30 Conn. App. 550 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The defendant was convicted, after a trial by jury, of possession of less than four ounces of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (c)
From a kitchen cabinet, the officers seized a plastic bag containing approximately 1.1 ounces of marihuana. In the den, they found a business card with prices of drugs printed on the back. The officers found a triple beam Ohaus scale, three guns and various ammunition, and a total of $12,350 in two separate dresser drawers in a downstairs bedroom. From the top of a hutch in the dining room, they seized a loaded nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol. The officers found cardboard boxes filled with plastic bags of different sizes in various locations throughout the house. In an upstairs bedroom, $7660 was found in a dresser drawer. They searched the defendant’s purse and seized a passbook for a joint savings account with her father and $940. At about 10 p.m., one of the officers left the defendant’s house to secure a second warrant for the seizure of financial records. This warrant is the subject of this
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the financial records warrant. That warrant provided as follows: “All financial records, including, but not limited to cancelled checks, bank statements, bank books, income tax reports, receipts for purchases, answering machines and tapes, telephone pager records, and all records, memos, passports, telephone records, income records, and other records used as means and instrumentalities of the crimes of possession of more than one kilogram of marijuana with intent to sell, operating a drug factory, and possession of more than four ounces of marijuana.” The defendant alleges that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of our state constitution.
A high degree of scrutiny is required when reviewing the particularity requirement of search warrants for documents. The Supreme Court recognized this in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976), when it stated that “[i]n searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among
The warrant and accompanying affidavit in this case were sufficiently particular to guard against this danger. The affidavit specifically described the results of the initial search and described many of the items found, relating to the possession and sale of drugs, in the course of that search. It also described how, in the affiants’ knowledge and experience, certain documents are evidence of an attempt to secrete and launder proceeds from these activities, and the fact that the affiants had specifically observed “numerous records which are pertinent to identifying assets and other property gained from this illegal activity.”
Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the language including but not limited to is not overbroad when viewed in light of the totality of the case. First, the language of the warrant impliedly limited the seizure of records similar to those specifically outlined in the warrant and the affidavit. Second, the seizure of records was specifically limited, by the language and other records used as means and instrumentalities of the crimes, to records relating to the crimes listed in the warrant and affidavit. The warrant did not allow an unrestrained rummaging for evidence of any crime. It effectively instructed the officers to seize only those items indicating activity associated with the illegal possession and distribution of marihuana. See United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Vanichromanee, 742 F.2d 340, 347 (7th
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony of the state’s expert witness concerning the relationship between the evidence seized in this case and drug trafficking. The defendant argues that the probative value of the testimony of the police officer was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We disagree.
“A trial court has broad discretion in its rulings on the relevance of evidence and in its determination of whether the probative value of evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Reversal is required only when there is an abuse of discretion or when an injustice has been done.” State v. Baskins, 12 Conn. App. 313, 318, 530 A.2d 663, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 811, 532 A.2d 586 (1987). The test for the admissibility of expert testimony is “whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such knowledge or experience any aid to the court or the jury in determining the question at issue. . . . Generally, expert testimony may be admitted if the witness has a special skill or knowledge, beyond the ken of the average juror, that, as properly applied, would be helpful to the determination of an ultimate issue.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 166, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985). The trial court has broad discretion in applying these concepts and in ruling on the admissibility of expert opinions. State v. Rodgers, 207 Conn. 646, 651, 542 A.2d 1136 (1988); State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 476, 507 A.2d 1387 (1986). “The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the
In State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 44-45, 540 A.2d 42 (1988), our Supreme Court noted: “Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, expert testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The subject of the expert testimony here, i.e., the clandestine manner in which drugs are bought and sold, is unlikely to be within the knowledge of the average layman. ... We believe that a trial court should have broad discretion in the matter of the admission of expert testimony concerning the sale of illicit drugs. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in allowing the testimony of the state’s expert.
Ill
Finally, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that led to her conviction of conspiracy to distribute marihuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 21a-277 (b). She argues that the evidence presented by the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she and a coconspirator had the intent to agree to commit a crime. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are required to resolve this claim. The defendant testified that she met Uriah Anthony Walker in August, 1989.
When a claim on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake a two part task. “We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the [jury’s verdict] .... We then decide whether, on the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the . . . jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 26 Conn. App. 433, 435, 602 A.2d 36, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 916, 603 A.2d 747 (1992).
“To establish the crime of conspiracy under § 53a-48 of the General Statutes, it must be shown that an agreement was made between two or more persons to engage in conduct constituting a crime and that the agreement was followed by an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by any one of the conspirators. The state must also show intent on the part of the accused that conduct constituting a crime be performed. . . . Further, the state also must show that the conspirators intended to agree and that they intended to commit the elements of the underlying offense. . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Channer, 28 Conn. App. 161, 168, 612 A.2d 95, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 921, 614 A.2d 826 (1992). “To prove the offense of conspiracy to [distribute] narcotics, the state must prove two distinct elements of intent: that the conspirators intended to agree; and that they intended to [distribute] narcotics to another per
It is well established that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that there was an agreement because conspiracies, by their very nature, are formed in secret and only rarely can be proved by other than circumstantial evidence. State v. Holmes, 160 Conn. 140, 150, 274 A.2d 153 (1970); see State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 299, 513 A.2d 1226 (1986) (existence of a formal agreement between the conspirators need not be proved because only in rare instances can a conspiracy be established by proof of an express agreement).
Construing the evidence in light of sustaining the jury’s verdict, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant conspired with Walker to distribute marihuana. The marihuana operation pervaded the entire residence. The plastic bags used to distribute the drugs were found throughout the house. The defendant acknowledged that she knew that the distribution operation was in her house. She admitted purchasing large quantities of plastic bags from her employer — bags that were used as part of the operation. She also admitted that she knew that the money that Walker gave her was proceeds from the distribution operation. All of this evidence supports a finding that the defendant and Walker agreed to operate a drug distribution enterprise, and that she intended to distribute the drugs to other people.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 21a-279 (c) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who possesses ... or has under his control less than four ounces of a cannabis-type substance, except as authorized in this chapter, for a first offense, may be fined not more than one thousand dollars or be imprisoned not more than one year, or be both fined and imprisoned; and for a subsequent offense, may be fined not more than three thousand dollars or be imprisoned not more than five years, or be both fined and imprisoned.”
General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.”
General Statutes § 21a-277 (b) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who . . . distributes, sells . . . [or] dispenses . . . any controlled substance . . . except as authorized in this chapter, may, for the first offense, be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars or be imprisoned not more than seven years or be both fined and imprisoned; and, for each subsequent offense, may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars or be imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or be both fined and imprisoned.”
This task force is comprised of members of municipal enforcement agencies of Avon, Simsbury, Bloomfield and Windsor.
The defendant failed to brief the state constitutional issue separately. This court may, but need not, independently undertake to engage in such an analysis where the issue has not been briefed. Here, we choose not to consider this issue. State v. Jacobs, 30 Conn. App. 340, 342 n.1, 620 A.2d 198 (1993); State v. Johnson, 28 Conn. App. 708, 713, 613 A.2d 1344, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 911, 617 A.2d 168 (1992).
Walker was named in the information as a coconspirator. It is believed that he fled the Hartford area sometime around the middle of November, 1990. The FBI was searching for him at the time of trial.