The state appeals from a pretrial suppression order excluding evidence obtained in a search conducted during a traffic stop. We conclude that the search violated ORS 810.410(3) and, therefore, that the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence.
The relevant facts found by the trial court are аs follows. State Trooper Klepp was on patrol in Coos Bay when he saw a person driving a car that had a defective headlight, which is a traffic infraction. ORS 811.515; ORS 811.520. He stopped the car for the infraction. As Klepp approached the car, he noticed that defendant, who was in the back seat, appeared to be trying to hide something underneath the front seat. After obtaining the identification of the driver and the passengers, Klepp asked defendant if she would step out of the car. 1 After defendant got out, Klepp frisked her for weapons and found none. He then asked defendant if he could search her purse, which he could see on the floor of the car in front of where her feet had been. Defendant agreed. Inside the purse, Klepp found a syringe containing a red liquid residue that he believed was a controlled substance. Some time after obtaining defendant’s consent to search her purse, he was notified by his dispatcher that there was a wаrrant for defendant’s arrest for possession of a controlled substance. 2 He arrested defendant, advised her of her Miranda rights, searched her again and placed her in the back seat of his patrol cаr. He then took defendant to the Coos County Jail, where she told him that the syringe had contained methamphetamine and that she had shot up with it four days before her arrest.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the syringe and her incriminating statements, *690 claiming that they were the product of an unlawful stop. The state argued that the existence of a warrant for defendant’s arrest cleansed the evidence of any taint arising from what may have been an unlawful stop. In the alternative, the state argued that defendant had voluntarily consented to the search and that her consent was valid even if the stop was unlawful. The trial court cоncluded that the stop of defendant was unlawful, because Klepp had no reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime and he had completed his inquiry about the traffic infraction before he asked defendant to get out of the car. The court further concluded that, because defendant’s consent was the result of the unlawful stop, it was coerced under the circumstances.
The state contends that the court erred in suppressing the evidence becаuse (1) defendant voluntarily consented to the search; (2) the existence of the arrest warrant cleansed the evidence of any taint that might have come from an unlawful stop; and (3) defendant was not “stopped.” We address the third argument first, because its resolution affects our analysis of the other arguments.
The trial court concluded that the search of defendant was unlawful because the investigation of the traffic infraction had been resolved, and Klepp had no other, indepеndent, reason to suspect defendant of having committed a crime. Under ORS 810.410(3)(b), a police officer
“[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic infractiоn for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.”
The Supreme Court has held that ORS 810.410(3)(b) рrohibits police officers who stop vehicles for traffic infractions from investigating anything other than the infractions unless they have an independent basis to expand the scope of the stop.
State v. Dominguez-Martinez,
*691
The state argues that the restrictions imposed by ORS 810.410(3)(b), as interpreted by
Dominguez-Martinez
and its progeny, do not apply to
passengers
in cars stopped for traffic infractions.
4
We disagree. Although some cases interpreting ORS 810.410(3)(b) have contained language that can be rеad so restrictively, there is nothing in the statute itself to support such a restrictive reading. Indeed, the codefendant in
Dominguez-Martinez
was the car’s passenger, and it was the consent search of that passenger that was rejected by the Supreme Court. The court did not differentiate between the driver and the passenger when it discussed the statute, and our cases have applied the statute to drivers and passengers alike.
See, e.g., State v. Foster,
We conclude that a police officer has no authority to question or search passengers of a stopped vehicle after the officer has resolved the investigation of the infraction that led to the stop unless the officer is acting pursuant to an independent source of authority. The state has conceded that Klepp had no such independent authority. It follows that defendаnt’s consent to the search of her purse does not make the search lawful, because the consent would not have been obtained had the officer сomplied with ORS 810.410(3)(b).
Dominguez-Martinez,
The state contеnds, however, that even if Klepp unlawfully obtained defendant’s consent to the search, the evidence obtained as a result of that consent is nonetheless аdmissible because the existence of the outstanding warrant
*692
for defendant’s arrest cleansed that evidence of any taint of the prior unlawful conduct. The statе relies on
State v. Dempster,
248
Or 404, 434
P2d 746 (1967), and related cases as support for that proposition.
See, e.g., State v. Snyder,
Affirmed.
Notes
Klepp testified that he did so because he was concernеd for his safety. The trial court concluded that Klepp did not articulate sufficient objective facts to support a search based on concern for his safety,
see State v. Bates,
Klepp first testified that he received notice of the arrest warrant “at that same moment in time” that he found the syringe. He later testified that he received the information “a short period of time” after he had talked to defendant and asked to search her purse.
In
Dominguez-Martinez,
the court strongly reaffirmed its earlier decision in
State v. Davis,
“[W]hen the object of the statute is to define the authоrity of officers to seize or to search a person or property * * * the court has drawn the logical *691 consequence and has given effect to the statute by denying the state the use of evidence that it would not have secured if its officer had respected the rights that the statute was designed to protect.”
The state also argues that simply asking a passenger to get out of a car does not constitute a “stop” and cites certain past decisions by this court in support of that argument.
See, e.g., State v. Woods,
The state does not argue that the search was conducted as a search incident to a lawful arrest.