State v. Taylor

Aug 20, 2026
2204012723

ORDER

Upon consideration of Defendant Shawn Taylor‘s Motion for Postconviction Relief,1 the State‘s response thereto,2 his postconviction counsel‘s Motion to Withdraw,3 his trial counsel‘s affidavit,4 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

(1) In its order resolving Mr. Taylor‘s direct appeal, thе Delaware Supreme Court deftly set forth the factual background of his crime as follows:

On the night of April 24, 2022, Trooper Hunter Bordley of the Delaware State Police pulled over a two-door, dark grey Dodge Challenger for speeding. The vehicle was going twenty miles per hour over the speed limit. When Trooper Bordley approached the vehicle, he observed four рeople seated in the car — two in the front and two in the back. Taylor was seated in the back seat behind the driver. Naim Abdullah, a friend of the driver, sat next to Taylor in the backseat.

During the stop, Trooper Bordley detected the odor of marijuana. Accordingly, he removed the driver from the vehicle and called for backup, which included Detective George Justice, to hеlp remove the other passengers from the vehicle and control the scene. When Detective Justice attempted to remove the front seat passenger from the vehicle, Trooper Bordley, standing at the rear of the vehicle, observed Taylor lean toward the floorboard of the vehicle. Because the reason for the downward reach was unknown, Trooper Bordley decided to quickly remove Taylor from the car. Because the Dodge Challenger was a two-door coupe, removing Taylor from the back seat required pulling the front seat forward.

After Taylor was removed, Trooper Bordley went back to the vehicle and searched the floorboard in front of where Taylor had been sitting. There, he found two items: a wаter bottle containing burnt marijuana and a loaded green firearm that, according to Trooper Bordley, was not visible when he removed Taylor from the back seat.

Delaware State Police collected the firearm for fingerprinting and DNA analysis. None of the prints or DNA samples were interpretable. During police interviews, both Taylor and Abdullah denied knowing to whom the gun belonged. Although Abdullah later took responsibility for the gun, Trooper Bordley testified that Abdullah had only done so in the hope that Taylor would be released and then post Abdullah‘s bail.5

(2) The Court went on to describe the salient procedural background:

Due to their prior criminal histories, both Taylor and Abdullah were indicted for [possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP“)], carrying a concеaled deadly weapon (“CCDW“), possession of ammunition by a person prohibited (“PABPP“), and second-degree conspiracy. Abdullah pleaded guilty to CCDW and second-degree conspiracy. Taylor opted for a bench trial. At trial, the State‘s theory was that, when Taylor leaned forward, he had taken the gun, either from his person or Abdullah, and placed it under the driver‘s seat.

For some unknown reason, the police did not collect the water bottle containing the burnt marijuana. The court was therefore required to assume when weighing the evidence of the water bottle, had it been preserved, would have been exculpatory. In Taylor‘s case, the court understood the required inference to be that, if preserved, forensic analysis of the water bottle wоuld have established that Taylor was its sole prior possessor. Even with the inference—that Taylor was reaching for the water bottle—the court convicted him of PFBPP but acquitted him of all other charges.6

(3) Mr. Taylor was sentenced two months later.7 In his case the PFBPP was a class C felony.8 And he was sentenced to serve, inter alia, a cumulative 5-year period of unsuspended imprisonment—the minimum term of incarceration that the Court was constrained to impose and could not suspend.9 Up until this point Mr. Taylor had been represented by Kevin P. Tray, Esquire.

(4) Mr. Taylor filed a direct apрeal in the Delaware Supreme Court. His conviction and sentence were affirmed.10

II. MR. TAYLOR‘S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

(5) The following month, Mr. Taylor filed, pro se, the present Motion for Postconviction Relief11 and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.12 The Court granted Mr. Taylor‘s Motion for Appointment of Counsel13 and James J. Haley, Jr., Esquire, (hereinafter “Postconviction Counsel” or “PCR Counsel“) was appointed to represent him in his postconviction proceeding. Mr. Haley has filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.14 In the memorandum supporting his motion, Mr. Halеy reports that, after careful review of Mr. Taylor‘s case, Mr. Taylor‘s claims are so lacking in merit that he cannot ethically advocate for them; and further, that he is not aware of any other substantial grounds for relief.15 Mr. Taylor was given an opportunity to respond to his PCR Counsel‘s motion and memorandum, as well as the State‘s response.16 He has filed nothing more. Mr. Taylor‘s trial counsel has filed an affidavit addressing Mr. Taylor‘s postconviction claims.17 And the State has filed its response opposing ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍Mr. Taylor‘s postconviction motion.18

(6) In his postconviction motion, Mr. Taylor raised one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and one standalone claim of Court error.19 Specifically, Mr. Taylor alleges his trial counsel, Mr. Tray, was ineffective because he never filed a suppression motion on Mr. Taylor‘s behalf.20 Mr. Taylor also contends he is due postconviction relief because he of his “actual innocence” of the PFBPP count he was convicted of.21

(7) As noted earlier, in accord with this Court‘s Criminal Rule 61(e)(1), Mr. Taylor was appointed postconviction counsel.22 Mr. Haley has now, pursuant to Rule 61(e)(7), filed a motion to withdraw with a supporting memorandum and appendix.23 Mr. Haley avers that, based upon a careful and complete examination of the record, there are no meritorious grounds for postcоnviction relief.24

(8) Under this Court‘s Criminal Rule 61(e)(7):

If counsel considers the movant‘s claim to be so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to the movant, counsel may move to withdraw. The motion shall explain the factual and legal basis for counsel‘s opinion and shall give notice that the movant may file а response to the motion within 30 days of service of the motion upon the movant.25

(9) Mr. Haley conducted a careful review of Mr. Taylor‘s case and determined that Mr. Taylor‘s claims are so lacking in merit that he cannot ethically advocate them. Mr. Haley explains further that he is unaware of any other substantial ground for relief.26 Mr. Taylor has been given an opportunity to file a rеsponse to PCR Counsel‘s motion to withdraw,27 as well as to docket any reply to the supplementary materials and State‘s response to his motion.28 He has filed nothing further for the Court to consider.

III. RULE 61‘S PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

(10) In order to evaluate Mr. Taylor‘s postconviction claims, and to determine whether his PCR Counsel‘s motion to withdraw should be granted, the Court should be satisfied that Mr. Haley conducted a truly conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support Mr. Taylor‘s Rule 61 motion. The Court should also conduct its own review of the record to determine whether Mr. Taylor‘s Rule 61 motion is devoid of any, at least, arguable postconviction claims.29

(11) Delaware courts must consider Criminal Rule 61‘s procedural requirements before addressing any substantive issues.30 The procedural bars in Rule 61 are timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former adjudication.31

Here, Mr. Taylor‘s motion was filed less than a year after his judgment of conviction became final.32 So, it‘s timely. This is Mr. Taylor‘s first Rule 61 application. So, it‘s not repetitive. But the Rule 61‘s other two procedural bars are relevant here.

(12) Under Rule 61(i)(4): “Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeаs corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.”33

(13) Rule 61(i)(3) bars any particular claim that could have been but was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, unless the defendant can show cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice.34 Generally, Rule 61(i)(3) is inapplicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—which in the norm can‘t be raised against trial counsel on direct appeal.35 And so, the Court usually considers those claims on their merits during postconviction proceedings.36

IV. DISCUSSION

A. MR. TAYLOR‘S “ACTUAL INNOCENCE” CLAIM IS A MERE REPACKING OF THE “INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE” ARGUMENTS MADE AT TRIAL AND ON DIRECT APPEAL.

(14) Mr. Taylor‘s standalone claim of “actual innocence“—alleging ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍that he should not have been convicted because:

There was a firearm found on the floor-board (sic) under the seat in from of where I was sitting. My DNA was not on the firearm. It was not in my possession, and the owner admitted it was his.37

is the same insufficient-evidence argument made, and rejected, at both trial and on direct appeal with a lightly different label attached thereto. It is, therefore, procedurally barred.38

(15) During his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Mr. Taylor was represented by counsel who argued a single claim—that the State presented insufficient evidence of his guilt of PFBPP.39 And when arguing such, appellate counsel outlined the very same factors and evidence Mr. Taylor does now.40

(16) “Justice does not require that an issue that has been previously considered and rejected be revisited simply because the claim is refined or restated.”41 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court addressed Mr. Taylor‘s insufficient evidence/actual innocence claim in a manner that triggers Rule 61(i)(4)‘s former adjudication bar.

(17) When assessing a certain postconviction claim this Court might find its underlying issues to have been fully addressed in an earlier adjudication of a related claim in the case and “conclude that the interests of justice would not be served by any further consideration of them.”42 “No doubt, a postconviction court is often urged by a Rule 61 petitioner to address a claim close but not identical to one that was substantively resolved—i.e., formerly adjudicated—on direct appeal.”43 Then, “the relevant determination is whether the underlying issue of a claim has already been decided.”44 And when it has, the latter postconviction claim is properly deemed procedurally barred because “a defendant is not entitled to have a court re-examine an issue that has been previously resolved.”45

(18) Here, Mr. Taylor‘s actual innocence claim—which was earlier cast as an insufficient-evidence argument—was substantively examined and resolved both at trial and on direct appeal. Thus, his current “actual innocence” claim is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4).

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM.

(19) A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.46 One claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (a) his defense counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (b) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel‘s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.47

(20) Now, “[t]he likelihood of [that] different result must be substantial, not just conceivablе.”48 And while the “objective inquiry is not mathematically precise,” there can only be a finding of the required prejudice “when there is a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would have occurred but for counsel‘s deficient performance.”49

(21) So, at some point for a movant to be successful under Strickland, the Court “must consider the totality of the evidence, and must ask if the movant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors” he alleges counsel made.50

(22) A movant must prove both deficient attorney performance and resulting prejudice to succeed in making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Failure in the first instance to prove either will doom his claim, and the Court need not address the other.51 Put another way, “if the Court finds that there is no possibility of prejudice even if a defendant‘s allegations regarding counsel‘s representatiоn were true, the Court may dispose of the claim on this basis alone.”52

(23) To determine whether Mr. Taylor was prejudiced because Mr. Tray ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍filed no suppression motion, the Court can begin and end its Strickland examination by considering the proposed Fourth Amendment issue‘s merits.53

(24) In whole, Mr. Taylor‘s entire postconviction claim reads:

There was no legitimate purpose to search the car and at no point did my аttorney file a motion to suppress. . . . There was no legitimate reason to search the car, marijuana is legal and, as such, was not a reason to search the car. As a passenger I should not have been subject to seizure or search.54

(25) Even were the Court to assume that Mr. Tray‘s performance was deficient because he didn‘t file a suppression motion to exclude the firearm found—which it was not55—this claim still fails under the Strickland prejudice analysis. This is because any attempt to exclude the firearm from evidence invoking search-and-seizure principles would have failed.

(26) “Police officers are permitted to stop a motor vehicle based on a police officer‘s reasonable suspicion that the operator or occupant of the vehicle has committed or is committing a violation of the law.”56 Here the vehicle was stopped for speeding.57 After the officers pulled over the vehicle that Mr. Taylor was travelling in, all the occupants, including Mr. Taylor, were removed. Once a vehicle is validly stopped, the police may have the vehicle‘s driver and passengers step out of it.58 “When that happens, mere passengers lose any potential standing they may hаve had to challenge evidence gathered from a later search of the vehicle.”59 Thus, on standing alone any suppression motion here would fail.60

(27) Given the applicable law, it cannot be shown that there was a meaningful chance that but for Mr. Tray‘s failure to move for suppression of the firearm found in car in which Mr. Taylor travelling, that handgun would have been excluded and Mr. Taylor acquitted of PFBPP.

V. CONCLUSION

(28) Having reviewed the record carefully, the Court has concluded that Mr. Taylor‘s claims are without merit, and no other substantial grounds for relief exists. He has not met his heavy burden under Strickland of demonstrating that his trial attorney‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his alleged errors, the outcome of his case would have been any different. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor‘s Motiоn for Postconviction Relief is DENIED and Mr. Haley‘s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED,

Paul R. Wallace

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Notes

1
D.I. 41.
2
D.I. 53.
3
D.I. 48 (“PCR Counsel‘s Mot. to Withdraw Br.“); id. (“PCR Counsel‘s App‘x” [contents of this comprehensive volume will be cited hereinafter as “A-***“].
4
D.I. 52.
6
Id. at *1-2. See A-32-35 (Indictment); A-59 (Jury Trial Waiver); A-61-154 (Trial Transcript); A-136-40 (Lolly argument and ruling); A-157-83 (Bench Verdict); D.I. 25 (Verdict Form).
7
D.I. 27.
8
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1448(c) and (e)(1)(2021) (PFBPP due to a prior violent felony is a class C felony).
9
Id. at § 1448(e)(1)(b) (mandating a five-year minimum for one who possesses a firearm within ten years of a conviction for a violent felony or release from the sentence for such); A-189-92 (Sentencing Order).
10
Taylor v. State, 2024 WL 3810967, at *3. Mr. Taylor was appointed appellate counsel, Kimberly A. Price, Esquire, who argued that this Court erred by convicting him on insufficient evidence of PFBPP; particularly when the Court had acquitted him of CCDW. Id. at *2. See A-196-220; A-241-49 (Mr. Taylor‘s Opening and Reply Briefs on direct appeal).
11
D.I. 41.
12
D.I. 42.
13
D.I. 43.
14
D.I. 48.
15
Id. at 1, 21-26.
16
D.I. 49.
17
D.I. 52. There was no need for Ms. Price, his appellate counsel, to file a substantive affidavit because Mr. Taylor made no claims regаrding her performance. See D.I. 50.
18
D.I. 53.
19
Def.‘s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3. Mr. Taylor‘s attempt to raise a second freestanding ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍claim of “Illegal Search and Seizure” would be procedurally barred as such by Rule 61(i)(3) because it was never raised at trial or on direct appeal. That said, it is just a slightly different take on or subsumed within Mr. Taylor‘s single ineffective assistance of counsel claim аnd is, therefore, addressed and resolved in the prejudice analysis engaged thereon.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
D.I. 44 (Order Granting Def.‘s Mot. for Appt. of Counsel).
23
D.I. 48.
24
Id. at 1, 21-26.
25
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
26
PCR Counsel‘s Mot. to Withdraw at 1, 28.
27
D.I. 49, at ¶6.
28
Id. at ¶14.
31
State v. Peters, 283 A.3d 668, 680 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022), aff‘d, 2023 WL 3880124 (Del. June 7, 2023); State v. Madison, 2022 WL 3011377, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 29, 2022), aff‘d, 2022 WL 17982946 (Del. Dec. 29, 2022). These procedural requirements are considered on a claim-by-claim basis. State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 342 n.15 (Del. 2017) (instructing that the “Rule 61 analysis should proceed claim-by-claim, as indicated by the language of the rule“); Madison, 2022 WL 3011377, at *2. And, if any one of these bars applies to a specific claim, then the inmate must show entitlement to exception therefrom under Rule 61(i)(5). Id.; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that Rule 61‘s procedural bars found in (i)(1)-(4) do not apply to a claim: that the court lacked jurisdiction; that pleads with particularity new evidence of the defendant‘s actual innocence; or, that application of a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral review is required).
32
D.I. 41 (Def.‘s Mot. for Postconviction Rеlief); D.I. 40 (Supreme Court Mandate).
33
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
34
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows . . . [c]ause for relief from the procedural default and . . . [p]rejudice from violation of the movant‘s rights.“).
35
See State v. Smith, 2017 WL 2930930, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 7, 2017); see also Guy v. State, 82 A.3d 710, 715 (Del. 2013) (noting that in Delaware ineffective assistance of trial counsel may not be raised on direct appeal).
37
Def.‘s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
38
Care must be taken to recognize that Mr. Taylor is not arguing the existence of the procedural-bar exception found in Rule 61(i)(5). Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that Rule 61‘s procedural bars found in (i)(1)-(4) do not apply to a claim that pleads with particularity new evidence of the defendant‘s actual innocence). Mr. Taylor argues no new evidence, just his view that the trial evidenсe produced to convict him was not enough and he is, in turn, actually innocent.
40
See, e.g, A-217; A-245.
45
Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992). See Garvey v. State, 2009 WL 2882873, at *1 (Del. Sept. 10, 2009) (finding a claim procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(4) because the court “disagree[d] with [movant]‘s contention that his current claim [wa]s sufficiently distinguishable from [a] previous claim to warrant consideration in this [postconviction] proceeding” as postconviction movant “merely recast his previously-rejected claim as an attack on his indictment.“).
48
Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“It is not enоugh for the [postconviction movant] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.” (citation omitted)).
51
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 825 (”Strickland is a two-рronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant” (citation omitted)); State v. Hamby, 2005 WL 914462, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
52
State v. Manley, 2014 WL 2621317, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174-75 (Del. 2020) (“We may dispose of an ineffective-assistance claim based on the absence of sufficient prejudice without addressing the performance prong if, in fact prejudice is lacking.“); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“an error by counsel, evеn if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the criminal judgment if the error had no effect“).
54
Def.‘s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
55
State v. Day, 2010 WL 2861852, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 8, 2010), aff‘d, 2011 WL 3617797 (Del. Aug. 17, 2011) (“Delaware courts have held multiple times that an attorney‘s failure to file a motion to suppress, when he had a reasonable belief that such a motion would not be successful, falls within the objective standard of reasonableness required under Strickland.“) (listing cases); Peters, 283 A.3d at 696 (“Counsel cannot be inеffective for failing to make futile arguments.“) (cleaned up).
57
State v. Huntley, 777A.2d 249, 254 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (explaining that “ordinarily a traffic stop involving a motorist does not initially violate the federal Constitution if the police have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation“) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).
59
State v. Jackson, 2022 WL 18401412, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2022); see also State v. Goldsborough, 2022 WL 3695054, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2022) (“a mere passenger in a vehicle does not have standing to challenge a search” (citatiоns omitted)); United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 441-42 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is clear that a passenger in a car that he neither owns nor leases ‍​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍typically has no standing to challenge a search of the car.” (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)); see Mills v. State, 2006 WL 1027202, at *2 (Del. Apr. 17, 2006) (finding a mere passenger lacks “standing with respect to the . . . search of [a] vehicle“).
60
That said, it is clear the police detected the handgun in plain view once the occupants were removed or that extant probable cause supported the limited search that uncovered it. Thus, the gun was seizable at that time. See, e.g., McDougal v. State, 2015 WL 7272051, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2015); State v. DuBose, 2016 WL 1590583, at *2 (Del. Apr. 17, 2006). Thus, any further suppression arguments would have been unsuccessful.