1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 509 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1962
The defendant was convicted in a trial to the court of violating the zoning ordinance of the city of New Britain in respect to the number of motor vehicles on one lot and of operating a motor vehicle junk yard contrary to the restrictions contained in this ordinance, in violation of § 21-26 of the General Statutes. He has assigned error in the refusal of the court to make requested corrections in the finding, in the conclusions of the court as not being supported by the subordinate facts, in the rendition of the judgment in that it was not supported by the conclusions reached by the court, and
The defendant is the owner of premises known as 269 Oak Street, New Britain, comprising lot 11, fronting on Oak Street, and lot 17, facing Dudley Street, a parallel street. The lots have a common boundary; each has a frontage of 50 feet and, taken together, they have a depth of about 255 feet between the two streets. For many years prior to September 16, 1925, and until he sold the premises to the defendant in 1952, Jacob Flemke operated a used-car business and repair garage on these lots. On September 16, 1925, the New Britain zoning ordinance was adopted, and these premises were placed in a residence C zone. Prior to September 16, 1925, and until it was destroyed by fire in 1951, a wooden garage structure stood on the premises, fronting on Oak Street. On February 23, 1951, the common council of New Britain, on recommendation of the board of adjustment of the city, granted Flemke an exception to permit him to construct a cinder-block, steel and frame garage to replace the frame structure, to be located partly on the Oak Street lot but extending over three feet onto the Dudley Street lot. The building faces on Oak Street and has a garage door on the Dudley Street side. The zoning ordinance permitted, in a residence C district, not more than seven motor vehicles on any one lot within twelve feet of any party lot line. In
As to the use of the Dudley Street lot for the parking of cars prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance, the evidence was conflicting and somewhat vague, but the court could have reasonably found, as it did, that fewer than seven cars were parked thereon. There is no question that, since the premises were used prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance for a used-car and repair business, their present use in such a business is a nonconforming use. The sole question on the first count is whether the increased use of the Dudley Street lot is violative of the zoning ordinance.
Nonconforming uses are exceptions to the general principle of zoning that certain uses should be confined to certain localities, and it is the policy of the law not to extend them but to reduce them to conformity as completely and as speedily as possible with due regard to the interest of the parties. Salerni v. Scheuy, 140 Conn. 566, 570; Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 23. But this principle does not apply to an increase in the amount of use; the use may be increased in extent by natural expansion and growth. Salerni v. Scheuy, supra, 571; Guilford v. Landon, 146 Conn. 178, 182; Nyburg v. Solmson, 205 Md. 150, 161; Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corporation, 364 Pa. 616, 621. “Once it . . . [has been] determined . . . that a nonconforming use existed, natural development and growth cannot be paralyzed by an overly-technieal appraisement of the existing use. An
Prom the entire evidence, including the exhibits, it is clear to us that the increased use of the Dudley Street lot for the parking of cars was not an extension of the defendant’s used-car and repair business but was an intensification of that nonconforming use and as such was not violative of the New Britain zoning ordinance.
Motor vehicle junk yards are subject to strict regulation and licensing under the provisions of chapter 406 of the General Statutes. A municipality may create restricted districts within which motor vehicle junk yards may not be permitted. §21-23. A certificate of approval of the location for the establishment, operation or maintenance of such
The defendant was licensed by the commissioner of motor vehicles to operate a used car and repair business on the premises involved in the instant case. In that business, he accepted used ears as trade-ins on purchases of other used cars. Also, cars which had been in accidents were brought in for repairs. Some of these latter cars had remained on the premises, including the Dudley Street lot, for two or three years pending the disposition of accident claims. Some of the cars parked on the Dudley Street lot had no registration plates on them, and some were in no condition to be operated on the highway. The defendant did not buy cars for junk or cut up cars for junk. He did remove bumpers from cars and had a pile of them which he kept to be traded in for replacements of new bumpers, and likewise he had a few fenders. When he had enough fenders and wrecks for a load, he had the junkman take them away or took them away himself; this occurred about two or three times a year. Some two and one-half years prior to November, 1961, a senior motor vehicle inspector of the state of Connecticut in the regular course of his duties inspected the premises. He testified that he saw some fifteen cars on the Dudley Street lot, some
The regulation of motor vehicle junk yards is a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety and welfare. State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 463. In that case, the defendant bought worn-out and broken automobiles, dismantled them, resold some of the parts and broke up others, using gasoline and acetylene gas in the process. The regulation of a business must not be unreasonably in excess of what is necessary to accomplish the purpose in view. State v. Porter, 94 Conn. 639, 645. The licensing of junk dealers is for the purpose of protecting the public against the crime of larceny and of providing for the detection of stolen articles. Clapp v. Ulbrich, 140 Conn. 637, 641.
The defendant was lawfully engaged in the business of repairing and selling used cars, and in the course thereof he naturally had on his premises many used cars in various degrees of repair or disrepair. Although a strict interpretation of the statute might lead to the conclusion reached by the trial court, it is clear to us that it was not the intention of the legislature to penalize the operation of a business such as that of the defendant. He did not cut up or buy cars for junk and did not dismantle them and use the parts in other cars, but did cause to be
We take note that the state did not file a brief in this case. We do not therefore have the benefit of a detailed statement of the arguments and points of law in support of its position. There having been no reporter on the argument of the appeal, our notes of the appellee’s argument are of necessity brief and incomplete. “As far as the claims of counsel on one side or the other and the arguments which they advance in support of those claims are concerned, the printed briefs are largely the basis upon which the judge works.” Maltbie, Conn. App.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment that the defendant is not guilty and ordering that he be discharged.