This appeal follows defendant’s conviction on two counts of assault without intent to inflict serious injury but causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code §§ 708.1, 708.2(2) (1987). In a prior proceeding, defendant was charged with two сounts of assault with intent to inflict serious injury. The trial court submitted assault without intеnt to inflict serious injury, but causing bodily injury, to the jury as a lesser included offense. The jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense.
This court, on Mаrch 23, 1988, reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded his case to the district court, on the ground the offense of assault causing bоdily injury was not a proper lesser offense of assault with intent to inflict serious injury, because it did not meet the legal test for inclusion.
State v. Swanson,
The writ of procedendo issued on June 6, 1988. Ninety-two days later, on September 6, 1988, the State filed a trial information charging defendant with the two counts of assault without intent to inflict serious injury but causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Cоde §§ 708.1, 708.2(2) (1989), the charges under which defendant was convicted. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the trial information, contending he was denied а speedy trial and the charge should be dismissed pursuant to Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(2)(b), which provides:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has nоt waived his or her right to a speedy trial he or she must be brought to trial within ninеty days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissеd unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
Defendant contends the date the proce-dendo issued was the date from whiсh the ninety days should be measured. The trial court denied this motion. Defеndant contends this was error. He raises no other issues on appeal.
Our review is to correct errors at law. We will affirm the trial сourt if any basis for doing so appears on the record.
See State v. Schrier,
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Defеndant contends his speedy trial time should have commenced whеn proce-dendo issued. Generally, speedy trial time under Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(2)(b) commences when the trial information is filed, because at thаt time the trial court has jurisdiction of the case.
See State v. Taggart,
Defendant relies on this authority to support his proposition his speedy trial time should have сommenced when proce-dendo issued. This reliance is misplaced. These cases involved situations in which action in the appellate or trial court did not terminate the case. Rather, the charge remained pending for further proceedings. In State v. Swanson, this court reversed. We did not remand. There was no retention of jurisdiction. When the procedendo issued, there was no further jurisdiction on the charge. Defendant, therefore, was not called to answer until the information was filed. It was only then that time under Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(2)(b) began to run.
We affirm the trial court.
AFFIRMED.