State v. TarasiukState v. Tarasiuk
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Alvord
Opinion
ALVORD, J.
The defendant, Jacek Tarasiuk, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts, as relevant to the issues raised in the defendant’s appeal. The defendant and the victim, Margorzata Backiel, finalized their divorce in May, 2006, but litigation with respect to child support and visitation continued postjudgment. On June 5,2008, the defendant and Backiel were at the New Britain courthouse for one such proceeding. After the hearing, the defendant noticeably was agitated and addressed Backiel in Polish. Backiel testified that he stated, twice, “I will kill you.”
When Backiel and her attorney reported the threat to the courtroom marshal, the marshal detained the defendant in the courthouse’s holding area. The lead marshal was informed of the incident and called the state police, who arrested the defendant and took him into custody. The state trooper inventoried the defendant’s backpack, which held, among other things, a plastic bag containing a leafy substance and a box of cigarettes housing a plastic tube with a burnt residue at the end. Subsequent testing showed that the plant material and residue on the plastic tube were marijuana. The defendant denied ownership of the items.
I
The defendant first claimed that the court improperly failed to instruct the jury that a “true threat” must not be “mere bluster, exaggeration or something carelessly said in the heat of the moment.” 2 The defendant did not request such an instruction at trial and did not object to the court’s charge, but he now seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 3 We determine that the record is adequate for review and that the claim is of constitutional magnitude, 4 but we conclude that the court’s instructions were proper and, therefore, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 5
In
State
v.
DeLoreto,
265 Conn. 145, 158-59, 827 A.2d 671 (2003), our Supreme Court established the definition and application of the term “true threat” in the context of
Our Supreme Court went on to “distinguish between true threats, which, because of their lack of communicative value, are not protected by the first amendment, and those statements that seek to communicate a belief or idea, such as political hyperbole or a mere joke,
“Imminence, however, is not a requirement under the true threats doctrine. . . . True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. . . . The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. . . . Nor does our breach of the peace statute require that the threat be imminent.
In the present case, that portion of the jury instructions challenged by the defendant is an almost
verbatim
reproduction of the definition of true threat outlined in DeLoreto.
6
DeLoreto
has been cited repeatedly as the primary source for our state’s definition of true threat.
II
The defendant’s second claim is that prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of his constitutional right to
“[I]n analyzing claims of prosecutorial [impropriety], we engage in a two step analytical process. The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Put differently, [impropriety] is [impropriety], regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial; whether that [impropriety] caused or contributed to a due process violation is a separate and distinct question . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 808, 835 A.2d 977 (2003).
“[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments. ... In determining whether such [impropriety] has occurred, the reviewing court must give due deference to the fact that [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . . Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. . . . Moreover, [i]t does not follow . . . that every use of rhetorical
“Or to put it another way while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. ... A prosecutor must draw a careful line. On the one hand, he should be fair; he should not seek to arouse passion or engender prejudice. On the other hand, earnestness or even a stirring eloquence cannot convict him of hitting foul blows.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 744-46, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030,127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006).
In the present case, the prosecutor asked the jury, to “send [a] message to this defendant . . . .” We agree with the state that State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004), is controlling. Our Supreme Court held that although the prosecutor may not argue that the jury should send a message to the community, the prosecutor may argue that the jury should send a message to the defendant. Id., 185-86; see also State v. Griffin, 97 Conn. App. 169, 177-78, 903 A.2d 253 (permissible to argue that the jury should “ ‘make [the defendant] listen’ ”), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 925, 908 A.2d 1088 (2006). Accordingly, we conclude that the use of such comments in this case was not improper. Thus, we need not proceed to the second inquiry, which is whether there was a due process violation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The defendant’s appeal form indicates that he is appealing from the conviction of each of the three criminal charges as well as the trial court’s finding that, in light of these charges, he had violated his previously ordered probation. The defendant’s arguments, however, addressed only the conviction of breach of the peace. Because we affirm the trial court as to those issues argued, it is not necessary for us to assess how a reversal may have affected the conviction of the other charges, or the court’s finding that the defendant violated his probation.
During oral argument before this court, these are the specific words that the defendant identified as missing from the charge.
“ [A] defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if aU of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.
“A claim that the trial court failed to instruct the jury adequately on an essential element of the crime charged necessarily involves the defendant’s due process rights and implicates the fairness of his trial. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flowers, 69 Conn. App. 57, 69, 797 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 929, 798 A.2d 972 (2002).
The state argues that this claim was waived because the defendant approved of the instructions at trial. Because we find that the charge as stated was proper, we decline to address the issue of waiver.
The jury charge in the present case provided, in relevant part: “[True threats] must be more than a mere display of bad manners. [The conduct] must cause or create a risk of causing alarm among members of the public. [True threats] encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual. A serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence toward a particular individual. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out that threat; rather, the prohibition on true threats protects individuals . . . from the fear of violence and from the disruption that such fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Whether a particular statement may be properly considered to be a true threat is governed by an objective standard. Whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates a statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. Moreover, alleged threats or threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction of the listener.”