46 W. Va. 128 | W. Va. | 1899
Lead Opinion
This was a suit in chancery, brought in the name of the State, under the provisions of chapter 105 of the Code, as amended and re-enacted by the act of February 23, 1893, against Thomas B. Swann and others, in the circuit court of Kanawha County, having for its object the sale of a tract of land containing seven hundred acres, more or less, known as the “Valcouion Tract,” situated on Kanawha river below the mouth of Coal river, Jefferson district; be ing the same land which was conveyed to said T. B. Swann by J. C. Brown and wife by deed dated November 30, 1871, which land was described as containing seven hundred to eight hundred acres, and was entered on the land book and •charged to said Swann for the year 1873 as seven hundred and.eighty-four and one-fourth acres, gradually reduced by the sale of lots, etc., until, in 1873, it was entered on the land books at seven hundred and forty-two acres.
The bill alleges that said Swann neglected and failed to have said land charged with taxes for the years 1882,1883,. 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890 and 1891, as it was his duty to do, and that, by reason of such neglect and failure to have said land entered upon the land book for five successive years, the said tract became and was thereby forfeited to the State of West Virginia, and liable tobe sold
The appellant claims that the circuit court erred in rejecting his plea which avers that section 39 of chapter 31 of the Code is unwarranted and not authorized by Art. XIII. of the Constitution of West Virginia, which does not give the Legislature the power to forfeit or confiscate a tract of land of less than one thousand acres, and the tract now proceeded against is not over seven hundred or eight hundred acres, and said act is in direct conflict with Art. XIII, Sec. 10., of the Constitution, and forfeits his land without any pretense of judicial inquiry or judicial proceeding, and is obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as well as Art. I. Sec. 10, of the same. Some of the questions raised by this plea were presented to this Court in the case recently decided of State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, (32 S. E. 283), in which it was held that “that clause of Sec. 6, Art. XIII. of the State Constitution, forféiting land for the failure of the owner to enter it for taxation is not in violation of that clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution restraining states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;” also that “due process of law does not always require judicial hearing. It does in matters of purely j udicial nature, but not in matters of taxation, or matters purely administrative. ”
It appears that the appellant T. B. Swann was, on the
In the case of State v. Dent, supra, Judge GreeN quotes approvingly from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations ,as follows: “Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the powers apportioned to other departments of the government, being frima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the Constitution, and the case shown to come within them.” In Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, 4th point of syllabus, this Court held that: “While the legislature is governed by the spirit of the Constitution, the courts cannot declare an act of the legislature invalid, unless its invalidity is placed beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative action, and the act be sustained. The courts must be guided by the express words of the constitution, and not by its supposed spirit. Whenever an act of legislature can be so construed as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, and give it force of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts.” On this point, Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 204, states the law thus: “Nor are the courts at
Now, at the time this constitutional provision was adopted, in 1872, the act of March 4, 1869, was in force, which provided generally that, “when any person owning real estate has not, or shall not have for five successive years been charged on such books with such taxes on such real estate, the same and all the title, right and interest of the owner, legal and equitable, thereto shall without any proceeding be absolutely forfeited to and vested in this State.” In April, 1873, however, the Legislature thought it necessarv to provide for the forfeiture of tracts of land containing less than one thousand acres, in the same' section, for nonentry on the land for five successive years, and it is clear that, in enacting the latter provision, it did not do anything in variance with the express words of the Constitution.
It is claimed by counsel for the appellant that the statutes providing for the forfeiture of lands for nonentry upon the books are unconstitutional, for the reason that they deprive the party of his property without due process of law. Counsel for the State, however, have collated the statutes in reference to the collection of taxes on real estate, and shown that as early as 1803 an act was passed in Virginia providing that, “when the taxes upon any tract or survey of land shall have remained unpaid for two years, such tract or .survey of land should be forfeited to the commonwealth,” etc., which act was amended and reenacted in 1807, 1809, and 1810; the last-named statute forfeiting the land for failure 'for eighteen months after the passage of the act, and appointing the high sheriff, the
The appellant claims that he made application to Sin-nett, the assessor in 1883, to place this land on the land books; but Mr. Sinnett, in his deposition, states that he has no recollection of the appellant telling him to put these lands on the assessor’s books, but his Recollection is that said land was not on the land books in 1882, and the auditor directed him where he found lands off the land books to make a separate list of them. But the appellant certainly knew that these lands were not on the land books, for the reason that no tax tickets came out against him for them, and he allowed them to remain off the books year after year, without making any effort to have them so entered for nine or ten years, and when this proceeding is instituted, to sell the land as forfeited, seeks to shelter himself under the claim that nine or ten years before he had asked the assessor to enter the lands upon the land books. If parties owning land could in this way shirk the responsibility of contributing to the state revenue and still retain their lands, many valuable tracts would be found missing from the land books.
The appellant also assigns as error that the decree directing the sale of this land did not require the commissioner appointed to make the sale to give bond before proceeding to make the sale as required by statute. In this, however he is mistaken, as the decree expressly requires the special commissioner to give a bond, before the clerk of the court with approved security, in the penalty of five
Dissenting Opinion
{dissenting):
I think that all acts since the Constitution of 1872, forfeiting tracts less than one thousand acres for nonentry are unconstitutional, for reasons given in Industrial Co. v. Schultz, 43, W. Va. 470, (27 S. E. 255). At its adoption the act of 1869 forfeited such tracts for past and future omission. Did it not repeal that act so that no forfeiture of those tracts could take place under it in future, and prohibit new acts doing so? If that act was repealed by it, how could a new act be any more valid?
Afirmed.