State v. T.D.State v. T.D.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Rogers
Opinion
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an appeal challenging a trial court’s finding of a violation of probation pursuant to
The following facts and procedural history are relevant. In 1998, the defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to charges of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
On March 9, 2004, the state charged the defendant with violating his probation by, inter alia, committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of
On October 5, 2005, prior to oral argument at the Appellate Court in the violation of probation appeal, the defendant was found guilty, following a jury trial, of failure to register as a sex offender. At oral argument on October 27, 2005, the Appellate Court was notified of this development, and the state argued that the appeal was moot and should be dismissed. Id., 90-91. On December 5, 2005, the trial court in the criminal matter rendered a judgment of conviction, and the defendant subsequently filed an application for waiver of fees, costs and expenses and for appointment of appellate counsel, which tolled the period in which he could file an appeal.5 See
Although neither party has addressed the issue in its brief to this court, we must consider at the outset whether the state is aggrieved by the Appellate Court’s judgment, which ultimately was in the state’s favor, and therefore has standing to contest that judgment. “[T]he right to appeal is purely statutory and is allowed only if the conditions fixed by statute are met. ... In all civil actions a requisite element of appealability is that the party claiming error be aggrieved by the decision of the [Appellate] [C]ourt.” (Citations.omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Selectmen, 234 Conn. 513, 522, 662 A.2d 1281 (1995). Aggrievement implicates both the state’s standing and this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 155-56, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005).
To be aggrieved, a party must have a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation and, further, that interest must be specially and injuriously affected by the decision at issue. See id., 157. Given the latter requirement, “[a]s a general rule, a party that prevails in the [Appellate] [C]ourt is not aggrieved. . . . Moreover, [a] party cannot be aggrieved by a decision that grants the very relief sought. . . . Such a party cannot establish that a specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 158; see also Seymour
Nevertheless, we have recognized that “[a] prevailing party . . . can be aggrieved ... if the relief awarded to that party falls short of the relief sought.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Allison G., supra, 276 Conn. 158; see also Seymour v. Seymour, supra, 262 Conn. 114; 5 Am. Jur. 2d 39, supra, § 243 (“[a] party who prevails at trial, but receives a judgment only partly in his or her favor, or a judgment which ... is less favorable than it should be, may appeal”); annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 705, supra, § 1 [b] (successful party not granted “ ‘full relief ” unless court “adjudicates the controversy in favor of the [successful party] in accordance with the prayer of the successful party”). In the present matter, the state, although it ultimately prevailed, had sought a complete dismissal of the defendant’s appeal rather than an adjudication on the merits. Accordingly, the relief obtained fell short of what was sought. The state, therefore, is aggrieved by the Appellate Court’s judgment. We now turn to the claim raised on appeal.
The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant’s appeal was not moot on the basis of its determination that the holding of Singleton is limited to cases involving convictions following guilty pleas. According to the state, the Appellate Court’s limited reading of Singleton is improper because there is no meaningful distinction between a conviction resulting from a guilty plea and one resulting from a jury trial because both effectively eliminate any controversy in regard to whether a defendant committed the acts forming a basis for the violation of his probation. The state argues further that the Appellate Court’s focus on the fact that, in an appeal from a conviction after a jury trial, a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction, is misplaced. The defendant argues in response that the Appellate Court properly interpreted Singleton. We agree with the state that the Appellate Court’s rationale, as that court broadly stated it, was improper, but nevertheless conclude that the Appellate Court correctly held that the defendant’s appeal was not moot because the applicability of Singleton is limited to cases in which a defendant is not actively pursuing an appeal from the criminal conviction underlying his probation violation.6
We begin with a brief review of our relevant precedents. In State v. Daniels, 248 Conn. 64, 67-68, 726 A.2d 520 (1999), the defendant was found to have violated his probation by breaking into an automobile and, on that basis, his probation was revoked. The defendant appealed from the judgment revoking his probation arguing, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence of a violation. Id., 69. During the pendency of his appeal, the defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,7 to burglary in the third degree in connection with the automobile incident. Id. The state argued that the defendant’s appeal was moot because, given his Alford plea, this court could provide him no practical relief. According to the state, even if the defendant were afforded a new probation violation hearing upon remand, the plea would estop him from denying that he had committed the criminal conduct at issue. Id., 70. We were unpersuaded by the state’s argument, reasoning that at a new hearing, even if a finding of violation of probation was predetermined by the plea, it still was conceivable that a different disposition, i.e., something less than a full revocation of probation, could result. Id., 72-73. In Daniels, therefore, the focus was not on whether a live controversy existed, but rather, on whether practical relief could be granted to the defendant.
We next considered a similar claim in State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). In McElveen, the defendant’s probation was revoked after he was found to have violated it by attempting to rob a food delivery person. Id., 203. The defendant appealed from the judgment revoking his probation, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of a violation. Id. During the pendency of his appeal, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted robbery in the third degree. Id. Consequently, we concluded that the appeal was moot because there no longer existed an actual controversy over whether the defendant had committed the criminal conduct underlying the violation of probation. Id., 217. We explained: “[T]he defendant is seeking review of the trial court’s determination that
Finally, in State v. Singleton, supra, 274 Conn. 429, the defendant was found to have violated his probation on the basis of his arrest for possession of an illegal substance, and his probation was revoked. He appealed from the judgment revoking his probation, claiming there was insufficient evidence of a violation. Id. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and reversed the judgment. Id. On further appeal to this court, however, it became apparent that, subsequent to the defendant having filed his appeal with the Appellate Court, but prior to that court’s judgment of reversal, the defendant had pleaded guilty to possession of illegal drugs with the intent to sell, based on the criminal conduct underlying his probation violation. Id. Relying on our holding in McElveen, we concluded that the defendant’s plea and subsequent conviction had eliminated any live controversy over whether he had engaged in that conduct and, consequently, had deprived the Appellate Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal such that it should have been dismissed. Id., 436. We therefore vacated the Appellate Court’s judgment. Id., 442.
Additionally, we took the opportunity in Singleton to resolve an apparent tension between our holdings in Daniels and McElveen. In response to an argument raised by the defendant, we recognized that those holdings, because they had focused on different aspects of the issue of mootness, were irreconcilable. Id., 438. Consequently, we “overrule[d] the conclusion in Daniels that a subsequent conviction of criminal conduct arising out of the same facts underlying a violation of probation does not render the appeal from the violation of probation moot.” Id. For clarity, we reiterated the holding in McElveen that “[wjhere, subsequent to a finding of violation of probation, a defendant is criminally convicted for the same conduct underlying the violation of probation, his appeal from that judgment of violation of probation is rendered moot because there is no longer any live controversy about whether he engaged in the conduct for which his probation was violated.” Id., 439.
In light of the foregoing decisions, we find untenable the defendant’s assertion that the holding of Singleton was limited to cases in which a probationer, through a guilty plea, has admitted engaging in the criminal conduct underlying his probation violation. First, the plain language of the holding, as we restated it for clarity, is not so restricted; rather, it contemplates the effect of new convictions generally on pending appeals from probation revocations. Furthermore, the defendant in Daniels did not admit his guilt to the criminal charges at issue, but rather, was convicted pursuant to an Alford plea.8 By overruling our determination that this circumstance did not render moot his appeal challenging the finding of a probation violation, we implicitly held that an admission of guilt to the crime underlying the violation is not a decisive factor. To the contrary, it is the fact of a
We also are not persuaded that a conviction based on a guilty plea is distinguishable from a conviction based on a jury verdict because the latter may be overturned on appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence. Although the available grounds for challenge differ, a judgment based on a plea also may be subject to reversal. See, e.g., In re Jason C., 255 Conn. 565, 570, 767 A.2d 710 (2001) (inadequate understanding of possible extension of commitment); State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 122-24, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983) (inadequate understanding of nature of charge); State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7, 9-10, 404 A.2d 871 (1978) (inadequate understanding of possible sentence). Thus, both types of convictions have the potential to be set aside on appeal.
Upon review of our decisions in Daniels, McElveen and Singleton, however, we are convinced that the rule of Singleton was forged within a procedural framework that differs in one vital respect from that of the present case. Specifically, in each of those cases the defendant, after pleading guilty to the crimes that formed the basis for the earlier finding that he had violated his probation, declined to challenge the validity of his guilty plea by way of appeal. Moreover, by the time each defendant’s appeal contesting the finding of violation of probation was argued, the period in which to appeal from the judgment in the underlying criminal matter had long since expired, indicating that no appeal was forthcoming.9 Accordingly, each defendant’s criminal conviction was final and unchallenged, thus making it clear that any controversy over whether he had engaged in the conduct underlying his probation violation unquestionably had concluded and that the conviction was so definite as to establish conclusively that a violation of probation had occurred.
In contrast, in the present matter, the defendant’s appeal challenging the probation violation finding was argued at the Appellate Court less than one month after a jury had found the defendant guilty of the underlying criminal conduct. When the Appellate Court released its decision, it was evident that the defendant was pm-suing an appeal from his conviction for the underlying criminal conduct and, although that appeal was not filed until after the decision’s release, the appeal period had not yet expired.10 See footnote 5 of this
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that a conviction following a jury verdict is indistinguishable from a conviction following a guilty plea or Alford plea for purposes of eliminating any controversy over whether the criminal conduct underlying a violation of probation has occurred. If a defendant has been convicted of criminal conduct, following either a guilty plea, Alford plea or a jury trial, and the defendant does not challenge that conviction by timely appealing it, then the conviction conclusively establishes that the defendant engaged in that criminal conduct. An appeal challenging a finding of violation of probation based on that conduct is, therefore, moot.* 11 When, however, the defendant has pursued a timely appeal from a conviction for criminal conduct and that appeal remains unresolved, there exists alive controversy over whether the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, and an appeal challenging a finding of violation of probation stemming from that conduct is not moot. Because this case presented the latter scenario, the Appellate Court properly refused to dismiss the defendant’s appeal.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
We granted certification limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly decline to dismiss the defendant’s appeal from his revocation of probation and ensuing incarceration as moot?” State v. [T.D.], 277 Conn. 916, 895 A.2d 793 (2006). We denied the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, pertaining to that court’s resolution of his evidentiary claim. State v. [T.D.], 277 Conn. 916, 895 A.2d 792 (2006).
It is well established that we may sustain a judgment on an alternate ground having support in the record. DeMilo & Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 233 Conn. 281, 295, 659 A.2d 162 (1995). “The . . . judgment will be affirmed, though based on erroneous grounds, if the same result is required by law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court also found that the defendant had failed to comply with a special condition of his probation that required him to complete sex offender treatment successfully.
The defendant also claimed that certain evidence was admitted improperly. State v. [T.D.], supra, 93 Conn. App. 92-93. The defendant did not raise any claims relating to the dispositional phase of his probation revocation. Compare State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 944 A.2d 276 (2008).
On January 11, 2006, the trial court granted the defendant’s application for waiver of fees, costs and expenses. Thereafter, the defendant timely appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
The state also claims that principles of collateral estoppel underpinned our decision in Singleton, and it argues that application of those principles renders the defendant’s appeal moot. As the state acknowledges, Singleton did not rely explicitly on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and we disagree that the doctrine controlled the outcome of that case. Unlike mootness, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 686-87, 490 A.2d 509 (1985); Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 762-63 n.7, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Even when applicable, therefore, collateral estoppel does not mandate dismissal of a case. Accordingly, the state’s argument is misplaced.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
When a defendant enters a plea pursuant to the Alford doctrine, he “does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.” State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 169 n.3, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985).
It is unclear whether the Appellate Court was informed that the defendant was pursuing an appeal from his criminal conviction. His pending application for waiver of fees, costs and expenses and for appointment of appellate counsel, however, was a proper subject of judicial notice. See State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 101, 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491, 167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007); Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 579 n.17, 877 A.2d 761 (2005).
Relatedly, if the defendant appeals from his criminal conviction and, at the time the probation violation appeal is decided, the appeal from the criminal conviction has concluded, resulting in an affirmance of the conviction, then the probation violation appeal is moot.