside the present state had to failed evidence that Bank Street London, in New the on he arrested, street which was public highway. appeal, Id., 662. On the court challenge treated the defendant’s claim as a “that the prove guilt state had failed to the of the defendant beyond presented.” a reasonable doubt on the evidence 661. Id., question

The court first noted that the offense in proof required operated that the his vehicle public highway. on a The then Id., 662. court looked to (14), predecessor (40), the of 14-1 to determine “highway.” the definition of Id. That section defined “any “highway” highway, to include trunk line state aid 1 statutory precedent Appellate are We not bound the of the Division Hyatt, 426, 430, State v. App. Circuit the Court. 519 A.2d 612 however, precedent may, persuasive. See, State (1987). e.g., find such Johnson, App. 708, 717, (1992) (agreeing Conn. A.2d 1344 adopting interpretation responsibility evading statute), and Circuit Court’s 'd, (1993). aff 227 Conn. 630 A.2d 1059 avenue, alley, street, public highway, road, or road other the control of place, or under driveway, parkway thereof, dedicated, any political or subdivision state other use.” travel or opened to appropriated Using Id. this defini- quotation omitted.) marks (Internal examined analytical framework, the court as tion its awas to whether Bank Street determine Id., 662-63. public highway. police officer’s that, to the according

The court found Bank patrol been testimony, assigned the officer had “police 3,” beat No. which indicated part as Street this subdivision, municipality, had political “the The Id., its control.” 662. court area, Street, Bank under that indicated Bank Street identified evidence then travel, “the railroad particularly, opened Street, on Bank the defendant was located station Street, Bank restaurant which was located on entered a area, is in as are a taxi stand Capitol Theater walking were restaurants, people and and numerous were both sides of parked Cars thereabouts. moving in both directions. street, and traffic 150 feet from the defendant entered about restaurant intersection, had to cross street and officer an of vehicular traffic. and, doing, in so had be careful police There was a call box at the comer of State The that Id., Streets.” 662-63. court concluded Bank ample pub- that was a “there was evidence Bank Street city that it was control of the highway, lic under the dedicated, appropriated London and that it was New public Id., or use.” 663. opened or travel other v. Harrison, App. State 108, in 30 Conn. Similarly, aff'd, 638 A.2d (1993), 618 A.2d 1381 his challenged the defendant conviction (1994), while under the influence motor vehicle operating in of General intoxicating liquor chugs violation appeal, On he claimed that (a) (1). Statutes 14-227a beyond prove state had failed to a reasonable doubt operated he on a public that had his motor vehicle required highway, by as was 14-227a (a) (1). Id., 118. “public This court noted that highway” was not a term of art and stated that essential feature of a high- “[t]he way every equal that traveler has right an in it with every other traveler.” (Internal quotation marks omit- Id., This ted.) 118-19. court then examined the record roadway question evidence that indicated that the in open Id., was to the at 119. large. This court found that was evidence, there in the form of testimony by police officer who had arrested the defendant, roadway defendant had used the on the night question roadway and that was regularly patrolled by police. Id. Furthermore, town this court found that roadway there evidence that the lined with business had establishments, traffic control signs stop signals by and and was maintained the state department transportation on some occasions. Id. This court verdict, sustained the concluding that the jury reasonably could have that roadway inferred in question private way, was not but rather, highway. Id. present

In the case, ample there was pre- sented that Whittier Avenue under Waterbury’s Evidence, control. testimony the form of exhibits, showed that there were posted traffic control signs along Avenue. Raymond Whittier Officer Rose of the Waterbury department police testified Whittier Avenue patrol was within his area,2 he had been transcript following pros reveals the examination Rose ecutor: you patrolling Waterbury? And what —what “[The area are Prosecutor]: Alpha six. “[The Witness]: alpha alpha what’s “[The And six? Prosecutor]: — Alpha covering six is “[The the Bunker —Bunker Witness]: town —Bunker way Avenue area all over to the Watertown line. Okay. So, Avenue, would the “[The Whittier —Whittier East- Prosecutor]: your your ern Avenue area be in —in area to— —in Yes. “[The Witness]: you (Continuing) patrol? “[The And are familiar with . . . Prosecutor]: — that area? was patrol of his puipose before, in that area in did enforce and that he fact to traffic laws enforce Avenue had on Whittier violations that occurred traffic testimony Therefore, Rose’s day question. on the Water- was Whittier Avenue under indicates that control. bury’s Ave that Whittier presented

There was also evidence testimony There was opened public nue to travel. was had used day question, the defendant on the that, Avenue. attempt to Sunset get Avenue in an to Whittier testimony many people that had driven There of Whittier one-way section wrong direction presented numer prior on occasions. The state Avenue indicating Whittier Avenue photographs ous that Cle from opened pedestrians and drivers oncoming was not off to the Avenue and closed matis More only persons. limited by a number accessible map demon an presented the state aerial over, common only Avenue was not strated that Whittier homes to the residents of the numerous convenience also as an guests it and to their but served alongside Avenue. route from Clematis Avenue Eastern access inferences evidence, of this and the reasonable The sum Whittier Avenue therefrom, drawn indicate that opened travel. not ask whether there is a reason- appeal,

“On we do would a reason- able view of evidence that whether ask, instead, innocence. We hypothesis able Yes. . . “[The Witness]: you’re things Now, patrol, when what are some “[The Prosecutor]: you’re looking for? Well, basically patrol, you’re looking when on for violation “[The Witness]: vehicle, laws, taking in the area.” of motor violation of traffic and also calls victim, Luigi transcript following reveals the examination of the Legorano, by prosecutor: up right. All And if was to that one— someone drive “[The Prosecutor]: they just up way, go straight would be able to that street? —to Many people No. have to wide . . . You’d take a “[The Witness]: [turn.] up get hung really gotten You have here before. have to take wide to —to onto Avenue.” Whittier

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports jury’s guilty. verdict of . . . Furthermore, [i]n [our] process review, it does not probative diminish the force of the evidence that it consists, whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is fact, not one but the impact cumulative of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Inter- quotation nal marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 204, 210, 869 A.2d 171 (2005). presented

When with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that the evi- considering “[i]n dence introduced a case, are not [triers fact] required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected lay aside matters of com- mon knowledge or their own observations experi- and ence of the life, but, affairs of contrary, apply them to the facts in hand, to the end that their action ” may be intelligent their conclusions correct. (Inter- quotation nal marks omitted.) State v. Fauntleroy, Conn. App. 144, 153, 921 A.2d 622 On the (2007). basis of the impact cumulative presented of the facts and the inferences jury was entitled to draw therefrom, ample there was evidence for to reasonably have concluded that Whittier Avenue was a high- way, that it was under the city control of the of Water- bury and that it opened travel.

For the reasons I given, respectfully dissent from the order to render a judgment as to the reckless driving charge.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Taylor

Court Name: Connecticut Appellate Court

Date Published: Jan 11, 2011

Citation: 2011 Conn. App. LEXIS 16

Docket Number: AC 30757

Court Abbreviation: Conn. App. Ct.