State v. TaylorState v. Taylor
The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine,
His one assignment of error contends the police had no justification for the initial stop and no probable cause for the subsequent search of his vehicle.
FACTS
Officer Frank Wicks of the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section tеstified that on February 16, 1984 at approximately 11:40 p.m. he was on a two-week-old narcotics investigation at 2659 Cleveland St. for which a searсh warrant had been obtained. Using binoculars Officer Wicks watched the defendant stop his white van in front of the house, exit, then gaze in both directions down the street. He went to the front door, “fooled with” the mailbox, then moved back several feet. Officer Wicks interpreted the mailbox аctivity as a procedure (based on his two weeks of surveillance) for identification. The defendant was admitted to the house and stayed about five minutes. As he exited he put an object in his right front pants pocket. He looked up and down the street, then got into the van and drove off.
Officer Wicks concluded that a drug transaction had occurred and contacted Officers Goodey and Wethern (who were onе block away) and told them to stop the van. Officer Goodey testified they followed the white van and its interior light was on and the defendant was counting money. Their interceptation of the van at Orleans and Claiborne Avenues was observed by Officer Wicks who verified that Goodey and Wethern had the correct van.
When the van stopped for a red light at Orleans Ave. and Broad St. the two officers asked the defendant to exit. Officer Goodey observed a clear plastic packet containing a white powder substance on the engine housing. He beliеved the packet contained cocaine and placed the defendant under arrest. During the subsequent search, Goodey found аnother packet of white powder in the defendant‘s pocket. The substance proved to be cocaine and the total weight was about 1½ grams. Officer Goodey advised the defendant of his rights and on the way to police headquarters he admitted getting the cocаine from 2659 Cleveland St.
LAW
Citizens are protected from unreasonable search and seizure.
A Louisiana police officer may stop a person in a public plаce whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand his name, address, and an еxplanation of his actions.
We are satisfied thаt Officers Goodey and Wethern had reasonable cause to stop the white van driven by the defendant. The focus of a two week investigation and surveillance was a residence for which the officers had obtained a search warrant. Officer Wicks observed the defendаnt‘s van stop in front of the residence, his furtive glances up and down the street, the identification procedure at the mailbox, his admittancе and exit after a five minute stay as he placed something in his pants pocket, and his hurried departure into the white van after looking in both directions.
Wicks properly notified Goodey of the suspected narcotics transaction and asked that the white van be stopped. Goodey intercepted the van (verified by Officer Wicks) and observed the defendant counting money as he drove with the interior light on. Under these circumstances there was reasonable cause to stop the van. See State v. Williams, 489 So.2d 286 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986).
Once the vehicle had been lawfully detained, for sаfety reasons the police officer could order the defendant driver to get out of the van without violating the Fourth Amendment. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).
The fact that Officer Goodey observed the clear plastic packet of white powder on the engine housing when he legally stopped the van makes the “plain view” doctrine applicable. The officer inadvertently discovered the packet and it was immediately apparent that the packet contained cocaine. See State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 (La.1982). His observations were made from a vantage point without intrusion upon the protected area.
The plain view discovery ripened the reasonable suspicion into probable сause. See State v. Smith, 489 So.2d 966 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). However, when an officer observes evidence in a vehicle without entering a protected area, he may nоt seize the evidence without a warrant absent exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 525 (La.1979); State v. Parker, 355 So.2d 900 (La.1978). Plain viеw of contraband (alone) is never enough to justify a warrantless seizure of evidence.
We are satisfied the police had probаble cause at that point. The van was movable, the occupant had been alerted, and the car‘s contents might never be found again. The “automobile exception” is applicable. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). There were also exigent circumstances
Once the officers had probable сause to arrest, the seizure of the additional packet after a search of the defendant incident to arrest was also valid. See State v. Doucet, 420 So.2d 953 (La.1982). The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
We have reviewed the record for errors patent and there are none.
The defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.