2006 Ohio 2692 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
{¶ 3} On August 26, 2005, Swan filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the police executed an unwarranted and unreasonable search of his person and his residence. The State did not file a brief in opposition to Swan's motion.
{¶ 4} On September 13, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and subsequently granted Swan's motion. Based on the testimony of Officer Crockett of the Akron Police Department, the trial court made the following findings of fact. Officer Crockett went to Swan's residence to execute an arrest warrant for Swan. When he arrived at the house it was dark outside and he observed that no lights were on inside the house; it was determined that Swan was not home. Officer Crockett returned the following night and he noticed the front door to the house was "cracked open an inch and one-half" and the lights were on throughout the house. Officer Crockett knocked on the door several times, but no one answered. "Officer Crockett testified that he entered the premises because he was armed with a felony warrant for [Swan] not because of any suspected emergency situation." Once in the home, he detected a strong chemical smell and while in the house he observed "in plain view" drug paraphernalia consistent with the manufacturing of methamphetamine. During the remainder of his search for Swan, Officer Crockett observed other items associated with manufacturing methamphetamine and the chemical odor grew stronger.
{¶ 5} The trial court continued its statement of the facts, finding the following. Swan was found sleeping in one of the bedrooms and was arrested on the arrest warrant. Swan would not provide consent for the police to search his residence, but he said his father, the owner of the home, could enter the residence. Swan's father searched the home and exited with a trash bag with items consistent with manufacturing methamphetamine. Officer Crockett denied that he either encouraged or told Swan's father to search the house. Officer Crockett cited the items he observed while looking for Swan in the house, the odor he detected, and the item he observed in the trash bag in his affidavit for the search warrant of Swan's residence. The trial court also found that no working methamphetamine lab was located at the residence.
{¶ 6} The State has appealed the trial court's ruling suppressing the evidence observed and eventually seized by Officer Crockett. The State has asserted one assignment of error.
{¶ 7} In its sole assignment of error, the State has argued that the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence observed by the Akron Police Department ("APD"). Specifically, the State has argued that the trial court erred in suppressing evidence observed by the APD when they searched for Swan in his residence. We agree.
{¶ 8} An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long (1998),
{¶ 9} The
{¶ 10} For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the
{¶ 11} In Payton v. New York the United States Supreme Court was presented with a New York state statute that allowed the police to enter a private residence without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York (1980),
{¶ 12} The year after it issued Payton, the United State's Supreme Court revisited the issue of utilizing arrest warrants to enter a home. In Steagald v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed "whether, under the
{¶ 13} The Steagald Court found that the police can only do what the warrant authorized, which was arrest Lyons, not enter and search a third party's home for a possible guest. Id. at 213. The Court quoted Payton and found that while an arrest warrant conveys to the police the authority to enter the arrestee's residence to search for him, it does not give the police the power to search every house the arrestee may be visiting. Id. at 215. The Court noted that such power could be greatly abused by the police and was not intended by the drafters of the
{¶ 14} This Court applied Payton in Akron v. Lough and found that the police had the authority to enter the residence at issue. Akron v. Lough, 9th Dist. No. 21547,
{¶ 15} In the instant matter, there was an active arrest warrant for Swan and the police knew where he lived. The first night the police attempted to effectuate the arrest warrant they arrived at Swan's residence and no lights were on; they determined he was not home. They returned the following night and the lights were on throughout the house. The officers also noticed the front door was slightly cracked open. They knocked on the door and received no response. The officers then entered the house and proceeded to look for Swan, whom they later found asleep in his bed.
{¶ 16} We find that pursuant to Payton, Steagald, andLough, supra, the police had the authority to enter Swan's residence to arrest him. Swan had an active arrest warrant, the police went to his residence, and they believed he was home. When they received no response from Swan, still believing that he was home, they entered his residence to arrest him. Pursuant toPayton, the officers in this case had the "authority to enter [Swan's] dwelling." Payton,
{¶ 17} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in granting Swan's motion to suppress. The State's sole assignment of error has merit.
Judgement reversed and cause remanded.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
Slaby, P.J. Carr, J. Concur.