State v. TatumState v. Tatum
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Keith
OPINION
KEITH, Chief Justice.
In this case we are asked to address the operation of certain penalty provisions in the contempts statute,
I.
Tatum was a member of the Rolling 60’s Crips gang on March 31, 1995, when Roy Griffin was killed. Tatum was charged with first-degree murder in connection with Griffin’s death, but he was acquitted by a jury on November 7, 1995. Before the verdict, Tatum was subpoenaed and ordered to appear before the Hennepin County district court judge who was to preside at the trial of Tatum’s co-defendant, Samuel Byers.
After Tatum was acquitted, the State sought to compel Tatum’s testimony in Byers’ upcoming trial. At the hearing on the State’s request, counsel for Tatum argued that Tatum’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination would justify a refusal to testify. Tatum’s counsel also argued that if Tatum were compelled to testify he would be placed in personal danger, although no specific threats directed against Tatum were identified. The district court rejected the arguments for privilege because, pursuant to the State’s request, Tatum would receive immunity from the use of his testimony.
See
Despite the district court’s ruling, Tatum indicated at the hearing that he would refuse to testify if called by the State as a witness in the Byers trial. The court deemed Tatum an unavailable witness and concluded that he had no right to refuse to testify in violation of the court’s order. The court then found Tatum in contempt for refusing to testify despite receiving use immunity. The court concluded: (1) that Tatum’s refusal was a direct contempt under section 588.01; (2) that the refusal was a criminal contempt “under a willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of the court”;
1
and
In punishing Tatum for direct criminal contempt, the district court made a good-faith effort to follow the contempts statute. The court concluded that Tatum’s indication that he would not testify was a direct contempt under section 588.01 because Tatum offered his intentions in the presence of the judge. See id. § 588.01, subd. 2. The court then invoked the summary punishment provision in section 588.03. Although it did not expressly refer to section 588.20 as a basis for the contempt order, the court did use the language of section 588.20(4): “I will further find that it is a criminal contempt. And I find that under a willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of the court.” The court also appeared to invoke the language of section 588.20(5): “The resistance [to testify] is willfully offered.” However, the court did not explain why the sentence for Tatum’s willful disobedience was governed by section 588.10.
The court of appeals granted Tatum’s petition for a writ of prohibition, concluding that the judiciary’s inherent power to punish a civil contempt is not limited by statute, but that the legislature can and has prescribed the appropriate punishment for criminal offenses. Section 588.20 lists “criminal con-tempts,” including willful disobedience to a lawful court process or other mandate. Id. § 588.20(4). The court reasoned that the legislature provided a misdemeanor penalty for such contempts and therefore the district court exceeded its lawful authority when it imposed a sentence longer than 90 days. See id. § 609.02, subd. 3 (limiting misdemeanor sentences to 90 days). The court stated that the 6-month maximum sentence in section 588.10 would have applied if Tatum’s contempt were not included in section 588.20, but here, section 588.20 governed.
II.
We first consider the character of the contempt order and Tatum’s conduct.
Traditionally, the law of contempt in Minnesota has been organized around two classifications — one judicially crafted and the other statutorily mandated. First, our contempt ease law explains that the purpose of the court’s contempt order can be either remedial or punitive. Knajdek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1967). The primary purpose of “criminal” contempt orders is punitive — in general, vindicating the court’s authority by punishing the eon-temnor for past behavior. Minnesota State Bar Ass’n v. Divorce Assistance Ass’n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976). The primary purpose of “civil” contempt orders is remedial — in general, vindicating the rights of a party by imposing a sanction that will be removed upon compliance with a court order that has been defied. Id. 2
Second, the contempts statute instructs that
the nature of the contemptuous conduct
can be either direct or constructive. Direct contempts occur in the immediate
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings;
(2) A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the business of the court.
To ensure that contempt orders are validly issued, we recommend that courts considering a contempt penalty determine at their earliest convenience whether the purpose of the contempt proceeding is remedial or punitive, and whether the nature of the contemptuous conduct at issue is direct or constructive.
Here, Tatum’s contempt was direct because it violated the court’s order that he be available to testify and because the defiance took place in the presence of the court.
See
III.
We next consider whether the contempts statute limits Tatum’s sentence to 6 months or to 90 days. Section 588.10 authorizes imprisonment not exceeding 6 months and a fine not exceeding $250, or both. In contrast, section 588.20 lists several types of criminal contempt for which the legislature has prescribed a misdemeanor penalty. “Every person who shall commit a contempt of court, of any one of the following kinds, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”:
(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due to its authority;
⅜ * * * * ⅜
(3) breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of a court, jury, or referee;
(4) willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of a court;
(5) resistance willfully offered to its lawful process or other mandate;
(6) contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory[J
Neither penalty provision applies to direct contempt, summarily sentenced, for punitive purposes. We agree with Tatum that section 588.10 does not govern this case. Section 588.10 applies only to constructive contempts and direct contempts that are not summarily punished.
Cf. Peterson,
278 Minn, at 279 & n. 5,153 N.W.2d at 828 & n. 5 (stating that section 588.10 applies to
constructive
criminal contempts). This conclusion is based on the plain language of the statute:
“Upon the evidence so taken,
the court or officer shall determine the guilt or innocence of the person
proceeded against
* * *.”
However, we also agree with the State that the misdemeanor penalty in
More important, legislative history supports the conclusion that the misdemean- or crime in
The relocation of the contempt misdemean- or provision, therefore, is not an indication that the legislative purpose had changed. We restore the intended statutory division between the crime
of contempt
and
judicial contempt,
and hold that
IV.
It remains to be decided what penalty is proper for direct contempt, summarily sentenced, for punitive purposes.
The absence of clear statutory sentencing limits for direct contempts that are summarily addressed for punitive purposes does not mean that courts possess unbounded discretion over sentencing. There are three, clear limitations on such sentences. First, the federal constitution requires that jury trial rights be afforded the contemnor when the sentence to be imposed is longer than 6 months.
See International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bag-well,
512 U.S. 821,- - - & n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2556-57 & n. 2, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994);
Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 475-76, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 2190, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975);
Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 208-11, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1485-88, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968).
6
Thus, a summary contempt penalty for punitive purposes is never proper if the sentence exceeds 6 months. Second, appellate courts in this state retain their traditional power to review punitive contempt orders for arbitrariness, capriciousness, and oppressiveness.
In re Jenison,
265 Minn. 96, 103, 120 N.W.2d 515, 520,
vacated on other grounds,
375 U.S. 14, 14, 84 S.Ct. 63, 11 L.Ed.2d 39 (1963);
In re Cary,
165 Minn. 203, 205-07, 206 N.W. 402, 403-04 (1925). Third, the principle of comity recommends deference to legislative judgments, especially in this area of law which so closely borders traditional criminal statutes. We held above that the misdemeanor penalty limitation in
In this case, the district court’s summary sentence of 6 months satisfied federal constitutional requirements. The order makes clear, however, that the court was attempting to follow the contempts statute and did not intend to rely on inherent judicial authority. The court stated, “I have made the findings necessary under 588.03, and I will adjudge, then, Mr. Tatum guilty of contempt and that he be punished under the statute.” (Emphasis added). The court also stated that it sought to vindicate its authority, but that language was most likely a reference to our established description of punitive contempt sanctions. See Minnesota State Bar Ass’n, 311 Minn. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741.
Under these circumstances, we remand the case for further consideration by the district court, consistent with this opinion. Our deei
Reversed and remanded.
BLATZ, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Notes
. The district court did not offer Tatum freedom in return for his testimony. “[T]he criminal contempt puipose is to vindicate the authority of the court. Civil contempt‘s purpose is to coerce
. For the purpose of clarily, we advise the use of the terms “remedial” and “punitive,” rather than “civil” and “criminal.” The latter are defined by the former, and extinguishing at least one layer of terminology will help simplify the law of contempt. We wish to make clear, however, that the substance of our prior decisions referring to “civil” and “criminal” contempt is in no way affected by our adoption of more intelligible labels in this opinion.
We also note that the applicability of federal constitutional rights in this context may turn on the “civil’’/“criminal” distinction, and that the federal standard for this distinction is consistent with our own. See Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-35, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429-31, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) (classifying con-tempts by the character of the relief and the substance of the proceedings; holding that a contempt is “criminal” and punitive when the penalty imposed is a fixed term of imprisonment or a fine payable to the court, and “civil” and remedial when the contemnor can purge the contempt by performance of an act required by the court).
. Constructive contempt proceedings for punitive purposes entitle the accused to procedural safeguards including prosecution by the state, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Knajdek, 278 Minn, at 284, 153 N.W.2d. at 847; Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 281, 153 N.W.2d 825, 830 (1967); State v. Binder, 190 Minn. 305, 311, 251 N.W. 665, 668 (1933). Constructive contempt proceedings for remedial purposes also require a hearing and other procedural protections. See Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn.1984); see also Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174-75, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216-17 (1968).
. Again, only
direct
contempts may be punished summarily by a court.
To the extent that any of our prior opinions implied that predecessors to
. Dicta in
Peterson
indicated that
. If imposed for punitive purposes, contempt fines may also trigger jury trial rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Bagwell,
512 U.S. at- n. 5, 114 S.Ct. at 2562 n. 5. We also note that
Muniz,
422 U.S. at 475, 95 S.Ct. at 2190, concerned contempt of federal court, but we see no reason for less protective jury trial rights when a contempt is committed in a Minnesota state court.
See
. We emphasize that the legislature has constitutional authority to limit summary and punitive penalties for direct judicial contempt, as long as the penalties provided are not so limited that the judiciary‘s ability to preserve its own authority is threatened.
See Binder,
190 Minn, at 313, 251 N.W. at 668;
Langum,
125 Minn, at 306-07, 146 N.W. at 1103;
State ex rel. Holland v. Miesen,
98 Minn. 19, 20-21, 108 N.W. 513, 513 (1906) (“While the Legislature cannot take away from courts created by the Constitution the inherent right to punish contempts yet it may regulate within reasonable limits, the exercise of the power.”). In fact, statutory guidance seems particularly proper in the context of judicial contempt orders based on inherent authority — a necessary but somewhat troublesome exception to “our usual notions of fairness and separation of powers.”
See Bagwell,
512 U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 2563 (Scalia, J., concurring). If the legislature wishes to consider limiting summary and punitive direct contempt sentences by the terms of either
It should also be clear that this opinion in no way questions the validity of the various penalty provisions in the contempts statute, when they apply.