State v. SweetingState v. Sweeting
Law Office of Angela Glaser and Angela Glaser, for Defendant-Appellee.
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} On February 1, 2000, in Michigan, defendant-appellee Deionandrea Sweeting was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual misconduct, fourth-degree misdemeanors. He served three years in prison and was required under Michigan law to register as a sex offender quarterly for 25 years. He moved to Ohio in 2006. The Hamilton County Sheriff‘s Office classified Sweeting as a sexually-oriented offender under Ohio‘s version of Megan‘s Law. After Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh Act, the Hamilton County sheriff notified Sweeting that he was classified as a Tier III sex offender and lifetime registrant.
{¶2} Sweeting filed a petition to contest reclassification in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in the case numbered SP-0800428. He also filed in that case a motion to terminate his registration requirement on the basis that he had “completed the 10 year registration, and finish[ed] the Sex Offender Program.” Ultimately, on February 7, 2011, the trial court in the case numbered SP-0800428 entered an order determining that Sweeting was classified as a sexually-oriented offender under Ohio‘s version of Megan‘s Law, which required him to register annually for ten years. The order noted that Sweeting had been released from prison in Michigan on August 2, 2003, “triggering the period of registration for the underlying charges of his reporting requirement.” The trial court went on in its order to find that Sweeting had been incarcerated various times in Ohio, which tolled the reporting requirement pursuant to former
{¶3} On February 3, 2017, in the present case, Sweeting was indicted for failing to provide periodic verification of his current address on or about December
{¶4} The state‘s first assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in granting Sweeting‘s motion to dismiss the indictment. The state argues that Sweeting already sought and obtained out-of-state registration credit in the case numbered SP-0800428, and that the trial court in that case correctly applied former
{¶5} In the case numbered SP-0800428, Sweeting filed a petition for reclassification under former
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “In our jurisprudence, there is a firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are meant to be just that—final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been ‘actually and necessarily determined in a prior action.‘” Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 Ohio St.3d 283, 2004-Ohio-2947, 809 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 10, citing Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989), quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
{¶7} The court‘s determinations as to the amount of registration credit to which Sweeting was entitled and the length of his remaining reporting period were actually litigated and determined in the case numbered SP-0800428 and were valid and necessary parts of the court‘s final judgment in that case. Therefore, Sweeting is precluded by collateral estoppel from challenging them in the present case.
{¶8} Because the court in the case numbered SP-0800428 ordered that Sweeting‘s registration period runs “until at least May 7, 2017,” the trial court in the present case erred in dismissing the indictment, which alleged that Sweeting had failed to verify his current address in December of 2016. The first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶9} The state‘s second assignment of error alleges, “The trial court erred to the extent that its ‘entry denying motion for credit of time and terminate registration’ indicates that the motion is granted.” The court‘s order states in the caption that the motion is denied, but states in the body that it is granted. The record shows that the
{¶10} In the appeal numbered C-170513, the judgment of the trial court dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with law and this opinion. The appeal numbered C-170512 is dismissed. We point out that the entry appealed from in C-170512 contains a clerical error in the body that should be corrected by the trial court.
Judgment accordingly.
MOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.